ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This petition under Article 98 of the Constitution seeks to challenge the correctness and legality of the refusal of the Irrigation authorities to allow supply of canal water for the purpose of irrigating nearly two hundred acres of land situate in Chak No. 187/9-L, In the District of Sahiwal. The dispute has arisen in the following circumstances.
2. The petitioner is a registered Company functioning under the name and style of Messrs Aziz Tanneries Limited, Montgomery. In 1951 it purchased from the Provincial Govern--ment barren State land measuring 211 acres, 2 kanals and 11 marlas by private treaty at the rate of Rs. 360 per acre for the installation of a tannery and industries subsidiary thereto. Subsequently, the Company applied for permission to utilize some of the area for agricultural purposes, and also prayed for the supply of canal water in that behalf. The request was refused, necessitating arbitration proceedings before the Divisional Commis--sioner, in terms of clause 12 (1) of the sale agreement between the parties. The Commissioner, Multan Division, gave his award on the 25th of November 1959 to the effect that he found no objection in allowing the petitioner the privilege of converting some of the area for agricultural purposes, subject to the condition that he should pay an additional price of the land at the rate of Rs. 100 per acre. In para. 3 of his award he stated that the petitioner- Company had desired to utilize some area for agri--cultural purposes, subservient to the tanning industry, by making the land fit for growing Kikar and Hura trees etc. And that in this connection they had requested for the extension of canal water supply without the Government claiming any compensation for the same. In para. 4 of his order he stated that he had by another order made on the 24th of October 1958 already directed the canal authorities to extend canal water supply to this land in the interest of the tannery industry as also for Grow More Food Campaign.
3. In pursuance of the award given by the Divisional Commissioner on the 25th of November 1959, the Deputy Commissioner of the Sahiwal District addressed a letter to the Executive Engineer of the Lower Bari Doab Canal on the 3rd of May 1960, requesting that as the petitioner-company had deposited the additional price for an area measuring 201 acres, 3 kanals and 18 marlas, necessary arrangements for providing canal water supply to the area may be made. The Executive Engineer concerned informed the Deputy Commissioner, vide his letter dated the 5th of July 1961, that the area in question is neither included in the capacity of the outlet nor in the capacity of the channel sanctioned by the Chief Engineer, vide his No. 3301/S-Nor, dated 11-8-1934. Therefore, in the light of the rules, this area cannot be supplied with canal water.
"Moreover, the case was referred to the Governor of West Pakistan who vide his letter No. 10/39/S/O 3 (1) 56-1, dated 21-3-1959 had turned down the request of Messrs Aziz Tanneries for regular canal supply."
4. Having failed to get the necessary relief from the executive authorities, the petitioner made an application in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Montgomery, under section 14 of the Arbitration Act on the 24th of November 1962, for the filing of the award of the Commissioner, Multan Division, dated the 25th of November 1959. The Province of West Pakistan, through the Collector, Montgomery, as well as the Superintending Engineer Lower Bari Doab Canal, Montgomery, were cited as defendants. It was prayed that the Commissioner's award be made the rule of the Court.
5. The petitioner's application was allowed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Montgomery, by his order dated the 15th of September 1964. He stated that in the reply filed by the defendants the right of the Canal authorities to stop the supply of water was asserted, and it was also pleaded that the award of the learned Commissioner had been sent to the Board of Revenue for confirmation under paragraph 92 (v) (vi) of Standing Order No. 67. An objection to the civil Court's jurisdiction was also taken in terms of section 36 of the Colonisation of Government Lands Act, 1912. After stating these objections, the learned Senior Civil Judge proceeded to hold that the relevant paragraph of Standing Order No. 67 did not require confirmation of the award by the Board of Revenue or the Provincial Governor. Accordingly, he made the award the rule of the Court, and directed that a decree shall be prepared in accordance with the award.
6. The Judgment of the learned Senior Civil Judge was followed by a decree in the following terms:- "It is ordered that there is no objection in allowing the petitioners the privilege of converting some of the area for agricultural purposes subject to the condition that he should pay an additional price for the land at the rate of Rs. 100 per acre."
