1. ' This First Rent Appeal is directed against the order dated 22-7-1984 passed by VIIth Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi whereby the defence of the appellant was struck off and he was directed to vacate the premises in question within thirty days of the order.
2. ' The facts which give rise to this appeal are that the respondent is the owner and landlord of the premises No,38/11, Sector 5-D, New Karachi and the appellant is the tenant thereof at the monthly rental of Rs,150. The respondent filed eviction application No,3151 of 1981 on the ground of default.
3. The respondent averred that the appellant did not pay the rent from December, 1979 till March, 1980. The appellant resisted the eviction application. During the pendency of the eviction application, the respondent filed an application under section 16(1) of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. The learned Rent Controller directed the appellant to deposit Rs,6,150 within two months from the date of order dated 8-11-1984. The appellant was further directed to deposit the future rent from November, 1983 at the rate of Rs,150 per month on or before 10th of each calendar month till the disposal of the case. The respondent filed an application under section 16(2) of the said Ordinance for striking off the defence of the appellant as he committed wilful default and he did not comply with .The order of the learned Rent Controller.. The Nazir in his report submitted that the appellant did not deposit any rent. The appellant did not file any objections.
4. ' The learned Rent Controller, after taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent and perusing the report of the Nazir, allowed the application vide order dated 22-7-1984.
5. ' The appellant being aggrieved against the above order dated 22-7-1984 has preferred this First Rent Appeal on the grounds disclosed in the memo. Of appeal.
6. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the R & P of the rent case No,3151 of 1981.
7. ' The appellant was directed to deposit arrears of rent amounting to Rs,6.150 within two months from 8-11-1983 and he was also directed to deposit monthly rent on or before 10th of each succeeding month from November, 1983. The appellant did not comply with the tentative rent order. I have perused Nazir's report which also shows that no rent was depos'ted by the appellant as directed by the learned Rent Controller.
8. ' In Mst. Akhtar Jehan Begum and 4 others v. Muhammad Azam Khan PLD 1983 SC 1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following dictum:- "The plain reading of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that for the purpose of passing the order of deposit under it, the Controller has not to determine the question of quantum or rate of rent, finally if the same is in dispute, but to determine such amount "approximately". This is the clear import of the words underlined above. Further this excludes final adjudication of this question. In the premises the consequence of noncompliance of such approximate determination is the summary disposal of the case, without taking any further proceedings, ipso facto on the basis of such non-compliance by striking off the defence and passing the order of eviction. If the argument of the respondent is accepted, then in every case the Controller would be competent to order ejectment of the tenant only on his final determination of the question as to quantum of arrears of rent or rate of rent. In the face of the clear language employed, such cannot be the intent and effect of this subsection. Reference in this behalf may profitably be made to a passage from the case of Ghulam Muhammad Khan Lundkhar v. Safdar Ali L D 1967 SC 530. In this case the contention advanced was that the Controller was not bound to order eviction of the tenant even if in fact non-compliance of the tentative rent order was established. But could extend the benefit of section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act on equitable principles, to relieve the tenant of forfeiture of tenancy, if it was shown to him that the tenant was not in fact in arrears of rent at the time of institution of the proceedings. In construing the true import of section 13(6) of the Ordinance it was observed by late Hamoodur Rahman, J. (as he then was): "Having regard to the language of this - subsection we find it difficult to accept that the Legislature intended to leave it to the discretion of the Rent Controller to decide whether he would or would not in a given case enforce the default clause. The Legislature itself having provided for the consequence of a default has used mandatory words to direct the Rent Controller to enforce the consequence. The object of this subsection is not so much to afford landlord an expeditious method of realising the rent but rather to protect a tenant who is mindful of his obligations from eviction. In interpreting the provisions of the Ordinance it must not be overlooked that the provisions thereof purport not only to curtail seriously the rights that a landlord enjoys under the general law, as contained in the Transfer of Property Act, of evicting a tenant by merely serving upon him a notice to .Quit but also to correlatively give special benefits and protections to tenants under certain conditions. Upon general principles, therefore, where a statute grants a privilege upon certain conditions the person seeking the privilege must show that he has strictly complied with those conditions. Unless those conditions are strictly fulfilled the privilege will not be available or the other party deprived of his rights under the law (vide Maxwell, page 285, 11th Edition)."
9. ' The dictum laid down in the above case is fully applicable to the facts of this case.
10. ' In this view of the matter the appellant committed default. The conclusion is that the findings of the learned Rent Controller is in B consonance with the law.
11. ' For the foregoing reasons the appeal was dismissed by my short order dated 10-10-1985. However the appellant was directed to vacate and hand over vacant possession of the premises in dispute on or before 9-3-1986 subject to continue to deposit rent with effect from 1-3-1986 upto 9-3-1986 failing which writ of possession will be issued without any notice.