1. ' AJMAL MIAN, J.--This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 13- 9-1967 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Suit No, 180 of 1965 decreeing respondents' suit for Rs, 18,161 with interest thereon at six per cent. Per annum from 24-6-1963 against the appellant, who was defendant No,1 in the suit and dismissing the suit against defendant No,2 Messrs Bird & Co. (Pakistan) Limited, shipping agent of the appellant.
2. ' The brief facts leading to the filing of the above appeal are that Messrs Dawood Corporation Limited, (hereinafter refered to as the consignee), on or about 8-5-1963 shipped 150 bales of cotton piece goods (hereinafter referred to as the bales) on board the vessel s.s. 'Dacca City' against bill of lading No, 124 for carriage from Karachi to Chittagong. The respondent issued an insurance policy No, MP/0995/63, dated 14-5-1963 in respect of the bales. The vessel reached Chittagong on or about 22-6-1963 and discharged the above bales in damaged condition. The consignee lodged claim with the appellant on 26-6-1963. The joint survey in respect of 54 bales was carried out 29-6- 1963 and 1-7-1963 Exh. 10/5. The consignee also lodged claim for the remaining 96 bales but no joint survey was carried out in respect thereof though the appellant asked the consignee to get the survey done by their surveyor. Be that as it may, the consignee submitted their claim to the appellant which was not settled and, therefore, the respondent being the insurer settled their claim by making payment of Rs, 37,379.35 and obtained letter of subrogation from the consignee. Since the appellant did not settle the respondents' claim they filed the aforesaid suit. The above suit was resisted by the appellant and the aforesaid company. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties eight issues were framed. The respondent in support of the case examined eight witnesses namely, P.W.1 A.C.D' Cruz, P.W.2 Noor Muhammad, P.W.3 Shaukat Mirza, P.W.4 Muhammad, P.W.5 Ghafoor Victor, P.W.6 Umer, P.W.7 Ilyas Usnian and P.W.8 Muhammad Ashraf, whereas the appellant examined D.W. 1 Nani Copal Patel and D.W.2 K, Anthony. The parties also produced documentary evidence. The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties decreed the above suit to the above extent against the appellant and dismissed the suit against aforesaid defendant No,2. The appellants being aggrieved by the above judgment/decree have filed the present appeal.
2. In support of the above appeal Mr. Muhammad Nasim, learned counsel for he appellants apart from submitting his arguments on merits has contended that the suit of the respondents was time-barred, whereas Mr. Ibrahim, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that in view of the correspondence exchanged between the parties the suit was within time.
3. This is a common ground. That Article 30 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act is applicable to the present case. It may be advantageous to reproduce hereinbelow the above Article, which reads as follows: "Article 30.
3. Against a carrier for compensation for losing One year When the loss or or injuring goods. Injury occurs.
4. It may be noticed that under the above quoted Article of the Limitation Act the suit against a carrier for compensation for loss or injury to goods is to be filed within one year from the date when the loss or injury occurs. Admittedly, in the present case at the most it can be urged that the loss or injury occurred on 22-6-1963 when the respondents found the bales in damaged condition. The suit, therefore, should have been filed within one year by 22-6-1964. Whereas the suit was filed on 16-8-1965. Even if we were to reckon the period of one year from the date of survey in respect of the 54 bales, the suit would still be time-barred as the survey was carried out on 29-6-1963 and 1-7- 1963. The learned Single Judge has observed as follows on the question of limitation: "Thus, the inferences to be drawn from this conduct of the parties and the correspondence between them are (i) that the defendants impliedly admitted that the consignment in suit did suffer damage in transit for which they were liable to pay compensation; (ii) the defendants required him to get a settlement of this claim from the insurers, the P & I Club, and (iii) the plaintiffs and the consignee, namely, Dawood Corporation Ltd., agreed to this extension by giving to the defendants further time of 12 months for settlement of the claim. This would constitute an implied agreement by which the carrier undertook to compensate the damage to the goods. I should fix the date of this agreement to be either 19th June, 1964, when the defendants agreed by Exhs. 8/16 and 8/17 to the extension of time by 12 months for bringing the suit, of the 28th July, 1964 when the defendants informed the plaintiffs by Exh. 8/19 that the claim for compensation of the damage to the goods had been referred to the P & I Club. Either of these two dates may be taken as the point for commencement of the implied agreement on the carrier's part to compensate the damage to the goods. This implied agreement gave a fresh cause of action to the plaintiffs, who can either claim specific enforcement of this agreement, in which case the period of limitation is three years from the date of the agreement, or sue the carrier for compensation for breach of this agreement within three years from the date of the breach. I have noted above that there was no denial or repudiation of the plaintiffs claim for compensation. However, on 8th December, 1964, the defendants wrote Exh. 8/25, in which they made a reservation as to their liability in the following words:-- 'This letter does not constitute and is not to be construed as an admission of liability under or extension of the terms of Bill of Lading or any act governing the carriage of goods covered by such Bill of Lading.'
