1. ' This order will govern the disposal of about noted 8 Revision Applications in which common questions of law and facts arise. It is necessary to state here the background of the present proceedings in order to dispose of the above petitions.
2. ' The petitioner who is admittedly the owner of Survey No,144 alongwith other survey numbers situated in Deh Chabralo, Taluka Tando Bago, instituted Suits Nos.10 to 16 of 1975 against the respondents alleging that they were his licencees in respect of 500 sq. Ft. Each out of Survey No,144 and since their licence has been terminated by the petitioner, they are liable to be evicted from the plot in their possession. It was alleged in the plaints that Survey No,144 was originally agricultural land which was converted into Sikni in the year 1967 and, thereafter, the respondents were allowed by the petitioner to occupy a portion of 500 sq. Ft. Each under the alleged licence. The respondents in their respective written statements took the plea that the land in their possession was occupied by their forefathers and they continued to be in possession thereof as such. On the basis of the above controversy between the parties the trial Court framed the following 8 issues:- "(1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of Survey No,144, Deh Chhabralo, Taluka Tando Bago?
(2) Whether Survey No,144 of Deh was converted into Sikni in the year 1967?
(3) Whether the defendant worked as Hari of the plaintiff on the land?
(4) Whether the defendants was permitted to occupy of portion of Survey No,144 at eastern and of the plot for temporary residence without any payment as licensee?
(5) Whether Lemoo Khaskheli village is an approved village within the limits of Tando Bago Town Committee?
(6) Whether the village of Limoon Khaskheli existed since long and defendants are residing in this village since their forefathers?
(7) Whether the suit is maintainable?
(8) What should the decree be?"
3. ' On issues Nos.1 and 2 the Courts below came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is owner of the disputed plot and that it was converted into sikni land in the year 1967. On issue No,3 it is held by both the Courts that the respondents are Harts of the petitioner. However, on issue No,4 the Courts below held that the petitioner failed to establish that the respondents were his licensees. No finding was given by the Courts below on issue No,5 and under issue No,5 it is held that the disputed land was in occupation of the respondents from the time of their forefathers. On issue No,7 both the Courts below came to the conclusion that the suit was beyond time having been filed after 12 years of the accrual of the cause of action which was taken to be the date on which the property was released to the petitioner by the Courts of Ward in. 1944 and respondents were also held to be in adverse possession of the land. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that one of the most important issues in the case was issue No,5 which was not touched by the Courts below and as such the question of limitation could not have been resolved in the absence of a finding on this issue. Alternatively it is contended that the respondents having failed to allege in their written statements that the suits instituted against them were time-barred and there being no specific issue on the plea of limitation, the petitioner had no opportunity of meeting this case either at the stage of the trial Court or before the first appellate Court. It is lastly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the question of adverse possession was neither pleaded in the written statement nor raised in the issues and in view of settled law in this regard that the plea of adverse possession must be raised and proved specifically the finding of the Courts below were wholly without jurisdiction as the petitioner had no opportunity of meeting this case which was neither set up in the pleadings nor put in the issue. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is not without force. The respondents in these cases were intimated the date of hearing as required under rules but no appearance was made on 20-10-1986 when these cases were heard. However, after these cases were heard a telegram was received without mentioning the name of parties in which it was requested that Revision Applications 187/189 may be adjourned to enable the respondents to engage counsel. The case was accordingly taken up today but again no appearance is made on behalf of respondents. I have, therefore, only heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in these cases. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the view that in the absence of specific plea of limitation end adverse possession in the written statements of respondents the Courts below could not decide these issues without first framing such issues and allowing the parties to lead evidence thereon if the Courts below were of the view that such pleas necessarily arise from the evidence of the parties. It cannot be disputed that the plea of limitation or adverse possession could only be decided on the facts either alleged by the defendants or established on record before the Court in evidence. Except a vague statement made by the respondents before the trial Court that they were in possession of land from the time of their forefathers, there is nothing else on record in support of these issues. It is an admitted position on record that the disputed plot of land was converted into Sikni Land in the year 1967 and respondents are Haris of petitioner. In these circumstances there should have been a categorical finding by the Courts below in respect of the date of accrual of cause of action to the plaintiff in order to determine the plea of limitation. It is rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicant that no specific Article of Limitation Act is referred by the Courts below while determining the question of limitation. Two specific Articles of Limitation Act, namely, Article 142 ACT, namely, Article 14Z or 144 may be applicable and to establish application of any of these Articles, different set of fact may be required to be established. There is nothing on record to show that the Courts below were conscious about the application of any particular Article of Limitation Act to the suits of petitioner. Similarly the plea of adverse possession is neither raised in the written statement by the respondents specifically nor any such issue was framed by the trial Court. Learned counsel has referred to the case of Noor Ali Pir Muhammad Parsala v. Patrica Dinshaw PLD 1974 Kar. 235 and Juma Khan and another v. Abdul Karim and another 1980 SCMR 364 to contend that in order to succeed on the plea of adverse possession it must be proved that possession of the defendant was not permissive, it was open and hostile to the title of the plaintiff, and that it was asserted as such to the knowledge of the plaintiff.. The evidence on record is D not sufficient to prove all the above ingredients so as to enable the Court to record a conclusive finding on this issue. I accordingly accept these Revision Applications, set aside the impugned judgments and decrees of the Courts below and remand the case back to the trial Court with the direction to allow opportunity to the parties to lead further evidence if necessary in the case and re-determine the issues after hearing the parties in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs as the respondents have not appeared and defended the case. , case remanded.