1. This application under Article 199 of the Constitution is by Federation of Pakistan against order dated 19-3-1986 of Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad and arises in the following facts and circumstances. Anwar Saeed, respondent No. 2, is owner of House No.8, Street No. l-E-7, Islamabad.
2. Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad acted under Act VII of 1956 (West Pakistan Requisitioning of Immovable Property (Temporary Powers) Act, 1956, and on 3-7-1985 requisitioned the house of respondent No. 2 for purposes of Federal Government. Owner submitted an application for review.
3. Deputy Commissioner Islamabad reconsidered the whole matter and vide impugned order dated 19-3-1986 found that the house in dispute, at the time it was requisitioned, was in possession of the owner and could not be requisitioned under the aforenoticed Act. In consequence of this finding, requisition order earlier passed was recalled and it was observed that the possession of privately- owned property be restored to its owner for his personal. Occupation Government of Pakistan has felt aggrieved of the action taken by the Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad and taking exception to it had challenged the order passed in review jurisdiction. Mr. Munir A. Shaikh, learned Deputy Attorney-General, on behalf of Government of Pakistan, addressed the Court. It was contended that power of review like appeal and revision was a substantive rights and unless expressly conferred, cannot be assumed to exist. It was argued that in the scheme of Act VII of 1956, no appeal, revision or review was contemplated and the requisitioning Authority after having passed the order of requisition has no locus poenitentiae to retrace its steps and undo the act of requisition, which, in the opinion of the learned Deputy Attorney --General, was complete, the moment it was passed. In the absence of express powers of review, learned counsel argued, Deputy Commissioner was neither possessed of competence nor jurisdiction to review his earlier order and to order de-requisition of the house-in-dispute. Only course open for respondent No.2 was to apply to the Government for de-requisitioning of the property. It was also argued that assuming that the Deputy Commissioner was possessed of some .Jurisdiction to recall his earlier final order, requisition order could not have been set aside without affording an adequate opportunity of hearing to the Estate Officer to support that the house-in-dispute at the relevant time was not in possession or occupation of the owner. Precise submission raised was that had the Estate Office been allowed opportunity, it would have brought sufficient material on record to controvert the plea of personal possession of the house which had prevailed with the Deputy Commissioner and made firm basis for recall of requisition order. Action of Deputy Commissioner who though a delegate of powers from the Provincial Government, being not supported by provisions of statute under which he purported to act was a total nullity and the High Court, it was prayed, should step in to declare the impugned order as illegal and to have been passed without lawful authority. Despite vehemence with which the points have been pressed, I have failed to discover any serious merits in them. Privately-owned property can be requisitioned by Provincial Government for purposes specified in section 3 of Act VII of 1956. Under section 10 of the Act, Provincial Government may by order notified in the official Gazette delegate its powers to such officers as it may specify in the order of delegation. It is not in dispute that powers under the Act had already been delegated to the Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad. His competence as delegatee of the Provincial Government to requisition private property was not in dispute. A clear reading of the requisition order dated 3-7-1985 shows that the owner of the property was not heard and right of prior hearing was denied to his counsel, of course, on the ground that the latter was not possessed of a valid powers of attorney. Owner of the property was proceeded against ex parte and the property belonging to him was requisitioned for purposes and use of the Federal Government. As the owner was not heard and his side of version could not be adequately put before the requisitioning Authority, he applied for a right of hearing and succeeded to have the attention of respondent No.1. In the result of rehearing, Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad felt satisfied that the house-in-question at the time of its requisition was in possession of the owner and consequently could not be requisitioned under Act VII of 1956. Two questions arise for consideration first, whether in the circumstances narrated above, Deputy Commissioner was possessed of powers to rehear the matter; second, in case, he was satisfied that the owner was in possession of the property, could recall order of requisition earlier passed. Learned Deputy Attorney-General was on a very firm ground when he urged that Act VII of 1956 conferred no powers of review and also that in the absence of express conferment of powers, review jurisdiction could not be availed of. The point of. View urged is well-established and admits of no dispute or doubt. However, on closer examination of the matter, I am of the opinion that it was not in exercise of review jurisdiction that the Deputy Commissioner acted, but he proceeded to allow hearing in exercise of his inherent powers. Indisputably, earlier order was passed ex parte as the owner had failed to appear before his on the date fixed. When the proceedings were ex parte and the owner could not be heard, could it be urged that respondent No.2 was powerless to undo the wrong done to the aggrieved party. Is it the law that once an ex parte order has been passed, the Authority passing the ex parte order loses all jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order when even sufficient cause for non-appearance acceptable to the Authority is disclosed. In my opinion, such a power was clearly available to the Authority and respondent No. 2 did. Not commit any error of law or jurisdiction when it proceeded to set aside the order passed by him ex parte. A Court or a Tribunal is always possessed of inherent powers to recall an order which had the effect of perpetuating injusitce on a party. In Muhammad Aslam Mirza v. Mst. Khurshid Begum PLD 1972 Lah. 603, a full Bench of the Lahore High Court, found that even in the absence of express powers to set aside an 'ex pane order, Rent Controller was found possessed of jurisdiction to recall ex parte order. This was on the principle that every Court or Tribunal has inherent polders to set aside an ex parte adjudication. Right to a prior hearing is implicit in the scheme of the Act and it also provides that owner-in-possession of the house shall not be required to vacate. It is well-established proposition of law that no order adverse to the interests of a party can be made without affording a prior right of hearing. Unless the application of rule was expressly excluded, it shall be deemed to form part of every statute. When the case is examined in the light of these principles of law, it presents no difficulty to find out that the respondent-owner who was ex parte and was denied a right of hearing could legitimately ask the Authority that he had sufficient clause to offer for his absence on the date fixed for hearing and in case he satisfies the Authority, the latter is bound to grant him hearing and if satisfied of the cause assigned for previous absence, rehear tine matter and pass appropriate order as the circumstances of the case warranted. Setting aside of the ex parte order, to my mind was not done in exercise of review jurisdiction as is generally understood in legal parlance. In my judgment, Deputy Commissioner, Islamabad was possessed of ample jurisdiction to rehear the dispute in presence of the parties and then express his opinion on merits of the cause. With respects, I do not find any, serious merit in the contention of learned Deputy Attorney- General on the first point raised by him.
4. Second point does not present much difficulty. On the material place before him, respondent No.2 was satisfied that the owner was in occupation of the premises and as such his house could not be requisitioned on account of an express bar in Act VII of 1956. Respondent No.2 as given powers to requisition the property by Provincial Government and it was he who was to decide whether a privately owned property should or could be requisitioned. In normal circumstances, the Government should have accepted the decision of their own Officer who was delegated with its powers to requisition the property. Learned Deputy Attorney-General has not placed on record copy of order, whereby powers were delegated to the Deputy Commissioner. Having examined the pros and cons of the case, I have no hesitation in saying that the order passed by Deputy Commissioner did not lack jurisdiction. It cannot be attacked on. Plane of propriety also. In the absence of adequate material, which in the instant case was wholly warranting, it can also not be urged that respondent No.2 who was a responsible Officer of the Government, had acted on considerations not relevant to the point in issue. Impugned order, cannot, therefore, be characterised either as illegal or without jurisdiction. Accordingly, I see no good ground to interfere.
5. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed summarily.