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PLD 1972 Karachi 84

MESSRS THE ASIATIC INDUSTRIES LTD., KARACHI vs ZAHID ALI

CitationPLD 1972 Karachi 84
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Letters Patent Appeal No. 122 of 1969
Date1969-08-21
Judge(s)Qadeer-ud-Din Ahmad, Muhammad Haleem
ResultAppeal dismissed

QADEERUDDIN AHMAD, J.-The Office has pointed out that the appeal has not been filed within 20 days from the date of the judgment, even after excluding the time spent in obtaining the copy of the judgment. Counsel for the appellant does not agree, with the view of the Office, and has contended that the time spent in obtaining a copy of the decree should also be excluded. He has based this argument on the, language, of Article 151 of the Limitation Act, and tried to find support from a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Karachi Municipal Corporation v. Messrs Karimi & Co. (PLD 1967 Kar. 537) and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the Government of West Pakistan and others v. Niaz Muhammad (PLD 1967 SC 271). The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered with reference to Article 156 of the Limitation Act read with section 12 of that Act, Order XXII, rule 7, and Order XLI, rule 1, C. P. C. And rule 185 of the Sind Civil Courts Rules. Article 156 of the Limitation Act is as follows: The appeal now before me is prima facie an appeal under clause 10 of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, and, therefore, it is not governed by Article 156 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Mahmoodi has tried to get out of this situation by saying that he has mentioned section 39 of the Arbitration Act also in support of the appellant's right to prefer this appeal.. The relevant part of the section is as follows:--- "An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order:- The appeals contemplated in the above provision lie to the Courts authorized by law to bear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order. Such a Court is a Letters Patent Bench when the order from which appeal is preferred is made by a Single Judge of this Court in exercise of his original civil jurisdiction. From this point of view also, this is a Letters Patent Appeal.

2. The period of limitation provided for Letters Patent Appeals is contained in rule 4 of Chapter I-A of Volume V of the Rules and Orders of the High Court of Judicature at Lahore. It is as follows:- "Every appeal to the High Court under clause 10 of the Letters Patent from a judgment of a Judge sitting singly on the appellate side of the High Court, shall be presented within 30 days from the date of the judgment appealed from unless the admitting Bench, in its discretion for good cause shown, grants further time.

The period of limitation for the presentation of an appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge exercising original jurisdiction is 20 days from the date of the judgment (Article 151 of the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908): "In an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, the memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the decree, order or judgment appealed from. But where a certificate is required under clause 10, the memorandum of appeal must contain a declaration to the effect that the Judge who passed the judgment has certified that the case is "a fit one for appeal. The time spent in obtaining the certificate (including the date of application and the date of the order granting certificate) shall be excluded in computing the period of limitation.

The periods of limitation prescribed in this rule, shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of section 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908."

It provides that the period of limitation for the presentation of appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge exercising original jurisdiction is 20 days from the date of the judgment. A reference is also made in the rule to Article 151 of the Indian Limitation Act. .

If this rule is read with clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of judicature at Lahore, it becomes clear that Letters Patent Appeals are preferred from judgments, and not from dec--rees.

The word "judgment" which occurs in the clause, has been interpreted so liberally, that many orders which are made with no, possibility of any decree being prepared under them, have been found to be appealable. The conclusion, therefore, is that, for purpose of a Letters Patent Appeal, a decree prepared in pursuance of a judgment is of no relevance.

3. The above view is supported by the language of the Division Bench of this Court to which counsel has referred. The portions to which counsel has drawn our attention, are paragraphs 3 and 5 of that judgment. In both of them, there is reference to `judgment' and it is held that time taken in obtaining copies of decrees should also be excluded.

4. An argument was advanced before that Bench that in so far as a Letters Patent Appeal is concerned, it is not necessary that copies, even of judgments, be filed. This was recognised, but it was pointed out that a Full Bench of the High Court of Lahore had decided in the In re : Punjab Co- operative Bank Ltd. (AIR 1941 Lah. 257), that time taken in obtaining copies of judgments for filing Letters Patent Appeals, be excluded. The reasoning reproduced in the Division Bench judgment is as follows:-- " . . . The only argument which could be pressed in support of the preliminary objection would be upon the basis that copies of the judgment or decree need not be filed in an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent as provided in rule 4. However, for the reasons contained in the said Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court, with which we are in respectful agreement, this argument must be repelled. The fact that a copy of the judgment need not be accompanied is merely a facility which is permitted under the rule but it often becomes necessary for a counsel to examine the judgment before draft--ing the grounds of appeal. Therefore, when such a copy has been applied for it is difficult to see how the time taken in obtaining such copy is not to be excluded in computing the period of limitation, particularly when the rule itself provides that section 12 of the Limitation Act would apply."

The words "when such a copy has been applied for," should be noted.

5. We have no doubt that in a Letters Patent Appeal copies of decrees are not only not required b9 law to be produced, but ordinarily will not even be necessary to look at. Therefore, to try to extend the period of limitation on the ground that a copy of a decree could not be obtained within 20 days, cannot be accepted as a good excuse.

6. We nay mention additionally that fn this case the judgment was given on the 12th of February 1969, and an application for obtaining its copy was made on the 7th of March 1969. The copy was made ready on the 21st of March 1969 but stamps were not supplied up to the 27th of March 1969.

The most material point, however, to note is that the application for obtaining the copy of the judgment was made after the appeal had become time-barred. Counsel explained this aspect of the case by saying that the judgment was dictated in open Court, but was not typed out for some time afterwards. Typing out the judgment, however, could not obviate the necessity of applying for its copy, because time did begin to run from the date on which the judgment was delivered.

7. In view of the above facts and discussion, we hold that this appeal is barred by time.

8. We have heard counsel on merits also. The facts are that a suit was filed by the manager of the appellant for the recovery of Rs. 25,200 and that the dispute was referred to the sole arbitration of an Advocate of this Court. The arbitrator gave his award in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 19,998.

According to counsel the award is bad, because the claim was barred by time, that no specific finding was given on the issue of limitation, and that the award was not based on evidence.

Counsel, however, conceded that evidence was accorded; therefore, by contending that it was not based on evidence, all that he means to say is that the evidence has not been mentioned and discussed in the award. According to counsel, the award has been expressed in a few lines without setting out any reasons in support of the conclusion. In these circumstances it is obvious that the issue of limitation has been decided against the present appellant. It was not necessary for the arbitrator either to say so specifically or to give reasons for doing so. Similarly, the arbitrator was not bound to set out the evidence which led him to the conclusion at which he arrived.

The appeal is dismissed in limine.

"Description of AppealPeriod of limitation.Time from which period begins to run.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to a High Court, except in the cases provided for by Article 151 and Article 153.90 daysThe date of the decree or order appealed from."

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