1. ' This appeal is against the order of the learned Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Jacobabad, dated 29-5-1985 in Rent Application No,21 of 1982 whereby he ordered ejectment of the appellant from the demised premises. The admitted facts of the case are that the appellant was tenant of the respondent of demised premises on a monthly rent of Rs,240 since 27-4-1977 under a tenancy agreement. The appellant is alleged to have made default in payment of rent from 1-5-1977 and therefore, respondent filed ejectment application on 24-6-1982. The appellant claims that by sale agreement, dated 24-6-1979 the respondent agreed to sell demised premises to the appellant for Rs,20,000 and received Rs,15,000 as part of consideration of the sale amount and in part performance of said agreement he allowed appellant to continue the possession of the premises.
2. ' The main argument of the learned counsel is that the appellant is protected from ejectment under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. In his support he has relied on PLD 1971 SC 114, PLD 1964 SC 456 and PLD 1976 Lah.
46. Before I consider the question as to how far these authorities are applicable to the facts of the present case it is relevant to see as to what evidence is on the record which can extend protection under section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act to the appellant. The only evidence in this respect is photostat copy of the alleged sale agreement .Which has been produced through the respondent in his cross-examination and is Exh.40 on the record of the trial Court. In the cross- examination the respondent has denied that on 24-6-1979 he executed agreement of sale of disputed house in favour of the appellant for Rs,20,000. He stated that he does not know about execution of agreement of sale and state that it does not bear his signature. Thus, the execution and the signature on th alleged sale agreement is denied by the respondent and, therefore, the burden shifted upon the appellant to prove it. It will be pertinent t note that the appellant had neither examined himself nor had he examined any of the two witnesses of this alleged sale agreement. Even the original sale agreement has not been produced. The record of the lower Court shows that side of the respondent was closed on 17-1-1984 and the matter was fixed for the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses for a number of hearings but no evidence was produced by the appellant. Even did' not come to depose in his support to prove the alleged sale agreement. The side of appellant was finally closed by the learned trial Court on 5-5-1985 viz. After about 16 months after the evidence of respondent was closed and the judgment was passed on 25-5-1985. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied 'On the evidence of witness of the respondent, namely, Abdul Kadir who in his cross-examination has admitted that the entry No,1597 in stamp register shows the signature of the appellant in the column of signature. It may be pointed that the alleged sale agreement is on stamp paper bearing No,1597, dated 24-6-1979. The admission of the witness merely shows that this stamp paper was purchased by the appellant which is also borne out from the fact that the photostat copy of the document I also produced by the appellant. This evidence in no way connects the respondent with the purchase of this document or alleged execution agreement of sale by him on this document. In fact, before the learned Rent Controller, apart from the suggestion in the cross-examination to the respondent which was denied by him, there was absolutely no other evidence to show, that any agreement of sale was executed by the respondent in favour of appellant.
3. ' It is stated by Mr. Mangi on behalf of the appellant that the appellant has filed a suit for specific performance of the sale agreement on 8-1-1984 and the suit is still pending. He argues under the circumstances, the appellant cannot be ejected pending decision of the suit. Admittedly there is no stay order issued by the learned Senior Civil Judge in the said suit. It will be for the learned trial Judge to come to a finding on the basis of the evidence produced before him as to whether any sale agreement was executed by the respondent but as already pointed there was practically no evidence before the learned Rent Controller on which he could extend the benefit of section 53-A of the Transer of Property Act to the appellant.
4. ' Reverting to the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, in the case of Mst.
5. Ghulam Sakina v. Umar Bakhsh and another PLD 1964 SC 456 it was held:- "Section 49 of the Registration Act, no doubt, provides that if a document, which is compulsorily registerable, is not registered, then such a document does not affect any rights in the property dealt with under such document. But section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act makes an exception to- this and provides that where a person obtained possession of or .Continues to remain in possession of a property under a document in writing which, though compulsorily registerable, has not been registered, then neither the person transferring the property nor any one claiming under him shall be entitled to enforce against the transferee or any person claiming under him any right in respect of that property."
6. ' In the reported case share in the house was conveyed under a compromise decree which was compulsorily registerable under section 17 of the Registration Act but was not so registered but the facts were not disputed. In the case of Kalimuddin Ansari v. Director, Excise and Taxation and another PLD 1971 SC 114, the Government has allotted that appellants and other sub-licensees to construct residential buildings on the land and also expressly provided under the agreement that o the completion of buildings the sub-licensees shall be entitled to obtain registered lease from the Government. Their Lordships, therefore, held 'In short, but for the technical objection that no registered lease has been executed the lands are leased out in perpetuity, and it would indeed be very difficult for the Government to oust them. In an proceeding for ejectment section 53-A of the.
7. Transfer of Property Ac would afford a valid defence against the ejectment.
8. ' The above two reported cases are apparently distinguishable: from the present case as in those cases the agreement on which the parties sought protection of section 53-A were admitted. In PLD 197 Lah. 637 one, of the landlords had entered into agreement to sell the property in dispute to the tenant and received some amounts in part performance of the contract. In the ejectment proceedings the tenant sought protection of section 53-A and it was held that as the other landlord did not hold the divided portion of the house in dispute the appellant cannot be ejected from any portion of the property in dispute even if there was no agreement of sale because if the appellant was allowed to be ejected the provisions of section 53-A would be defeated so far as the case related to respondent/landlord No,1 which cannot be allowed under the law. Even in this case it will be seen that the agreement relied upon by the tenant was admitted. As already pointed out in the instant case there was no sufficient evidence before the Rent Controller to come to finding that there was any agreement of sale executed by the respondent in favour of appellant. As such h was correct in not extending the protection of section 53-A to the appellant.
9. ' The fact that the rent was not paid by the appellant as alleged by respondent is not disputed. It is only contended by the appellant that after the alleged sale agreement the respondent was not entitled to receive any rent and that if there was any debt due before the execution of the alleged sale agreement such rent was time-barred as it was for the period of more than three years prior to the filing of rent application. As I have already held that there was no sufficient proof adduced by the appellant before the learned Rent Controller in support of his contention of the execution of alleged sale agreement the appeal of the appelalnt has no merit and is dismissed with costs. The appellant is allowed three months time from today to vacate the premises provided he deposits the rent with the Rent Controller or pays rent of these three months on or before 10th of each month. In case of default the respondent will be at liberty to file execution proceedings.
10. ' This appeal was dismissed by short order, dated 10-2-1986 and above are the reasons in support of the said order.