' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, C. J.-This petition seeks review of the otder of this Court, dated 6-6-1983, in the circumstances set out below. One Syed Amir Shah, deceased, whose heirs in this petition are arrayed as non-applicants, sued the applicants (vendees) to pre-empt the suit land in the Court of Sub-Judge, Kotli. His suit was dismissed on 12-2-1972. The applicants, it may be observed, contested the suit amongst others on the two-fold main grounds : one being that Syed Amir Shah had no right of prior purchase ; and second that even otherwise by his conduct he had waived his right of prior purchase. Issues Nos. 1 and 2 settled in the suit cover these points.
3. An appeal taken by Syed Amir Shah (deceased) to assail the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-Judge before the District Judge, Mirpur, however, was accepted vide judgment, dated 5-4-1973. Consequently, Syed Amir Shah was allowed a possessory decree of prior purchase On payment of Rs, 4,095 which amount was required to be paid to the vendees (judgment-debtors) before 13th of May, 1973.
4. Syed Amir Shah, deceased (pre-emptor), failed to make payment of decretal amount to the vendees on or before the specified date i. e. The 13th of May, 1973. After consuming the allowed period he, on 9-6-1973 submitted an application to the District Judge to allow him further time for depositing the decretal amount in the Court. This application was turned down by the District Judge vide order, dated 9-6-1973.
5. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned District Judge, Syed Amir Shah, pre-emptor, went up in second appeal before the High Court for extension of time for depositing the decretal amount. The vendees, Ghulam Akram and others, applicants herein, also moved an appeal before the High Court against the order made by the District Judge. Their grievance in appeal was that Syed Amir Shah, pre-emptor, had no right of prior purchase and for that reason the judgment of the District Judge is liable to be ignored and quashed. The point of waiver raised but not attended to be the learned District Judge was also required to be resolved by the High Court.
6. Both the appeals, entitled Ghulam Akram and others v. Syed Amir Shah (Civil Appeal No, 54 of 1973) and Syed Amir Shah v. Muhammad Suleh and others (Civil Appeal No, 65 of 1973), were heard and disposed of by a consolidated judgment by a learned Single Judge in the High Court on 27-12- 1977. The appeal of Syed Amir Shah, for extension of time to deposit the decretal amount, was dismissed while the appeal of the vendees, Ghulam Akram and others was accepted with the following words :- "As a result of the dismissal of the pre-emptor's appeal, the position now is that on account of his failure to deposit the decretal amount, the suit also stands dismissed as the decree passed in his favour was conditional. The appeal of the vendees Ghulam Akram and others is, therefore, accepted and the suit of Syed Amir Shah is hereby dismissed with costs."
7. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, referred to above Syed Amir Shah moved a petition for leave to appeal in this Court. His appeal, by leave, was accepted ride order, dated 6-6-1983 with the following observations : - "In the circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that this is one of the cases where in the interest of justice the extension of time to allow the appellants to deposit the decretal amount is the legal demand. We say so because in our view another order by the District Judge for the disposal of the suit for non-payment of the decretal amount has not so far been recorded. In the result, we accept this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned High Court dated 27-12-1975 and direct that the appellants shall deposit the decretal amount, i. e. Rs, 4,095, on or before 6-8- 1983 If the appellants make the deposit in time the vendee would deliver them the possession of the suit land. In the event the appellants default to make the payment in time, their suit shall stand dismissed with costs."
' This review petition seeks reconsideration of the judgment referred to above.
