ORDER
(i) The relevant facts briefly stated are that against the petitioner, a tenant, the respondent No, 2 filed an application for his ejectment under section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 in the Court of the respondent No 1/the Additional Rent Controller. Clifton Cantonment, Karachi. In the said application after pleading that the petitioner is the tenant of the respondent No, 2 in respect of residential premises situated in Defence Housing Society, ejectment was sought on the following grounds
(a) That the petitioner/tenant continued to live in the demised premises after the expiry of the extended term of 11 months in violation of the agreement between the parties and that his occupation of the demised premises in the circumstances, is illegal and without the consent of the landlord.
(b) Default in payment of rent ; and
(c) Personal requirement of the respondent No, 2.
(ii) In the written statement filed by the petitioner tenant the execution of the agreement of tenancy between the parties was admitted. The learned counsel for the petitioner/the tenant before me conceded that pursuant to the said agreement the respondent No, 2-put the petitioner in possession of the demised premises and relationships of landlord and tenant was created between the parties. It was, however, submitted that the petitioner had received legal notice, dated 12-1-1985 from the respondent No, 2 in which it was alleged the petitioner presently is residing illegally and without approval of the landlord in the demised premises.
(iii) The case for ejectment referred to above is pending before the Rent Controller. In it an application was moved by respondent No, 2 praying for direction to be given to the petitioner/tenant to deposit arrears of rent and future rent in the Court. The said application was contested by the petitioner who also filed a separate application for rejection of the ejectment case on the ground that according to landlords own case the petitioner was in illegal occupation of the demised premises and therefore according to him the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to try the case which in the circumstances deserved to be rejected.
(iv) The learned Rent Controller/the respondent No, 1 by order, dated 10th November, 1985 after coming to the finding that the relationship of landlord and tenant has been proved by admission of the parties and further finding that the petitioner/tenant had not filed his statement of rent account, relying upon the account filed by the respondent No, 2/ landlord directed the petitioner to deposit Rs, 36,000 being the arrears of rent within one week of the date of the passing of the order.
The petitioner was also directed to continue to deposit future monthly rent at the rate of Rs, 4,500 per month in t said Court on every 5th day of following month for which the rent becomes due. It was, however, observed that the landlord would not be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited towards the arrears of rent until final disposal of the case by the said Court or the petitioner/tenant himself consented to the withdrawal of the arrears by the landlord/respondent No, 2.
' Further being of the opinion that the case bad been delayed for almost 18 months, after taking into consideration attempts made by the petitioner to entangle the respondent No, 2/the landlord in technicalities and causing hindrance in the pissing of the rent order and prolonging the proceedings unnecessarily due to mala fide reasons, while rejecting the petitioner's application challenging the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller the petitioner was directed to pay Rs, 500 as special costs.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner by filing this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan has challenged the above-mentioned order, dated 10-11-1985 passed by the Rent Controller/the respondent No, 1 on the following grounds :-
(1) That according to the respondent No, 2/landlord himself the petitioner is in illegal occupation of the demised premises and thus the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment application or give any direction for deposit of rent by the petitioner.
(2) That the order directing the petitioner to pay Rs, 500 as special costs is without jurisdiction.
3. I have heard the learned counsel at length and find that both the grounds on which the impugned order is sought to be challenged cannot be sustained. My reasons for coming to this conclusion are as follows :-
(i) Admittedly the petitioner was put in possession of the demised premises by respondent No, 2/landlord under the agreement of tenancy executed by the former. After expiry of the period of tenancy the petitioner/tenant having not vacated the demised premises and delivered back its possession to the landlord respondent No, 2 in law continues to be a tenant within the meaning of section 2( j) of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1963 even though such possession is wrongful and not authorised by the landlord Moreover in the written statement and even before me the learned Advocat has not denied the fact that the status of the petitioner is that of a tenant. The learned counsel, however submitted that respondent No, 2/landlord in his legal notice, dated 12-1- 1985 had himself taken the plea that the petitioner in the demised premises is "presently residing illegally and without approval". This assertion of the landlord in his notice, however, neither amounts to putting an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties within the meaning of section 2( j) of the Act of 1963 or Transfer of Property Act nor absolves the petitioner of his obligations to continue to pay rent to the respondent No 2/landlord tilt he (the petitioner) vacates the demised premises and delivers back its possession to the respondent No, 2/landlord.
' The contentions raised under ground No, 1 by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot therefore be sustained.
3(ii) There is, however, another aspect of the case. In my opinion the petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for purposes of challenging the interlocutory order passed on 10th November, 1985 by the Rent Controller directing the petitioner tenant to deposit rent in the Court. The view thus taken by me finds support from the case of Rashid Ahmed v. Soofi Muhammad Saleem and another (1)
(1) PLD 1976 Lab. 1450 wherein the learned Judge (Mr. Justice Muhammad Afzal Zullah as he then was) held :---- "No doubt sometimes in some cases a direction under section 13(6) of the Ordinance might look oppressive but that by itself is not enough to ignore the ratio decidendi of and spirit underlying the ruling of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ibrahim v. Muhammad Hussain PLD 1975 SC 457. It was observed that the provisional fixation of current rent and the amount of arrears under the first part of subsection (6) of section 13 "remains provisional" until it is followed by a final determination or striking off of the tenant's defence. It was also held that fragmentary decisions of the type, as involved in this case, on preliminary points, leaving the main controversy about the liability of the tenant for ejectment, are most inconvenient and "tend to delay administration of justice".
(4) The mischief, their Lordships were at pains to highlight, would be done if instead of appeals the High Court were to entertain writ petitions against directions made by Rent Controllers under first part of subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance. Obviously, if as a result, and in pursuance, of such a direction, the defence of a tenant is struck off, he would have an immediate remedy by filing an appeal. I do not agree with learned counsel that the said remedy would not be efficacious simply because it would be difficult to obtain stay order, when filing an appeal. The practice, however, it seems, is to the contrary."
' The arguments advanced underground (1) for the aforesaid reasons cannot be sustained, 3 (iii) Re. Ground (ii).-The submission is made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to give direction to the petitioner to pay Rs, 500 as special costs inasmuch as provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the proceedings before him.
This argument also cannot be accepted. Every Tribunal/Court has jurisdiction to control the proceedings before it and while doing so has jurisdiction to see that unnecessary harassment is not caused to the other side and that the matter is not allowed to be delayed by any party adopting delaying tactics particularly for mala fide reason. Even though Code of Civil. Procedure strictly speaking is not applicable to the proceedings before the Rent Controller, its provisions can be invoked to meet the ends of justice and in doing so it is open to him to evolve his own procedure, the only condition being that the procedure must not be contrary to principles of natural justice deeply ingrained in section 17 of the Act itself (Khadim Mohyudin and another v. Ch. Rahmat Ali Nagra and another (1) which was a case under section 13 of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959).
' The objection taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner to pay costs in the circumstances particularly when the reasons given for awarding costs have not been challenged, does not render the direction so given by the Rent Controller as without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
6. The upshot of the above discussion is that this petition is without any merit and is, therefore, dismissed.
' The above are the reasons for the short order passed on 27-3-1986.
(I) PLD 1965 SC 459