This is an appeal under section 16 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Ordinance), against an order of the learned Industrial Court (Central Zone), Lahore, dated 25th November 1968. The appeal is directed against the order passed on an application under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 (herein--after called the repealed Ordinance), for permission to dismiss the appellant. The appellant was charge-sheeted on three counts, namely
(1) He was detailed to perform duty on Bus No. 751 on 22-1-67. He disobeyed the order and left Jhang, where he was posted, for Lyallpur, without obtaining station leave.
(2) On 23-1-1967, the respondent was detected, travelling without ticket from Lyallpur to Mang by a Checking. Party headed by the Station Superintendent, officiating as Assistant Traffic Manager, Jhang. The respondent was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid misconduct and after obtaining his reply, which was found to be unsatisfactory, an enquiry was ordered to he held against him but he declined to take part in it and hence ex parse proceedings were taken against him. He was found guilty of the charges levelled against him.
(3) Muhammad Ayub, Station Superintendent, Government Transport Service, Sub-Office, Jlian, called the respondent to his office on 9-2-1967, in order to deliver the order of his transfer from Jhang to Sargodha issued by the District Manager -on 8-2-1967. He declined to receive it and instead placed his form 'C' Book before the Station Superintendent and asked him to sign on page bearing No.127069. The Station Superintendent observed that on the back of page No.127067, the respondent had written
2. The learned Chairman of the Industrial Court held that the appellant had been guilty of disobedience of the order of his superior and was absent froni duty without permission. He also held that the appellant was guilty of riotous and disorderly behaviour during working hours and that he had made false and frivolous allegations against his superior officers, including the District Manager. The learned Industrial Court having come to that conclusion, granted permission to dismiss the appellant.
3. Mirza Nazir Ahmad, the learned Representative for the appellant, contended in the first place, that the District Manager was biased against the appellant. The suggestion is that the appellant was victimized as a result of the ill-will of the District Manager. There is no force in this contention.
The appellant, it seems had made certain allegations against the District Manager much after he was found to have disobeyed the order of his superior on 22nd January 1967. It may be that the appellant made certain allegations against the District Manager to create defence for himself.
4. It was next contended that the Enquiry Officer was not independent. There is no force in this contention. Mr. A.indul Karim, Assistant Traffic Manager, who held the enquiry was examined by the Industrial Court. There is not a word in the cross-examination of Mr. Abdtil Karim to suggest that he had any bias against the appellant or had any reason to hold the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him.
5. It was in the third place contended that the learned Chairman of Industrial Court found that the appellant was guilty of misconduct inasmuch as he had been absent from duty for a-very long time. The contention is that the appellant was not charge-sheeted for being absent from duty. It is true that the appellant was not charge-sheeted for being absent from duty for very long. This, however, does not affect the finding of the learned Industrial Court in respect of other charges. All that the learned Chairman of the Industrial Court bad to see was as to whether the domestic enquiry was fair, impartial and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Mr. Naz, the learned Representative, has failed to show that the enquiry was not fair and in keeping with the principles of natural justice,
6. Lastly, it was contended that the appellant was not given an opportunity to defend himself before the domestic enquiry.
There is no force in this contention. There is no provision of law allowing a workman to be defended by an Advocate in the domestic enquiry. The law applicable to a workman is the same as applicable to a private servant, except as modified by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. A private servant has no right to claim to be represented by an Advocate. The Standing Order, which ha modified the law of master and servant, does not confer any such right on the workman to be represented by an Advocate before the domestic enquiry.
7. For the reasons given above, I will dismiss the appeal.