7. The judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge were not challenged in appeal by the Provincial Government in the Revenue Department, nor by the Superintending Engineer, Lower Bari Doab Canal, who was specifically cited as one of the defendants before the civil Court.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Canal authorities did not agree to sanction the supply of canal water, with the result that the Company was compelled to make further applications to the Irrigation Department. On the 7th of April 1965, the Superintending Engineer, in his capacity as the Superintending Canal Officer of the Lower Bari Doab Canal Circle, addressed a letter to the Divisional Canal Officer, Montgomery giving a brief history of the dispute and directing that 200 acres of the land in dispute be Included in the CCA of the relevant outlet. As this is an important document in the case it would be useful to reproduce it here in extenso:- "Since the award of the learned Commissioner, Multan Division passed on 25-11-1959 in favour of Sh. Abdul Aziz & Sons, Montgomery, has been upheld and made a rule of the Court by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Montgomery vide his order dated 15-9-1964. And in face of the opinion given on the matter by the Law Department vide Solicitor to Government of West Pakistan, Lahore letter No. 4713/65 dated 13-3-1965, copy received with Chief Engineer, Irrigation Lahore Zone's letter No. 437/R&ST/65/LR/465/53/59 dated 17-3-1965 to the effect that the case seems to have been rightly decided by the Senior Civil Judge, Montgomery and no useful purpose will be served by taking the matter in appeal and the enhanced cost for whole of the area in question i.e. AKM 211-2-11-having been deposited in the Government Treasury at the rate of Rs. 140 per a.-re as stated by the applicant, it is hereby ordered that 200 acres (Two hundred acres) area belonging to Sh. Abdul Aziz & Sons Montgomery situated in Chak 187/9L should be included in the CCA of the outlet RIO 65500R/IR/9L Disty. Chak 187/9L. The rest of the area of the applicant measuring 11-2-11 AKM has not been provided with canal water, because it has come under permanent structure as a result of erection of buildings for tanneries as stated by the applicant, and as such is Ghair-Mumkin: "In view of the order of the Court the case should be dealt with on priority basis, by sending the A/Form within a period of 7 days, and thereafter warabandi fixed within 3 weeks"
8. A copy of this letter was endorsed to the petitioner---Company for information with reference to its application dated the 5th of April 1965, and it was directed to approach the Divisional Canal Officer, Montgomery Division Lower Bari Doab Circle in connection with the fixation of its warabandi.
9. The proceedings before the Divisional Canal Officer took some time to finalise, and ultimately this officer passed an order on the 30th of May 1966 under section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act directing that the applicant's area measuring 197.16 acres be included is CCA of outlet RD- 65500R/9L. Of Chak No. 187/9-L. He stated that no new Khal or Nakas were required to be sanctioned. He concluded his order by giving technical data having a bearing on the question of water supply, and stating that his decision would be subject to confirmation by the Superintending Canal Officer, Lower Bari Doab Canal Circle, Montgomery.
10. The matter finally came up before the Superintending Engineer, and by his order dated the 11 of September 1966 he rejected the decision given by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966. He observed that "this was a cast and still is a case of extension of Irrigation. It was only for the competent authority to consider the issue. This case has only now been considered, under section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act VIII of 1873. I have studied the case thoroughly and the decision of the learned Divisional Canal Officer, Montgomery Division has been studied. Decision given by the Divisional Canal officer is rejected."
11. It is contended by Sh. Aftab Hussain, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that in the presence of the award given by the learned Commissioner, Multan Division, on the 25th of November 1959, the judgment and decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Montgomery, on the 15th of September 1964, and the sanction granted by the Superintending Engineer on the 7th of April 1965, the successor Superintending Engineer, who has passed the impugned order dated the 11th of September 1966, had no jurisdiction or lawful authority to refuse the supply of canal water by reversing or revoking the previous order made in this behalf by the competent authority. It is submitted that the Provincial Government as well as the Superintending Engineer being parties to the proceedings before the learned Senior Civil Judge, were bound by the decree of the civil Court, as they had accepted the same and had not thought it fit to file an appeal against it. It appears to the learned counsel that even otherwise the order made by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966, was correct both legally and technically and could not, therefore, be set aside by the Superin--tending Canal Officer in an arbitrary and capricious manner, without giving any cogent reasons for its rejection. It is finally submitted by the learned counsel that the technical data mentioned in the decision of the Divisional Canal Officer, dated the 30th of May 1966, clearly shows that sufficient supply of water is available for the land in dispute, and therefore even on merits there is no justification for the refusal of the depart--mental authorities to permit canal irrigation in this case.th