5. 'This reservation was repeated in letters, dated 29th December, 1964 (Exh. 8/27) and 27th February, 1965 (Exh. 8/29). The letter Exh. 8/25, dated 8th December, 1964, may be treated as amounting to denial or repudiation of the plaintiffs claim, in which case the plaintiffs could bring a suit for compensationwithin three years from this date, or the plaintiffs could bring a suit for specific enforcement of the agreement to compensate, the limitation period in which case would be three, years from, either 19th July, or 28th July, 1964. Thus, the presenti, suit may be treated either as a suit for specific enforcement oft this implied agreement, or for compensation for breach of ' this agreement'.
4. We have perused the relevant correspondence on record and find that there was no admission of liability on the part of the appellant. In this regard reference may be made to Exh. 8/14, which is a legal notice sent by the respondents through their counsel to the appellants, agents reply, dated 16-6-1964 Exhs. 8/15 and telegram, dated 19-6-1964 Exh. 8/16.. Agent's letters, dated 19-6-1964 Exh.
6. 8/17 and, dated 28-7-1964 Exhs. 8/18 and 8/19 respectively. The respondents letters, dated 19-8- 1964, 16-9-1964 and 16-10-1964 Exhs. 8/20, 8/21 and 8/22 respectively. Agent's reply, dated 24-10- 1964 Exh. 8/23. It may be pertinent to reproduce Exhs. 8/15 and 8/16 which read as follows:- "Exh. 8/15 16th June, 1964.
7. Messrs. A. Rauf & Co., 9 & 13 A Court Chambers, Wadhumal Udharam Road, Karachi Dear Sirs, C/B & I No, 4506 s.s. 'Dacca City' arrvd. Ctg. On 22-6-1963. Claim for damage to the Bales of C.P. Goods B/L Rs, 124.
8. We are in receipt of your letter, dated 6th inst. On the 10th and would inform you that we have referred this matter to our Principals for their decision in due course.
9. We regard to the extension of time, we have telegraphically taken up the matter with our Principal at your end and hope our Principal have since informed their views to your clients. Yours faithfully, Pro. Bird & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. (Sd.) Illegible.
10. As Agents. cc. Messrs Chittagong Steamship Corporation Ltd. Karachi. We acknowledge receipt of your Letter No, CSC/D/28/22/71, dated 11th inst. And refer our telegram, dated 13th instant."
11. Exh. 8/16 Express: 19th June, 1964.
12. Repeat.
13. CENINCO EPAKSHIP KARACHI KARACHI.
14. REFERENCE YOUR LOSS NUMBER CM 108/64 EXTENSION TIME FOR TWELVE MONTHS GRANTED SUBJECT PROVISIONS GOLD CLAUSE AGREEMENT LETTER FOLLOWS BIRSHIP:--"
15. ' From the above quoted letter and telegram, it is evident that the appellants' agent did not admit the claim of the respondents but stated that the matter was referred to their Principal for their decisi in due course. It is also clear from the above quoted telegram that t. Appellants' agent agreed to extend the period for 12 months for the purpose of limitation which was confirmed by them through their above letter, dated 19-6-1964, Exh. 8/17. The question, therefore, arises whether the extension of limitation period by the appellants' agent was legal and was enforceable through the Court. In this regard reference may be made to the following cases:--
(i) Deutsche Dampschiffaharts-Gesellschaft and another v. Central Insurance Co. Ltd., Karachi, reported in PLD 1975 ,Kar. 819, in which a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Sind and Baluchistan dissented from the judgment under appeal reported in PLD 1968 Kar. 252, and held that the agreemen for extension of limitation period is illegal and not enforceable.
(ii) Messrs. United Electric and Refrigeration Company v. Ve Deustsche Secree Derex, Restock, East Germany and another, reported in 1980 CLC 931, in which one of us (Ajmal Mian, J.), followed the above D.B. Judgment and held that the ground of extension of limitation period are given in sections 6,7,12 t 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and that the parties by thei agreement cannot add any additional reason or ground fo extending the period of limitation.
(iii) National Insurance Corporation v. Pakistan National Shippin Corporation, 1985 CLC 360. In the above case a learne Single. Judge of this Court held that mere fact that the consigne had preferred a claim on the basis of short landing certificate which was under consideration could not have revive the period for filing of a suit.
16. ' The extension of one year period contained in the above quoted telegram Exh. 8/16 and confirmed by the above appellants' agent by their above letter, dated 19-6-1964 Exh. 8/17 is of no legal consequence as the above agreement for extension of limitation period was not enforceable in law In this view of the matter, in the absence of any admission of liability by the appellants or their agents on their behalf, the period of limitation was one year from the date of occurrence of the cause of action. In the presence case, as observed hereinabove, at the most it can be said that the cause of action accrued on 1-7-1963 when the joint survey was completed, whereas the suit was filed on 16-8-1965, it was evidently time-barred.
5. We, therefore, allow the above appeal and set aside the judgment and decree under appeal with no order as to costs and dismissed the respondents, suit.