8. Kh. Muhammad Saeed, the learned counsel for the applicants, contends, that he has no quarrel with the enunciation of law that the non-applicant (pre-emptor), for the reasons listed in the order, was entitled to extension of time which was rightly allowed to him. His grievance is that the appeal of the applicants vendees before the High Court, which was meant to avoid the finding of the District Judge to the effect that Syed Amir Shah had the right of prior purchase, though appears to have been decided and appeal accepted but the concluding part of the judgment of the High Court clearly points out that the appeal was accepted presumably on the assumption and understanding that as the extension of time had not been allowed to the non-applicant ; resulting in the dismissal of his appeal, the appeal moved by the applicantsvendees automatically succeeds, without deciding the points agitated by the applicants. It is certain that two main questions pointedly raised, namely, that Syed Amir Shah, deceased, had no right of prior purchase and the learned District Judge errorneously held so under the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act ; and that question of waiver raised, have not been decided by the District Judge and remained unresolved by the High Court. In these circumstances after acceptance of the appeal of Syed Amir Shah in allowing further time to him to deposit the decretal amount it was mandatory for this Court to remand the case to the High Court to decide the above unresolved points. The reasons, he submits, are not difficult to be traced. Even after depositing the decretal amount, if Syed Amir Shah was found to have no prior right to purchase the suit land, he would Still stand non-suited. Likewise, even if he had prior right of purchase but it is established that he had waived his right, in that case too, he would be non-suited. Omission on the part of this Court not to remand the case, in these circumstances, Kb. Muhammad Saeed submits, creates an error apparent on the face of the record and the impugned order, therefore, needs, to be recalled by way of a review. Even otherwise, the learned counsel maintains, sufficient cause exists for the acceptance of the review petition.
9. Sh. Abdul Aziz, Advocate, appearing on the opposite side, opposes the acceptance of the review petition simply on the ground that the applicants have not challenged the judgment of the High Court.
10. We have given our dispassionate thought to the arguments advanced at the bp- to consider as to whether a case is made out for the review of the judgm6nt ?
11. The main provisions for the review of a judgment are contained in Order XLVI, rule 1 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, and Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
' Order XLVI, rule 1 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, reads as under :- "Subject to the law and the practice of the Court, the Court may review its judgment or order in a civil proceeding on grounds similar to those mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record."
' Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as under :- "Any person considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order."
The second part of rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates the existence of a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. Review, however, under this provision, can also be granted on any other sufficient ground.
13. Apart from the above, as held in 40 I A 151, a Court can act in its inherent powers to set aside an order which is apparently illegal. There is, however, one condition that the omission must be relatable to the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal and events which have happened subsequent to the passing of the judgment and decree are not to be reflected in the judgment by process of the review. After a Court had disposed , 1' a matter it ceases to he seized of it and cannot. Therefore, exercise even the inherent powers of review which were vested in it so long as the matter was pending before it.
14. Let us now see as to whether some such omission is traceable in this case and if so whether the omission can be termed to be an error apparent on the face of the record or can be said to have crated sufficient cause for review. It would also require consideration as to whether such omission is relatable to the proceedings during the pendency of appeal ?
15. The rule laid down in the precedent cases was that merely because a decision of this Court is erroneous per se is not a ground to justify its review for that would seriously impair the finality attaching to the judgments of this Court which sits at the apex of the judicial system. Nevertheless, it has always been observed and that is the correct law that if there be found a material illegality in the decision which is of the nature which "converts the process from being one in aid of justice to a process which brings about injustice", review is justified.
16. The instant case is one of the type. In this case the word `therefore' appearing in the concluding part of the judgment of the High Court, we agree with the learned counsel, unmistakably indicates that the appeal of the applicants-vendees was accepted simply for the reason that the respondent's suit stands dismissed for his failure to deposit the decretal amount. The controversial issues agitated by the applicants in the High Court that it was wrongly decided by the District Judge that Syed Amir Shah had the right of prior purchase and the learned District Judge also erred in not to decide the question of waiver had not been resolved by the High Court.
17. It is settled principle that vital points raised must always be decided by the High Court and if it is not done remand is always desirable for the following reasons
(a) In appealable cases it is always desirable that the Courts should pronounce their opinion on all the relevant points which arise or have been raised in a case. Omission on the part of the High Court, from whose orders the appeals are permissible to the Supreme Court, to decide all such points creates difficulty not only for us but also for the litigants. Omission on the part of the High Court to decide two vital points referred to above and our failure to look into them is a vital error and cannot be lightly ignored. The failure on the part of the High Court to decide these points, in fact, shows misapplication rather non-application of the mind. In Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export (1) Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. (as he then was) considered the omission where the impugned order pissed by the High Court did not disclose the application of the mind of the High Court to the merits of the case that was before it. Relying on Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (2), his Lordship remarked :- "In view of the fact that a substantial question was raised by the applicant invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court it was as observed by Muhammad Munir, C. J., 'the undoubted duty of the High Court to state what the precise point raised by the applicant was and the grounds on which it was rejected'.", and the case was remanded.
