' This order shall dispose of the two Transfer Applications (C. M. Nos. 668-1-85 and 667-T-85) moved by the petitioner banking company as common question of law is involved in these petitions.
2. On 6-1-1979 the petitioner banking company filed two separate suits, one against Muhammad All Khan (respondent in C. M. No, 668-T-85) for the recovery of Rs, 12,065 and the other against Zafar Ali Khan (respondent in C. M. No, 667-T-85) for the recovery of Rs, 45,638 which are pending trial in the Court of Syed Muhammad Mumtaz Hussain Gilani, Additional District Judge, Rahimyar Khan as the amount of loan did not exceed Rupees one lac, hence jurisdiction to try these suits at the time of their institution, vested in that Court as provided by section 6 (2) (a) of Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance X of 1979.
3. It so happened that Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) (Amendment) Ordinance II of 1963 was promulgated on 30-1-1983 where under section 6 (2) (a) was omitted and section 2 (f) was substituted so as to make cases involving loan up to rupees one lac, triable by the special Courts constituted by the Federal Government and beyond rupees one million by the High Court in its original civil jurisdiction. In view of this change in the statute, petitioner Banking Company requested the Additional District Judge, Rahimyar Khan. To transfer aforesaid two suits to the Court of Special Judge, Banking. This request was not acceded to, therefore, these transfer applications have been moved.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as for the respondents.
5. The question which falls for determination before me is that whether the amendment brought in through Ordinance H of 1983 pertaining to the change of forum has retrospective effect and applies to the cases pending prior to coming into force of the amendment. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied on Mrs. Yasmeen Nighat v. National Bank of Pakistan (I), wherein it has been held that since Ordinance II of 1983 has brought in procedural amendment therefore, it is retrospective in effect. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents relying on a Division Bench authority of this Court reported as National Bank of Pakistan v. Taj Muhammad (2) canvassed that the amendment in question has prospective effect because if retrospective effect is given to it then. Litigant public shall face inconvenience and frustration for the transferee Courts being already over-worked would not be able to dispose them of soon. He emphasized the observation made in the aforesaid judgment at page 420 which reads :- "If the said amendment which has transferred jurisdiction over suits for recovery of bank loans for a sum of a lac or less than one lac of rupees is considered to be retrospective in effect, then all cases regarding recovery or loans up to one lac of rupees would have to be taken away from the civil Courts and sent either to Special Court so
(1) PLD 1984 Posh. 188 (2) PLD 1984 Lab. 417 notified or in the absence of any notification, to the District Court of each District. If that happens the Special Court or District Courts would get flooded with spate of cases and already overworked as they are, they would not be able to effect speedy disposal of the said cases which would result in inconvenience and frustration to litigant public. In our opinion, therefore, if retroactive operation is given to the new forum and to the new remedy for recovery of old loans in respect of sums of one lac of rupees or less than one lac of rupees,. It would cause great hardship to parties and witnesses of the said suits."
6. In the aforementioned two Division Bench authorities divergent view has been expressed but while sitting singly I am bound to follow the dictum laid down by the learned Division Bench of this Court in Taj Muhammad's case (supra). Therefore, respectfully following the same I hold that despite amendment of 1983, the legal position with regard to pending cases remaining unchanged, learned Additional District Judge is competent to hear the cases in question and I, therefore, decline to transfer them to the Court of Special Judge, Banking, as prayed. In the result, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs.