This is an appeal under section 16 of the West Pakistan In--dustrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called the Ordinance against the order of the learned Chairman of- the 1st West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi dated August 3, 1968. The impugned order was passed on an application under section 30 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. The facts giving rise to the present appeal briefly put are these.
2. On 25th December 1966, while the appellant was on duty on Hyderabad-Sujawal route, his bus was checked at 1 miles before Sujawal by the Traffic Assistant Mr. Muhammad Khan, in the presence of the Traffic Assistant Jamaluddiu and the Assistant Traffic Manager, Mr. A. H. Bokhari.
The Checking Party found that 21 persons were travelling in the bus without tickets and that the appellant had realised fare from 9 of them. Mr. Muhammad Khan, Traffic Assistant issued tickets to the pas--sengers and recorded the report against the appellant on T. T. 40 Form. The appellant was charge-sheeted and was required to show cause why he should not be, dismissed from service. The appellant submitted his explanation on 4th January 1967. He denied to have realised fare from 9 persons, though he admitted that tickets were issued to 21 passengers by Mr. Muhammad Khan, Traffic Assistant. The appellant further stated that it was his first trip on Hyderabad---Sujawal route and that he did not know the places of destination and the fare. Some 13 police officials were travelling and going to Sujawal to make arrange--ment for the arrival of the President of Pakistan. The police officials asked the appellant to issue the tickets in the running bus as the bus was already late. The appellant was about to issue tickets when the Checking Party arrived.
3. Mr. Arz Muhammad Abro, As3istant Traffic Manager, was appointed Enquiry Officer, who concluded the enquiry on 16tH Januiri 1967, and submitted his report to the District Manager. The Enquiry Officer found the appellant guilty of the charge of Misconduct and recommended that the permission of the industrial Court may be taken for dismissal of the appellant, as the appellant was an office-bearer of the Trade Union. The District Manager agreed was the Enquiry Officer. ' An application under section 30 (21 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, was made on 27th February 1967, for permission to dismiss the appellant from service on the ground that he was guilty of misconduct as defined in clauses (b) and (i) of section 7 (2) of the Road Transport Workers Ordinance, 1961.
4. Before the Industrial Court the appellant examined---himself, while on behalf of the respondent Mr. Muhammad Khan, Traffic Assistant and Mr. Arz Muhammad Abro, Assistant Traffic Manager, were examined. The learned Chairman after hearing the arguments of the parties came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was fair and did not violate any principle of natural justice and that the finding of the Enquiry Officer was based, "on solid facts and not on whimsical grounds'.
The respondent was granted the permission asked for to dismiss the appellant from service.
5. Mr. W asiullah Qureshi, Representative for the appellant, has raised a number of points before me, which I propose to dispose of separately.
6. The learned Representative contended, in the first place, that there is contradiction in the statement of Mr. Muhammad Khan, Traffic Assistant and Jamaluddin, Traffic Assistant, in respect of fare that the appellant is said to have realised from the 9 passengers and also the place from where these 9 persons are said to have boarded the bus. Mr. Muhammad Khan, in his statement before the Enquiry Officer stated that the 9 passengers, from whom the appellant had realised fare, boarded the bus at Amra for Sujawal. He was not asked as to how much fare may have been realised from these 9 passengers. Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, however, calculated the fare from Amra to Suj awal at the rate of 0.25 paisas each passenger. It thus came to Rs. 2.25. On the other hand, Mr. Jamaluddin witness for the complainant stated that 5 persons had boarded the bus at Amra for Sujawal and 4 persons from Dari to Sujawal. The fare thus calculated would come to Rs. 3.05. Before the Industrial Court, however, Mr. Muhammad Khan, when pointedly asked about the fare that the appellant is said to have realised, stated that he had realised Rs. 3.15. It is true that there is this contradiction. The main point, however, is as to whether the appellant had charged fare from 9 persons or not. 'The statement of Mr. Muhammad Khan was rightly accepted and the learned Chairman of the Industrial Court found support from T. T.
40. T.T. 40 is a Form on which the person who checks the bus, is required to state all facts as they were at the time of checking. T. T. 40 clearly states that 9 out of the, 21 passengers had paid the fare 0 the appellant. The appellant is a literate person. He has signed the T. T.40 Form in English after reading the contents of the T. T. 40 Form and given his reply in his own handwriting. He stated that it was incorrect that 7 persons had boarded the bus at Dari and that these persons boarded the bus at Amra. He kept quiet about the charge of having realised fare from 9 persons. He has neither accepted the charge nor denied the same in his statement on T. T. 40 Form. The silence of the appellant as to the realisation of the amount of the fare from 9 persons at the time when the bus was checked is very significant. The Enquiry Officer, therefore, cannot be said to have acted perversely in his conclusion that the appellant had realised the fare from 9 persons, and had not issued tickets to them.
7. It was in the next place contended that the Enquiry Officer did not consider the evidence produced by the appellant. There is no force in this contention. I have gone through the report of the Enquiry Officer. It appears that he has applied his mind to the statement made by the two Police Head Constables. The Enquiry Officer observed as under:- "The Conductor's defence witnesses stated that the Conductor was issuing tickets in running bus and they compelled him to do so. The witnesses also failed to contradict that he had realised fare froth 9 passengers."
8. The Enquiry Officer is not expected to deal with the enquiry as a trained judicial officer. It is sufficient that while dealing with his finding he had not ignored the defence version. He had taken the same in consideration. His reasoning need not be elaborate, and exact.
9. It was contended, in the third place, that the appellant was not given an opportunity to be heard in person by the District Manager. It is true that the District Manager did not call upon the appellant to show cause why he should not agree with the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer. I am not aware of any rule or law that the District Manager should have also given a show-cause notice to the appellant before accepting the finding of the Enquiry Officer. The appellant was given full opportunity by the Enquiry Officer to produce his witnesses and to cross-examine the witnesses of the complainant. It is not the case of the appellant that he was not heard by the Enquiry Officer. All the witnesses were examined in the presence of the appellant and he was given full opportunity to cross-examine them. Mr. Qureshi relied on two authorities of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that the principle of natural justice required that the appellant should have been given an opportunity to be heard in person by the District Manager. He, relied on the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, East Pakistan v. Fazlur Rahman (1). In that
(1) PLD 1964 SC 410 case, the question was as, to whether proceedings under section 33-A were judicial or administrative. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the proceedings were judicial and, therefore, the appellant in that case should were have been allowed by the income-tax Authorities an opportunity to be heard. In the present case, the appellant had already been heard by the Enquiry Officer. So far as the question of his hearing in respect of the proposed punishment was concerned, he had the fullest opportunity before the learned Chairman of the Industrial Court. He examined himself and had person opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Muhammad Khan, person who had checked the bus, before the learned Chairman of the industrial Court. The appellant was represented by Mr.Wasiullah Qureshi before the Industrial Court. He was entitled to raise all the points, which he has urged before me. The learned Chairman after considering the arguments of Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi against the application for permission to dismiss the appellant granted the same.
10. The second case that he relied upon is of Saiyyld Abdul A'la Maudoodi and 2 others v. The Government of West Pakistan and another (1) In that case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court again laid down the principle that no one should be condemned unheard. 1n the present case, as I have already observed, there is no dental of the principle of natural justice if the District Manager did not call upon the appellant to show cause shy he should not be dismissed. Whether the person had an opportunity to defend himself is a question which depends upon the circumstances each case. In the present case, the appellant had the fullest opportunity before the Industrial Court, as welt as before the Enquiry Officer.
11. It was contended in the fourth place, that the Depart--mental instructions in respect of the recording of the statements of the passengers and other persons at the time when the checking took place have not been observed. Mr. Qureshi has not referred to any departmental instructions, which so laid down. Mr. Nasirul Hasan, the learned Representative for the respondent, submitted that he was not aware of any such instructions. Mr. Nasirul Hasan relied on 1963 PLC 235. That case has no application to the proposition advanced by Mr. Qureshi. All that has been observed in that case is that the Court is entitled to see as to what are the rules of the Department.
12. It was urged in the fifth place that the Enquiry Officer has not given reasons for his conclusions.
In the absence of the reasons it was urged that the finding of the Enquiry Officer was vitiated. The learned Representative relied on the case of Kardah & Co. Limited v. Their Workmen (2). In that case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court of India held that the Enquiry Officer should give his reasons for his finding. In the present case, as I have already observed, the perusal of the Enquiry Report show that the Enquiry Office had applied his mind to
(1) PLD 1964 SC 673(2)1964 PLC 402 the version put forward by the appellant and had given his reasons for his conclusions as a layman.
13. It was submitted in the sixth place that no independent evidence was produced. 1n this connection reliance was placed on PLD 1965 SC 1 t 1 at p.
113. A perusal of the authority itself discloses that the rule of law does not lay down that persons interested in the prosecution cannot be believed. It will depend upon the circumstances of each case whether person9 interested in the prosecution should or should not be believed. In the present case, nothing has been made out in the cross--examination of Mr. Muhammad Khan, Mr.' Arz Muhammad Abro and Mr. Jamaluddin, as to why they should not be believed. No case in the cross-examination has been made out against these persons that they had any motive to falsely implicate the appellant.
14. It was submitted that no show-cause notice was given to the appellant in respect of the proposed punishment. It has been held in a number of unreported cases of the West Pakistan High Court, Karachi Bench, in matters relating to the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, that where the worker had an opportunity before the industrial Court to show cause against D an application under section 30 of the Ordinance of 1959, not further show-cause notice was necessary.
15. I may mention some of the cases referred to in support of the contention that no second show- cause notice was necessary where a worker had an opportunity before the Industrial Courtin an application under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959.
Anwar Husain v. Industrial Court. Karachi, Petition No. 726 of 1966, decided by Ilahi Bakhsh Khamisani and S. A. Haq, JJ. supports the view. Muhammad Gul and Muhammad Afzal Cheema, JJ. expressed the same view in Writ Petition No. 448 of 1967 (Irfun All v. The Chairman, Industrial Court, Karachi), Muhammad Gul J. in Miscelleneous Appeal No. 96 of 1967 (Asamtulluh v. The District Manager, Government Transport Service, Hyderabad at Karachi), observed as under :- "The matter rests entirely in rules and it is firmly established principle that a mere violation of a rule as distinguished from a provision of the Statute or Constitution would not furnish an aggrieved employee to challenge the order of his dismissal if otherwise he is given a fair opportunity to defend himself. See the Supreme Court's judgment Nurul Hasan's case PLD 1936 SC (Pak.) 331.
Moreover, it was recently held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of an employee of the EPIDC. The Chairman EPIDC v. Rustam Ali etc. PLD 1966 SC 848, which is a body corporate that in his case the mere fact that no notice was issued to him at the penultimate stage of the disciplinary proceedings against him would not vitiate the order of punishment."
17. Lastly, It was submitted that the usual procedure of examining the complainant's witnesses first and then allowing an opportunity to the defence, has not been observed. It was Submitted that on 9th January 1967, Mr. Muhammad Khan, Traffic Assistant, was examined and thereafter, the appellant. On 10th January 1967, the appellant examined his defence witnesses. Thereafter, on I1th January 1967, two witnesses on behalf of the complainant were again examined, namely, Bokhari and Jamaluddin. Mr. Nasirul Hassan on the other hand brought to my notice that after examination of Mr. Boknari and the appeallant was again given opportunity to say whatever he wanted to say.
The Appellant examined himself on 16th January 1967, and thereafter, the case was closed. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the appellant had been prejudiced by the conduct of the Enquiry officer. No other point was urged before me. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.