12. The petition is stoutly contested on behalf of the Provincial Government and the Superintending Engineer, Lower Bari Doab, Canal Circle. It is submitted by Mr. Qadir Bakhsh, the learned counsel for the respondents, that-
(a) the sale-deed executed in favour of the petitioner---Company clearly recites that the land in disputes is waste State land, and, therefore, by the very nature of the transaction, and the purpose for which the land was being sold, namely, the establishment of an industry, there could be no question of any entitlement accruing in favour of the petitioner for the supply of canal water;
(b) the award given by the Divisional Commissioner, as well as the decree made by the learned Senior Civil Judge on the basis of the award, do not relate to the question of the supply of canal water, but are strictly restricted to the conversion of some of the land from an industrial to an agricultural purpose;
(c) the Superintending Engineer not being a party to the proceedings before the Court or the Divisional Commissioner, is not bound by the award and the consequential decree
(d) the order made by the Superintending Engineer on the 7th of April 1965, for sanctioning water supply, was in violation of section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act as no notice was given to the persons concerned, and as the initial proceedings were not commenced by the Divisional Canal Officer;
(e) the final order made by the Superintending Canal Officer on the case having been referred to him by the Divisional Canal Officer under section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act, was within the jurisdiction of the Superintending Engineer, and proceeded on a proper appreciation of the technical aspect of the matter inasmuch as the area in dispute was not included within the irrigation boundary of the channel and outlet concerned; and
(f) that, in any case, the authority to include additional area within the irrigation boundary rested with the Chief Engineer and the Provincial Government, and both these authorities had rejected the petitioner's request after fully applying their mind to the matter.
13. The first question which naturally requires determina--tion in this case is regarding the effect of the award made by the Divisional Commissioner on the 25th of November 1959 and of the decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sahiwal, on the 15th of September 1964, by making the award the rule of the Court. From the narration of events, as given in the opening paragraphs of this judgment, there can be no doubt whatsoever that reference to arbitration was necessitated by the desire of the petitioner-Company to utilise some of the area for agricultural purposes, and by the refusal of the canal authorities to supply water for the same. It was precisely for this reason that an interim order was obtained from the learned Commis--sioner on the 24th of October 1958, directing that canal water should be supplied for the entire area. It is instructive to note that in this order the Commissioner wrote that,- "I have also taken the opinion of the land valuation experts in regard to the difference in the price of land of this descrip--tion without canal water supply and in the price of land to which the canal water supply is made, considering the exact amount of extra money which should be levied from Aziz Tanneries for being granted the facility of canal water supplies. The Tanneries have agreed to pay to the State in the normal instalments whatever sums are held to be due in my capacity as arbitrator. The proprietor has requested that as the Rabi sowing season is right on us, facilities may be granted for the supply of canal water in this area at once. I think it is in the public interest that these facilities should be granted on the undertaking by him as already referred to."
14. The interim order, partly reproduced above, shows unmistakably that whatever the scope of the arbitration clause, as contained in paragraph 12 of the sate-deed, the petitioner was seeking a conversion from industrial to agricultural purposes and was also demanding water supply for the same. It is therefore, not possible to accept the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the Provincial Government or the Superintending Engineer were not aware of the real purpose of the arbitration proceedings, nor is it possible to agree that the Superintending Engineer was not bound by the award, or the consequential decree of the civil Court, as he was not a party to those proceedings. The assertion is factually incorrect, as in the judgment and decree granted by the Senior Civil Judge the Superintending Engineer and the Province of West Pakistan are both cited as defendants. In the copy of the arbitration award, placed on the record, the names of the defendants are clearly stated to be the same as were arrayed before the civil Court. In any case even an interim order had already been issued by the arbitrator for supplying canal water. The Irrigation Depart--ment was therefore fully involved. We further find that in the detailed order, recorded by the Superintending Engineer on the 7th of April 1965, it is clearly mentioned that the Irrigation Department had actively considered the advisability of filing an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sahiwal, but the idea was dropped on the advice of the Solicitor to the Provincial Government. Finally, in terms of sec--tions 79 and 80 of the Civil Procedure Code it was not; necessary to cite the Superintending Engineer as a defendant, and it was sufficient if the Provincial Government was sued through the Collector of the district concerned. Any decree passed against the Province, acting through the Collector, would be binding on all the departments of the Provincial Government. It would be an altogether untenable position to maintain that individual departments of the Provincial Government are not bound by a decree granted against the Government as a whole.
