DURAB PATEL, J.-The dispute in these four Letters Patent Appeals relates to a property in Garden East, Karachi. The property is owned by the appellant and consists of four flats which have been rented to the respondents in these four appeals at Rs. 45) p.m. Plus water and conservancy charges. The asses--sing authority under the West Pakistan Immovable Property Tax Act has assessed the tent of thele fiats at R s. 450 p.m. And fpr the year 1st July 1963 to 30th June 1964 it levied a property tax on these flats at 10 % of the letting valud. The result was that the property tax payable in respect of each of these four fiats was increased by Rs. 20.25 p.m. From 1-7-1963. And as the appellant believed he was entitled to recover the entire increase from his tenants, he filed four applications under section 9 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereafter called the said Ordinance) against the four respondents in these four Letters Patent Appeals for the Recovery of the said amount of Rs. 20.25 p.m. From each of them. The respondents contested these applications which were heard together by the Rent Con--troller and 1st Civil Judge, First Class, Karachi, who by his order dated 30th July 1965 held that the appellant was only entitled to recover from the respondent half the amount of the additional tax payable by him. The appellant then filed four appeals against this order in the West Pakistan High Court and as all these appeals were dismi-ised in limine by orders dated 4.10- 1965, he filed Letters Patent Appeals against the summary dismissal of his appeals, and these Letters Patent Appeals have now come up for hearing before us. As they all involve the same questions of law and facts, they have been herd together and will be disposed of by this judgment.
2. As the appeals turn on the construction of section 9 of the said Ordinance, it will be convenient to quote it. This section, in so far as it is relevant, reads as follows: "9. Increase of rent on account of payment of rate etc. Of local authority, but rent not to be increased on account of payment of other taxes, etc.-(I) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Ordinance, a landlord shall, subject to the approval of the Controller, be entitled to increase the rent of a building or rented land if after the com--mencement of the Ordinance a fresh rate, cess or tax is levied in respect of the building or rented land by Government or any local authority, or if there is an increase in the amount of such a rate, cess or tax being levied at the commencement of this Ordinance: Provided that the increase in rent shall not exceed one- half of the amount of any such rate, cess or tax or the amount of the increase in such rate, cess or tax, as the case may be. .
The section deals with two contingencies the imposition of rates, cesses and taxes which were not in force when the said Ordinance was promulgated, and increme in rates, cesses and taxes which were in force when the said Ordinance was promul--gated. The first part of the proviso to the subsection deals with a the first contingency, whilst the second part, beginning with the word "or" after the words "rate, cess or tax" deals with the second contingency, and, as in the present case, the appellant, seeks the reimbursement of an increase in taxation which was in force when the said Ordinance became applicable to Karachi, the question for determination in these appeals is the proper construction of the second part of the proviso.
3. There is no ambiguity about the first part of the proviso, as the landlord's right is expressly limited to recovery of one-half of the amount of any new fiscal burden imposed on him. But the language of the second part of the proviso is different; the! Words "one-half of", which occur in the first part of the proviso, have been omitted after the word "or". As there is not even a A qualifying preposition such as "of" between the word "or" and the words "the amount of the increase in such rate . . . ." in my humble opinion, the intention of the Legislature is very clear, that the landlord should be entitled to full reimbursement of any increase in the existing fiscal burden. However, even if I am wrong, at the highest, there is an ambiguity in the statute, and in order to construe that ambiguity, it is necessary to examine the history of the statute.
4. As the provisions of section 9 of the said Ordinance have been reproduced almost verbatim from the corresponding provi--sions of the earlier Punjab Rent Restriction Acts, it is necessary to refer to those statutes, and it will be convenient to begin with an examination of the Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as this was the first statute after Independence. Like the pre--amble to the said Ordinance, the preamble to this 1949-Act stated that the statute was enacted "to restrict the increase of rent . . . ." and "the eviction of tenants". The statute then proceeded to define "fair rent", which was to be fixed by the Controller on the basis of rents prevailing on 1st January 1939, and the rental value of buildings as shown in the Property Tax Registers of the local authorities. Section 5 of the Act prohibited the recovery of rent in excess of the fair rent, except when the land--lord had carried out repairs or made improvements in the property. However, section 9 of the Act entitled the landlord to recover from the tenants all increases in rates, cesses and taxes. The heading and the substantive part of subsection (1) of this section of the 1949-Act was identical to that of section 9 of the said Ordinance which I have quoted. But the proviso to sub--section (1) read as follows: "Provided that the increase in rent shall not exceed the amount of any such rate. Cess or tax or the amount of the increase in such rate, cess or tax, as the case may be."
