' This Revision Petition filed on 29-4-1986 impugns a preliminary decree, dated 25-7-1981 passed by the lower appellate Court in a suit for partition.
' Placing reliance upon Muhammad Swaleh, etc. v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97 and an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Feroze Khan, etc. v.
Zaman All etc. Civil Revision No,154/D of 1985 Rawalpindi Bench, it was contended that no limitation was provided for a revision petition.
2. A perusal of the aforecited judgment of the honourable Supreme Court, reveals that though the Limitation Act did not specifically prescribe any period for revisions as such, yet the residuary Article 181, thereof, providing a limitation of three years could be made applicable to them. The further observation was that even this limitation may not stand in the way, for, the Court could exercise its revisional power suo motu. This analysis would lead irresistibly to a conclusion that the residuary Article could be made applicable to a revision petition being essentially an application not provided for otherwise in the schedule. In this case, the exercise to -revise the impugned order is not being made by the High Court suo motu. Instead it has been overtly asked for by the petitioner by moving a formal application. There is no reason why not to apply to it the limitation of three years under Article 181 which indeed covers all sorts of applications not otherwise provided for. To say that there is absolutely no limitation applicable to revisions would be fraught with an extreme situation, e.g. a party might move for it, say after fifty years of the order of which it may be feeling aggrieved. The intent is not to make the matter so unwieldy for the opposite party who may be expecting a fait accompli thereof, over the passage of a reasonable time like three years stipulated by the said Article. The case, however, of exercising this power suo motu stands on a different footing and is distinguishable. The Division Bench judgment proceeds upon the same assumption which equally did not exclude the application of the residuary Article.
3. The rule laid down in Manager, Jammu & Kashmir, etc. v. Khuda Yar, etc. PLD 1975 SC 678 was that if a revision petition is filed beyond the normal unprescribed period of ninety days, the High Court could entertain it if it was satisfied as to reasons for delay. No application was filed here to show why a long period of more than five years has been taken in filing it. There is nothing on the file, to satisfy this Court as to why the petitioner was prevented from filing it earlier.
4. Learned counsel submitted that the suit was still pending and that points of law of considerable importance were involved in the impugned judgment/decree. That may be true but the limitation or for that matter laches also had to be kept in view. As against unprescribed period of ninety days usually applied to revisions, the petitioner took more than five years and that too without any explanation. It appears to be a case of sheer lethargy and the same cannot suffice to condone the delay of years.
5. As a result, the petition is dismissed in limine.