1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.--This petition is directed against the judgment, dated 15-7-1979 passed in Writ Petition No. 3836 of 1979.
2. The relevant facts are that respondents 3-8 were allotted 100 Kanals in Chak No. 164/10-R, Tehsil Khanewal, District Multan under Islamabad Oustees Scheme. According to the petitioner respondents 3 to 8 through respondent No.2, who acted as their attorney, entered into an agreement to sell the land in question. The petitioner averred that the bargain sale had been struck for Rs.25,000 out of which he had paid Rs.15,000 to respondent No.2. It is further his case that he obtained possession of land on 7th September, 1968, when the agreement of its sale was executed. On the 5th June, 1970, the petitioner instituted a suit in the civil Court, Khanewal, for a declaration that he was in possession of the land and entitled to enjoy its usufruct with the consequential relief of issuance of permanent injunction restraining respondents 2-8 from interfering with his possession.
3. According to the petitioner, he paid the balance of the purchase money amounting to Rs.10,000 on 18-6-1970 to respondents during the pendency of the suit. Notwithstanding the above, the respondents 3-8 alienated the land in question by a registered sale, dated 9-7-1977 to Muhammad Sharif and others. In order to incorporate these developments in the plaint, the petitioner, therefore, moved an application under Order VI, Rule 17 and Order I, Rule 10 of the C.P.C. For amendment of the plaint to implead the new vendees of the land as defendants and for bringing on record the factum of payment of the balance of the purchase price. The learned trial Court, namely, the Civil Judge, Khanewal, by his order, dated 3-10-1978 granted permission to amend the plaint as prayed.
4. However, in revision, the learned Additional District Judge, Multan, respondent No.1, herein, by his order, date(: 4-6-1979 reversed the order of the learned Civil Judge on the ground that the amendment of the plaint was sought belatedly after a lapse o: ten years of the institution of the suit and would simply prolong the litigation. The petitioner, therefore, challenged this order by filing a writ petition in the Lahore High Court (W.P. No. 3836 of 1979) which,, was dismissed relying on the doctrine of lis pendens and it was observe()I that the new situation and sale of the land to Muhammad Sharif and others during the pendency of the suit would not affect the merits of the case of the either party. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed on 15-7-1979. Hence, this petition for leave to appeal.
5. The learned counsel, in support of this petition, has submitted that the petitioner was not only challenging the subsequent sale by respondents 3 to 8 to Muhammad Sharif and others and asking for their impleadment as a party to the suit by an application for amendment but he was also seeking a declaration that he was the owner in possession and wished to incorporate in the plaint the factum of payment of the balance of the consideration money by him to respondent No.2 on 18-6-1970. Therefore, the entire amendment could not have been refused on the ground that the sale to Muhammad Sharif during the pendency of the suit was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens.
6. We have some sympathy for the above submission but feel that in writ jurisdiction, wherein the scope of interference by High Court is on narrow grounds, the order passed in revision could not be interfered with. However, the learned Judge in the High Court has himself observed that the trial Court can even without amending the plaint or introducing the new matters sought to be introduced therein still dispose of the case without affecting the interest of the petitioner. We may further clarify that the trial Court will be at liberty to allow the petitioner to lead evidence in support of the allegations made the amendment application to obviate the possibility of the petitioner suffering on account of the refusal to allow amendment in the plaint, the evidence of the parties has not yet concluded.
7. This petition, with these observations, is hereby dismissed.