There is no ambiguity in this proviso, which entitled the landlord to full reimbursement from the tenant for any increase in the fiscal burden, and I may further observe here that the difference between this proviso and the proviso to section 9 of the said Ordinance was the omission of the words "one-half of" between the words "shall not exceed" and the words "the amount of any such rate . . . . " in the first part of the proviso.
5. The next change in the rent control legislation of the Punjab, which Is relevant to these appeals, was contained in the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1956. Although the preamble to this Ordinance was identical to that of the 1949 statute, the Ordinance permitted landlords an increase of 20 % over the rents prevailing on 1st January 1939, and it further directed the Controller, whilst fixing the fair rent, to 'take into consideration the rise in the cost of construction and of the repairing charges as well as the imposition of new taxes, since the 1st of January 1939."
Despite this express provision with regard to the imposition of new taxes, section 9 of the Ordinance also entitled landlords to an increase of rent on account of increases in rates, ceases and taxes, and as.a matter of fact the provisions of this section were identical to those of section 9 of the 1949-Act. The resulting situation was perhaps anomalous or at least not free from ambiguity, because the pro--visions of section 9 overlapped with the express direction to the--Controller that fair rent could be revised on account of imposi--tion of taxes. However, the Ordinance expired in due course, and on its expiry the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957 was promulgated.
This Act introduced further changes. Thus the base year for fixing fair rent by the Controller was altered from 1st January 1939 to 1st January 1950, for houses. Built before that date, and in the case of buildings constructed after 1st January 1950, the fair rent was to be determined on the basis of the rents at which such buildings had been first let out and the rents of similar accommodation fn similar circumstances.. The express provision in the 1956-Ordinance that fair rent should, take into account any increase In taxes was retained under the Act, and further, as under the Ordinance, section 9 of this Act dealt with the landlord's rights for an increase of rent on account. Of increases in local rates and taxes. However, the anomaly in the Ordinance, to which I have referred, was removed by an alteration of the proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 of this. Act. The proviso to subsection (1) of section 9 of the Act read. As follows: "Provided that the increase in rent shall not exceed the one half of the amount of any such rate, cess or tax or the amount. Of the increase in such rate, cess or tax as the case may be."
The substantive part of the section was the same as In the' Ordinance and in the 1949-Statute, and the result of the alteration in the proviso was that the landlord's right to recover from his tenants increases in local rates and taxes was limited to one--half of the amount paid by him when the rates, cesses and taxes levied were fresh rates cesses and taxes. In the context of the history of this section, it is clear beyond any doubt that the landlord remained entitled to recover from his tenants the full B amount of any increase in existing rates, cesses and taxes. Now, as the provisions of section 9 of the said Ordinance are a verbatim reproduction of section 9 of this Act of 1957, it follows that section 9 of the said Ordinance has to be construed in the same manner, and this fully supports the claims of the appellants.
6. I must however point out here that the said Ordinance came into force in Karachi on 1-7-1963, and as the pattern of rent control legislation in Karachi before this date was different from the rent control legislation in the Punjab and the provisions of the said Ordinance, the question which arises for consideration is whether this difference affects in any way the conclusion reached by me, on the basis of the Punjab Acts, that a landlord is entitled to recover from his tenant the full amount of any increase in, existing rates, ccsses and taxes. I will briefly refer here to the salient features of the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947 and of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953.
Under both these statutes, the landlord seas only entitled to charge fair rent which was to be determined by the Rent Controller. The fair rent of residential premises under the Sind Rent Restriction Act, which remained in force in Karachi until 1953, was the rent prevailing on 1-12-1941 and the fair rent of non-residential premises was the rent prevailing on 1-12-1942. The Act also contains express provision entitling landlords to recover from tenants all increases in municipal rates, cesses or taxes, after the date on the basis of the fair rent was to be fixed, namely 1-12-1941 for residential houses and on 1-12-1942 for non-residential premises. I may further observe here that during the pendency of this statute only the Municipality levied local rates, ceases and taxes in Karachi. These provisions were continued in the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, which also fixed the fair rent of properties constructed after partition at a rent which would give the landlord a net return of 6 Y. On his investment exclusive of taxes. Thus under both the Acts, the landlord was entitled to recover from the tenant increases in local taxes. The Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953 was amended on 7-6-1962. But the amendment is not material to the question under consideration in this appeal, and finally this Act was repealed by the said Ordinance on 1--1963.
