' NAIMUDDIN, C.J.-By this constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, two interlocutory orders, dated 29-9-1985 and 22-12-1985, passed by the Rent Controller, Karachi East, Karachi, during the pendency of eviction application under section 15 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, have been questioned.
2. By the first order, dated 29-9-1985, the Contr8ller disposed of three applications under sections 10 and 20 of the Ordinance, dated 12-9-1985, 17-9-1985 and 22-9-1985. In the order the Controller has stated that the petitioner prayed in the first application that the documents filed alongwith the application be accepted as evidence and inspection of ground floor of House No.53-1, Shikarpur Colony, Karachi, be made. By the second application the petitioner prayed for inspection of the premises in question. By the third application the petitioner prayed that the applicants be directed to file the original lease agreement, dated 5-10-1982.
3. The Controller by the first impugned order, dated 29-9-1985, allowed the application to produce document filed by him alongwith the application. She has also allowed the prayer for inspection of the ground floor premises bearing No.53-1, Shikarpur Colony, Karachi, and appointed Mrs. Tabbasum Ghazanfar Advocate as Commissioner to inspect the ground floor and report how many rooms on the ground-floor are in occupation of the applicant. She, however, did not grant the second application for inspection of the disputed premises for the reasons stated in the order.
She has also disposed of the third application for the reason that the agreement was not in possession of the respondent but was in possession of his,tenant Ume.Rjarooq.
4. By the second impugned order, dated 22-12-1985, she disposed of four more applications, the first two applications were under sections 19 and 20 of the Ordinance, the third were objections to the Commissioner's report, dated 6-11-1985, and the fourth application was for the production of further evidence.,
5. By the first application the applicant prayed for direction to respondents 1 to 7 to give details of the lease agreement, dated 5-10-1985, and the Controller held that in this application more or less same prayer was made as was made in the earlier application disposed of by her, by the order dated 29-9-1985. The Controller did not re-open the same question again. She further held that the petitioner shall be at liberty to summon the lease agreement, dated 5-10-1982, at the time of his evidence.
6. By the second application which was in the nature of objections to the CommissionPr's4report, dated 6-11-1985, the Controller observed as follows:- " A p plica nt has filed objections to this objection to the Commissioner's report and has stated that Commissioner has submitted his report strictly in accordance with order, dated 29-9-1985 and the objections taken by opponent are beyond the scope of order, dated 29-9-1985. The perusal of order whereby the Commissioner was appointed also shows that Commissioner was directed to inspect the ground floor of premises bearing No.53-1, Shikarpur Colony, Karachi, and report that there are how many rooms on ground floor and how much are in occupation of applicants. The report submitted by Commissioner specifically says that accommodation in occupation of applicants is one drawing-cum-dining room, one bedroom, one store room, one kitchen, one bath room and adjacent one small bathroom. From drawing room to kitchen there was a narrow passage. So far as the other accommodation pointed out by the opponent that the same was also in occupation of applicants could not be inspected by.The Commissioner as the same has been reported to be locked. I- have gone through whole the Commissioner Report and found that the same is in accordance with directions given to her, vide order dated 29-9-1985..................
7. By the third application the petitioner prayed that the respondent be directed to produce original agreement, dated 28-7-1985, whereby he came to know that the respondents have purchased and are in possession of the full ground floor of the premises bearing No.53/1, Shikarpur Colony, Karachi.
8. By the fourth application the petitioner prayed for summoning three witnesses and by the impugned order, dated 22-12-1985, she rejected both the applications.
9. We have heard Mr. Wajihuddin Ahmed learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Farooq H. Naik, Advocate has filed power on behalf of respondents 1 to 7.
10. We are of the view that the two impugned orders being o interlocutory nature do not call for any interference in this constitutionalA jurisdiction, for, firstly, in our opinion, no question of want o jurisdiction, or exercise of jurisdiction not vested or any patent illegality is involved. Secondly, even if there is one, the petitioner has alternat remedy of appeal, if the final order goes against him and in tha appeal he can also attack the interlocutory orders on any ground available to him. Further, section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, does specifically bar appeal from an interlocutor order and the object seems to avoid delay of the decision of the main B application and if constitutional petition is entertained agains interlocutory orders the very object of the Ordinance, would be defeated. Moreover, any order passed in the proceedings which ultimately ha effect on the final order, the same can be attacked on any ground available to the aggrieved party.
It would be advantageous if we here refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rehman v. Haji Mir Ahmed Khan PLD 1983 SC 21 wherein the Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court have followed their decision in Mian Manzar Bashir and others v. M.A. Asghar and Company PLD 1978 SC 185. The observation reads as follows:- "Keeping in view the aforediscussed aspects of the question raised before the High Court and the trend of authority regarding exercise of writ jurisdiction in rent matters, it is held that the petition in the High Court, was liable to be dismissed on the short ground of availability of adequate remedy to the petitioner if every any adverse final order was passed against him, that being so, this petition must fail."
11. Accordingly, the petitioner can raise the grounds taken in this constitutional petition in appeal, if the final order goes against him, which will be considered on their own merits.
' We, therefore, dismiss this petition in timine as having no merits.