(b) The High Court and the Supreme Court are Courts of record
(1) 1970 SCM R 323 (2) PLD 1959 SC (Pak:) 272 and 'both the Courts, and for that matter every Court, are expected to decide every important issue involved in a case. If the High Court leaves undecided any important matter, it may be said that it has decided the case in vacuum. Naturally, the Supreme Court in such cases would feel poor without the, wisdom of the High Court and deciding a matter without having the view point of the High Court may not be desirable.
(c) It is our considered belief that the omission on the part of the High Court to apply its mind to the most important points had prejudiced the applicant's case inasmuch as the possibility cannot be excluded that 'G had the learned Judges of the High Court considered the point the conclusion might have been different. It is a substantial objection to the judgment and warrants review and remand of the case.
(d) It is also well-settled law that the judgment should conform with the provisions of the law, i. e., it should contain concise statement of the case, the points for determination raised or arise in the case, a decision thereon and reasons for such decision. The impugned judgment, in ignoring the important points referred to in the above paras, has flouted the principles to be followd while writing a judgment. Naturally, such an order cannot be considered as a valid judgment and remand is desirable. Riaz Ahmad v. Amin Baig etc. (1) corroborates our view point. In that case it has been observed :##TE# "The impugned judgment does not show that the learned Judges applied their mind to all the points raised in the grounds of the writ petition They omitted 'to decide two important points. This disregard to the provisions of the law and inadvertent omission has not only wasted their valuable time but has caused unnecessary expense and trouble to the litigant public as well as encouraged further litigation."
' This view also prevailed in an unreported case of this Court entitled Mir Haider Shah v. Azad Government and others Civil Appeal No, 14 of 1981. It has been observed in that case :- "Therefore, while reiterating our view in Riaz Ahmed v. Amin Baig etc. PLD 1978 SC (A J & K) 161 we are constrained to remand the case for decision of the High Court especially on the point reflected above."
(e) Judicial order, as we know, must be speaking manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of all the material issues because the litigants, who bring their disputes to the law Courts with the incidental hardship and ex 'eases involved, do expect a judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders. Such a treatment to this case is missing.
18. In these circumstances; after allowing further time to the non-applicant to deposit the decretal amount it was imperative for this Court to remand the case to the High Court for the resolution of the unresolved issues. By not doing so an error apparent on the face of the record has/ been committed. Even otherwise it creates a cause sufficient to accept the review petition. The omission, it may be observed, is clearly relatable to the proceedings during the pendency of the appeal.
19. The concluding paragraph of the judgment, as said earlier, shows that it assumed that no other point was involved in the High Court. Butt
(1) PLD 1978 SC (A I & K) 161 the fact of the matter is that the High Court, for the solitary reason, that no extension was allowed to the respondent, accepted the appeal or the applicants and failed to apply its mind to the controversial vital issues raised, i. e., whether in fact the respondent had the prior right of purchase and if so whether he had waived his right ? In these circumstances, it has rightly been pointed out by Kh. Muhammad Saeed that the impugned order merely notices the contention on behalf of the non applicant and it could not be brought to the notice of this Court that after acceptance of the appeal the remaining points would naturally require determination by the High Court. Being the author Judge of the judgment sought to be reviewed. I also missed the point. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Zafarullah Khan v. Muhammad Khan (I) reviewed the order on the ground that the judgment proceeded on erroneous assumption of material fact. That case was based on Privy Council's case entitled North-West Frontier Province v. Suraj Narain Anand (2).
Accordingly, we accept this review petition, recall partially (to the extent indicated in the body of the judgment) the judgment, dated 6-6-19831 and remand the case to the High Court to determine as to whether the non-applicant had the right of prior purchase and even if he held such a status whether he had waived such a right. No order as to costs of this Court.
Revision .
(1) P L 1975 SC 300 (2) PLD 1949 P C 1