The said Ordinance conferred many benefits on landlords. For instance, the definition of fair rent under it is much more flexible than under the legislation formerly prevailing in Karachi. Again, whilst the recovery of rent in excess of the fair rent continues to be prohibited, it is no longer a criminal offence as under the Sind and Karachi statutes. The said Ordinance also confers wider rights on landlords to eject tenants than they had under the previous legislation. But perhaps the most material difference is in the method of ejectment. Under the Sind and under the Karachi Rent Restriction Acts, in order to eject a tenant, the landlord had first to obtain a certificate from the Rent Controller and, after the certificate had become final, he had to file a suit for ejectment against his tenant. Now, on the other hand, section 17 of the said Ordinance merely prescribes that an order under section 13 "shall be executed by a civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court". Thus even a cursory comparison of the statutes shows that the provisions for rent control in the Sind and Karachi Rent Restriction Acts were far more rigid than those of the said Ordinance. This clearly means that the intention of the Legislature in repealing the Karachi Rent Restriction Act and in -extending the said Ordinance to Karachi was to relax the rigour of rent control in Karachi, and if the Legislature had intended to curtail a right which the landlord had enjoyed even under the Sind and the Karachi Acts, namely, the right to recover from his tenants all Increases in local rates, cesses and taxes, it would have done so by express provision. As such express provision is contained only in the first part - of the proviso to section 9 of the said Ordinance, I see no reason to modify tire conclusion reached by me in paragraph 5.
7. Mr. Merchant however submitted that the preamble of the said Ordinance supported the construction of section 9. As the preamble states that "It is expedient in the public interest to restrict the increase of rent . . . . . " it lends support to learned counsel's argument. But it is a trite observation that the preamble to a statute is only one of the aids to its construct tion. As the object of the Legislature in repealing the KarachilC Rent Restriction Act by the said Ordinance was to relax the rigour of rent control, in the circumstances discussed, the preamble is of no significance to the construction of section 9.
8. Finally, there is another circumstance which is fatal to the case of the respondents. It was admitted before us that the property In dispute had been constructed after partition but before the said Ordinance came Into force in Karachi. This means that the respondents are liable for and the appellant is entitled to recover from them the fair rent as defined under subsection 7(c) of section 4 of the said Ordinance. I may point out here that this definition was inserted in the said Ordinate by an amendment in 1965 and it reads as follows: "4 (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the fair rent of any building in the Karachi Area shall be-
(e) in relation to any building, residential or otherwise constructed after the 15th day of August 1947, but before the first day of July 1963, such rent as shall secure to the landlord a net return of six per centum, and in the case of any such building first let on or after the twentieth day of October 1959, eight per centum per annum on the total cost (which shall include the value of the land) and the cost of construction of the building after deducting the taxes, insurance premium for insurance against fire or earthquake but not otherwise, and an amount equal to one and a half per centum of the total cost by way of expenses for maintenance and repairs."
On the plain language of this definition the appellant is entitled to recover from the respondents the increase in tax which he has been called upon to pay, and if I were to accept Mr. Merchant's construction of section 9, it would reduce the fair rent of the property by the amount of the increase in taxes. As however, D at the highest, there is only an ambiguity in the section, the ambiguity must be construed in a manner which would harmonise it with the definition of fair rent In section 4(7)
(c), the more so as the Legislature has prescribed this definition for new construc--tions in Karachi long after the said Ordinance had been extended to Karachi. On this ground also I cannot accept Mr. Merchant's construction of section 9, and I hold that the appellant is entitled to recover from the respondents the increase in the taxes paid by him.
9. In the result, the appeals are allowed, but I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
AGHA Am HYDER, J.-I have had the benefit of going through the judgment, which my learned brother proposes to pronounce. I regret that I cannot subscribe to the interpretation of section 9 of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, which has found favour with him. That being the solo point of disagreement, I will confine myself to that aspect of the matter.
Where the liters legis the language of an enactment is plain, and admits of only one meaning, the question of interpretation does not arlse. The obvious needs no interpretation. The need, arises when more than one meaning or interpretation can bei assigned to a particular text. There are two ways to resolve the difficulty, in such an eventuality: (1) by looking to the literaE scripla ; the very words in which the enacted law is expressed--with the application of the laws of speech, but without the aid of logic or equity. This is called the grammatical interpretation ; (2) by comparing the statute with other statutes and with the whole system of law, and for the consideration of the time and circumstances, in which the statute came to be enacted. This is called the logical Interpretation, ,vherein the effort is directed to discover the "real intention" of the Legislature.
The logical interpretation has its own hazards. Legislation is after all an objective phenomenon, in which quite often all subjec--tive antecedents undergo a total metamorphosis. The seeker finds himself in the unenviable position of a weary pilgrim in search of a still-receding goal. Even in the course of this search, the relevant quest should, however, be to find out not what the Legislature actually intended but what it had to say on the subject. The intention must be discovered from the language finally adopted in the statute under construction and in that language alone. Nur Muhammad v. Lal Chand (1), Mohammad Jamil v. Saudagar Singh and another (2) and Prabhu Mat v. Chandan and another (3).
It is also a well settled principle of law that an interpreta tion, which is more in consonance with the avowed policy F underlying the Act as decipherable from its title and preamble, i to be preferred to an interpretation, which is at tangent with its object, Hod Lal v. Chatura Prasad and others (4). In other words in choosing between two competing constructions each of them possible, the interpretation, which makes them more officious with respect to the clear and ascertained policy of the statute, and would reasonably and fairly execute that intention, must prevail over the other that nullifies or whittles down its effect.
Seemingly the proviso to section 9 of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance is quite susceptible of interpretation in two ways. My learned brother, in arriving at his opinion, has examined the corresponding provisions of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1949, the Sind Rent Restriction Act, 1947, the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1956 and the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Act, 1957. In my humble opinion, it is not necessary to look in that direction, because what was the intention of the Legislature In any particular Act, is a question of the construction of that Act itself. The title and the preamble of the Ordinance In question can go a long way in unrevelling the knot. The title of the Ordinance speaks for itself. The preamble is in the following words :- "Whereas it is expedient in the public interest to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom in the Province of West Pakistan."
It does not, therefore, require the courage of an Euclid to say, that the anxiety of the framers of the Ordinance was to alleviate the burden of the increase of rent from the tenants. The determination of the fair rents of the buildings, is to be found in section 4 of the Ordinance. The increase of rent on account of payment of rate etc. Bas been dealt with in section 9, in the following words :- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Ordinance, a landlord, shall subject to the approval of the Controller, be entitled to increase the rent of a building or rented land if after the commencement of this Ordinance, a fresh rate, cess or tax is levied in respect of the building or rented land, by "Government or" < ny local authority, or if there is an increase in the amount of such rate, cess or tax being levied at the commencement of this Ordinance."
The section expressly contemplates the increase of rent, in two ways : ll) if there is a levy of afresh rate, cess or tax after the commencement of the Ordinance ; (2) by increase in the amount of such rate, cess or tax, at the commencement of this Ordinance. Then comes the proviso, which is as follows: "Provided the increase in the rent shall not exceed one-half of the amount of any such rate, cess or tax or the amount of the increase, in such rate. Cess or tax as the case may be."
A proviso is a part of the section to which it is attached. Generally it is appended for explaining what particular matters are not within the meaning of the enactment or for providing exceptions or qualification,. The section has to be read subject to the restrictions and qualifications imposed therein. It is to be seen that there is only one proviso aprended to the section, and opens with the unmistakable declaration that the increase shall not exceed one-half of the amount of any such rate, cess or tax, (of a building or rented land levied after the commencement of this H Ordinance) or the amount of the increase in such rate, cess orl tax, (at the commencement of this Ordinance) "as the case may be". The words "as the case may be" patently indicate that these govern buildings of either category. If the latter category was to be excepted from the qualification it was not necessary t include it In the proviso, as subsection (1) had already provided for the entitlement of the landlord to the entire increase in the amount of such rate, cess or tax. This part of the proviso in that case would be a mere surplusage. Courts lean against construc--tions which make words unnecessary, void or inslgnificaat.
My learned brother has also observed that the absence of the qualifying preposition such as 'of' between the word 'or' and the words "the amount of increase in such rate", was a pointer to .The fact that the landlord was entitled to full re-imbursement ,of any increase in the fiscal burden. I am afraid, I cannot subscribe to this view. English is a capricious language, but idiosyncracies of its language and grammar apart, every day we hear people asking "would you have a cup of tea or coffee 7" It is neither Cockney English nor a slang and I venture to think that the proposition 'of' or the word 'cup' are not repeated before coffee, because the same would be just otiose.
To my mind, no ambiguity is involved and if there is an ambiguity, it will be legitimate to give it a meaning, which is in harmony with, and not at variance with the preamble of the Ordinance. That will be in accord with the declared intentions of the legislation.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgments are not open to any exception. The appeals, therefore, fail and stand dismissed, but with no orders as to costs.
MUHAMMAD HAL.EBM, J.-This judgment dispose of Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 204 to 207 of 1965 which have been listed for hearing before me on a difference of opinion between my brothers Dorab Patel and Agha All Hyder, JJ. The former has allowed the appeals while the latter has dismissed them by separate judgments dated 24th January 1972.
2. The appellant is the owner of building No. 289, Garden East, Karachi, which has four fiats. The respondents in the four appeals are tenants of one flat each, and pay Rs. 450 per month as rent.
