ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.--This is the tenant's petition seeking leave to appeal from the order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 7th October, 1985, dismissing his constitutional petition challenging an order of eviction passed against him. The premises in dispute consists of a shop and the respondent who is the landlord of the premises, contended before the Rent Controller that the petitioner had committed default in the payment of rent, had damaged the property in dispute impairing its value and that he required the building bona fide for the personal use and occupation of his son. The petitioner resisted and controverted the allegations made against him by the landlord. The learned Rent Controller, on the evidence led before him decided all the issues against the landlord and dismissed his application. Being aggrieved by this decision the landlord filed an appeal which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, who passed an order of eviction against the petitioner on the ground that the premises was required in good faith for the use of his son. The tenant, being dissatisfied with this decision of the learned Additional District Judge, challenged the order in a constitutional petition before the Lahore High Court. The only contention advanced in support of the constitutional petition by the tenant before the High Court was that on the evidence on record it was established that the premises in dispute is a "scheduled building" as defined in section 2(h) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, and, therefore, he was not liable to be evicted only on the ground that the landlord needs same for use of his son as a shop. In this behalf the case of the tenant was that he was a "Tabeeb" carrying on his business in the shop and also using the shop as his residence. The High Court rejected the contention of the tenant on the ground that in his written statement he had taken no such plea that he was occupying the premises for residential purpose as well but during the evidence he tried to develop his case by asserting that the shop was also being put to residential use partly. The learned Judge in the High Court took the view that this was an afterthought which was further supported by the fact that the rent agreement clearly stipulated that the shop was let out solely for commercial use. Thus the learned Judge in the High Court found no illegality in the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge and dismissed the constitutional petition of the tenant.
2. In support of this petition, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned Judge in the High Court had misread the evidence and wrongly excluded from consideration, the evidence of the tenant which sufficiently established that the shop was partly used for residential purpose and, therefore, the building in dispute was a "scheduled building". In the first place the argument advanced by the, learned counsel raised a pure question of fact which was conclusively determined by the learned Additional District Judge, who constituted a statutory forum of exclusive jurisdiction. Therefore, his findings were) not reviewable in the constitutional jurisdiction before the High Court. Additionally and more importantly even if it is established that the' disputed premises consisted of a scheduled building, we are unable to find any extra protection extended by the law to the tenant of such a building in the matter of eviction on the ground of personal use. Section 13(3)(ii) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, provides for the eviction of a tenant in the case of non-residential building or a scheduled building or rented land, inter alia, on the ground that the same is required by the landlord in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children. The grounds for eviction in respect of the three categories of premises mentioned above are identical and to us it is clear that no extra privilege has been extended by these provisions to the tenant of scheduled building. Learned counsel for the petitioner when confronted with this position of law was unable to controvert the same and conceded that no distinction has been made between the non-residential and scheduled building. The argument that the building in question may be a scheduled building is, therefore, wholly irrelevant in the context of the findings of fact that the same was required for the use of the landlord's son. As no other contention was advanced in support of the petition, we find that it is devoid of merit and accordingly dismiss the same.