They are also liabe to pay for the water, cons-.Rvancy and electric charges. In the year 1962-63 each flat was assessed by the Excise & Taxation Department at 5 of the yearly rental while in 1963-64 the rate was increased to 10 yo vide West Pakistan Urban Immovable Property Tax (Amendment) Act, 1963 and the appellant was liable to pay the increase in the amount of tax from Rs. 243 to Rs.486 per flat from July 1963. The appellant accordingly filed an application under section 9 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 in 1963, by which he claimed the additional amount of Rs. 20.25 per month from each respondent due to the Increase in the amount of tax. The Rent Controller after bearing the parties allowed only one- half of the increase, that is, Rs. 10 per month per flat. Against this order the appellant appealed to the High Court but the appeal was dismissed in limine on 4th October 1965. The respondents filed letters patent appeals against this order which were heard by a Division Bench, but since the learned Judges differed on the construction of section 9 of the Ordinance, the matter is now placed before me for decision.
3. The controversy centres around a limited question as to the construction to be placed on the proviso to section 9 of the Ordinance as is clear from the question referred for opinion which reads as under t "To what increase in rent is a landlord entitled under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance when there is an Increase in local rates or taxes which were being levied when the said Ordinance came into force ?"
Section 9 as it stands reads :- "9. Increase of rent on account of payment of rate etc. Of local authority, but rent not to 8e increased on account of payment of other taxes, etc.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Ordinance, a landlord shall, subject to the approval of the Controller, be entitled to Increase the rent of a building or rented land if after the commencement of the Ordinance a fresh rate, cess or tax is levied in respect of the building or rented land by Govern-- ment or any local authority, or if there is an increase in the amount of such a rate, cess or tax being levied at the commencement of this Ordinance: Provided that the Increase in rent shall not exceed one-half of the amount of any such rate, cess or tax or the amount: of the increase in such rate, cess or tax, as the case may be."'
4. Subsection (1) is plain. It provides for two con--tingencies, namely the increase due to fresh levy of tax and. For increase due to the increase in the amount of tax. No limit Is however prescribed as to the quantum of the Increase in the--rent. The p.---oviso therefore is intended to qualify the quantum of increase In either of the two contingencies. As in the first case, the expression "one-half of" is not repeated after the disjunctive 'or' and before the words "the amount of the increase in such rate, cess or tax". The legislative intent is manifest from the absence of the expression "one- half of" after the disjunctive 'or' to entitle the appellant to claim the actual amount of increase, which otherwise 99 restricted by this expression in the case of fresh levy of tax to that quantum which it qualifies. The expression "as the case may be" at the end of the proviso speaks of the two contingencies separately and In this context each contingency has to be separately construed in the light of the words used in the proviso. The learned counsel for the respondents wanted me to read the expression "one-half of" after the disjunctive 'or' which is against the principle of construction which requires it to be construed strictly and to the scope conveyed by the words used in it. My learned brother, Dorab Patel, J. Also reached the same conclusion but a different conclusion was reached in the dissenting judgment. Agha Ali Hyder, J. While construing the proviso to section 9 of the Ordinance has taken the legislative intent flowing from the title and preamble of the Ordinance into consideration to give to it a different meaning. The--language of section 9(1) and its proviso is clear and admits of no ambiguity. It is an accepted principle of construction that if the language of any enactment is clear, neither the title nor the preamble can be read to construe its meaning. I do not, therefore, agree with him In this respect. Again, my, learned brother has held :- "If the latter category was to be excepted from the qualifica--tion it was not necessary to Include it in the proviso as, subsection (1) had already provided for the entitlement of then landlord to the entire Increase in the amount of such rate, cess or tax. This part of the proviso in that case would be a mere surplusage."
I do not see how the expression "as the case may be" can be construed as a surplusage to reach such a conclusion when the principle of construction is that no portion of any statutory enactment ought to be disregarded and every word ought, if possible, be given effect to and receive its full and proper connotation, for the Legislature is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. The exception to this principle is when the construction leads to an absurdity which is not the case here. This expression conveys a definite meaning and relates to the qualification qua the increase in either of the two contingencies which is limited in the latter case to the actual amount.
It cannot. Therefore, be regarded as a surplusage on the supposition that if it was the intention of the Legislature to award the increase of the amount without arty qualification there was no necessity of mentioning It in the proviso. This reason--ing, if accepted, would lead to a departure from the well settled norm of construction.
5. The above discussion leads me to conclude while agreeing with Dorab Patel, J., that the appellant is entitled to the increase in the amount, whatever it may be. The case may now be placed before the Division Bench for pronouncing the order in the appeals.