15. We may now examine the contention that the arbitration award and the decree of the civil Court are not binding on the defendants for the reason that they go beyond the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the sale-deed executed by the Provincial Government in favour of the petitioner. The relevant clause reads as under:- "12. (i) If any question or difference whatsoever shall at any time thereafter arise between Government and the grantee in any way touching or concerning this grant, or the cons--truction making operation or effect thereof or of any clause herein contained or as to the rights, duties or of liabilities of either party under or by virtue of this grant, or touching the subject-matter of this grant, or arising out of or in relation thereto, then, save in so far as the decision of any such matter has been hereinbefore provided for and has been so decided, the matter in difference shall be referred to the arbitration of the Commissioner, who shall have power to decide any matter as referred, including the following questions:-
(a) Whether any other provision has been made in these presents for the decision of any matter and if such provision has been made, whether it has been finally decreased accord--ingly, and
(b) whether the grant should be terminated or has been rightly terminated, and what are or will be the rights and obligations of the parties as the result of such termination.
(ii) The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding, and when any matter so referred to arbitration involves a claim for the award, increase or reduction of a sum of money by way of compensation or any other payment or recovery of money, only the amount decided by the arbitrator shall be recoverable in respect of the dispute so referred."
16. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the res--pondents that the arbitration clause clearly refers to disputes which might arise between the parties with regard to the grant of land as such, and does not include extraneous questions like the supply of canal water. It is contended that accordingly any decision given with regard to the supply of canal water must be held to be outside the purview of the dispute which could be referred to arbitration under clause 12 of the sale-deed.
17. A careful examination of the arbitration clause does not support the contention put forward by Mr. Qadir Bakhsh. It will be seen that the purpose of the grant, as stated in clause 2 of the deed, is the "installation of a tannery and collateral industries". The petitioner desired a change in this purpose so as to enable it to utilise the area for agriculture, as a consequence where of two questions arose:-
(a) The enhancement of the price to be paid by the vendee, and
(b) the supply of canal water for agricultural purposes. This was clearly a dispute touching the grant and was referred to the Divisional Commissioner in accordance with clause 12 of the deed.
Both the parties clearly regarded the entire dispute as falling within the purview of the arbitration clause. We do not see how the Provincial Government can be permitted, at this late stage, to take up the position that the question of supply of canal water was not included in the dispute referred to arbitration, or that it went beyond the scope of the arbitration clause.
18. 1n any case, what is important is not the scope of the arbitration clause but the scope and nature of the dispute actually referred to arbitration. Even if the question of the supply of canal water be held to be not strictly covered by the arbitration clause, the fact remains that by mutual consent the Forties referred this dispute to the Divisional Commissioner as arbitrator. The binding effect of an arbitration award arises not from the scope of the arbitration clause, but from the nature and extent of the dispute actually referred to arbitration by the parties thereto. In the instant case, the enhanced price of the land assessed by the Commissioner clearly took into account the fact that canal water would be made available to the area in dispute. In the interim order made by him on the 24th of October 1958, he stated that he had "taken the opinion of the land valuation experts in regard to the difference in the price of land of this description without canal water supply and in the price of land to which canal water supply is made". Thus it is clear that the dispute referred to arbitration by the parties included the question of the supply of canal water to this land.
19. A perusal of the application made by the petitioner under clause 12 (1) of the sale deed places this matter completely beyond doubt. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the submission made by the Company deal at length with its efforts to obtain supply of canal water and the refusal of the Collector and the Irrigation officials to sanction the same. The prayers made in the concluding paragraph of the submission are:-
(i) That the Collector may kindly be asked to restore the canal water supply immediately;
(ii) that the applicants be allowed to make this land fit for cultivation in accordance with the layout plan; and
(iii) that the applicants may kindly be paid for damage done to standing crops which have been dried for want of canal water.
20. No material has been placed on the record by the respondents to show that they objected to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to go into the question of the supply of canal water. In these circumstances, we must hold that even if the original arbitration clause did not embrace the dispute regarding the supply of canal water, yet the submission to arbitration clearly related to this dispute, thus giving the arbitrator, by mutual consent, jurisdiction to make an award in this behalf.
21. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we have reached the conclusion that the arbitration award given by the Divisional Commissioner on the 25th of November 1959, does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity, that it was within the scope of the arbitration clause which embraced all question touching the grant, and that in any case the actual submission to arbitration Included the dispute regarding the supply of canal water. The Provincial Government and the Superintending Engineer concerned were parties to the arbitration and the proceedings in the civil Court, and therefore the award as well as the decree are binding upon them. Even if the Superintending Engineer was not a party to the arbitration proceedings, he would be bound by the award and the decree for the reason that the Provincial Government was a party to both proceedings. The real dispute referred to arbitration related to the supply of canal water, and an enhancement of the price payable by the petitioner was based solely on this consideration. Accordingly, the present petition has to be accepted on this ground alone.
22. Even otherwise, we find that the order made by the Superintending Engineer on the 7th of April 1965, and the subsequent order made by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966, could not be said to b e illegal or without jurisdiction. The case essentially fell within the scope of section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act as the petitioner had applied for the supply of water through an existing water--course, namely, outlet RD-65500-R on Distributory 9-L, Ganji Canal Lower Bari Doab). The water supply had previously been refused by the Executive Engineer on intimation given to him by the Collector of the district to the effect that the land had been sold to the petitioner- company for an industrial purpose. The Superintending Engineer dealt with the matter in the light of the award given by the Divisional Commissioner and the decree passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge. He did not, however, decide the matter finally but left it to the Divisional Canal Officer to take formal action in accordance with the procedure prescribed by section 20 of the Act.
23. A perusal of the decision given by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966, shows that he fully complied with the formalities prescribed by the section. He has stated that notice was issued by him on the 25th of April 1966, and properly served upon the shareholders of the watercourse under the rules and the case was heard by him on 24th May 1965. In the presence of this recital in the order of the Divisional Canal Officer, it is not open to the Superintending Engineer or the Provincial Government to raise the objection that no notice was given to the concerned persons.
24. Similarly, the objection that the proceedings should, is the first instance, have been initiated by the Divisional Canal Officer is nothing but a sheer technicality in the circumstances of this case, when the dispute had already gone up in arbitra--tion to the Divisional Commissioner and to the civil Court, and no appeal had been filed against the orders made in those proceedings. However, the Superintending Engineer, as already stated, did not docile the matter finally on the 7th of April 1965, and instead directed the Divisional Canal Officer to comply with the procedure prescribed in section 20 of the Act. Thus even the technicality of the Divisional Canal Officer dealing with the matter, in the first instance, and then referring his decision to the Superintending Canal Officer for confirmation was fully observed.
25. Mr. Qadir Bakhsh, the learned counsel for the res--pondents, referred us to Kadir Bakhsh v.
Bhagat Rain and others (71 P R 1888), Ganga Sahai and others v. Emperor (AIR 1929 All. 271), Ruksan and others v. Emperor (56 I C 717), Kania Lal and others v. Narain Singh (50 I C 299) and Hetam Lambardar v. Mokha (PLD 1956 Lah. 490) in support of his contention that an exact compliance with all the essential provisions of the section was absolutely necessary to give finality to an order passed under section 20 of the Act. We find that out of the cases cited by the learned counsel only the first is directly relevant in the present context, the remaining four being concerned with slightly different matters. We have, however, already recorded the finding that there has been no non- compliance with the provisions of section 20 of the Act by the Divisional Canal Officer inasmuch as he took proper proceedings after issuing notice to the persons mentioned in the section.
26. Coming now to the order passed by the Superintending Canal Officer on the 11th of September 1966, we find that there is substance in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it suffers from a serious infirmity, as it does not give any reasons whatsoever for rejecting the well-considered decision embodied in the Divisional Canal Officer dated the 30th of May 1966. It is true that in terms of section 20 of the Act the decision of the Divisional Canal Officer requires confirmation by the Superintending Canal Officer, but in matters affecting valuable property rights, confirmation cannot be allowed to be withheld without assigning cogent reasons.
27. In Ali Haider v. Ijaz Hussain Malik, District Magistrate, Rawalpindi and another (1968 P Cr. L J 127) their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the withdrawal of the arms licences held by the petitioner observed that - "the withdrawal of a licence is a penalty and the act of imposing a penalty must be based on an objective assessm ent of the material on which it is made and the matter cannot be left to the arbitrary will or caprice of the revoking authority. When the statute require that the revoking authority must give reasons for its action, we feel that the issue then travels outside the mere subjective satisfaction of the authority and reaches a domain where the absence of reasons or the scrutiny of the reasons will fall for determination of the High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 95 of the Constitution. In our mind this is a fit case in which we must hold that the order of the learned District Magistrate, revoking the licences of the petitioner is without any lawful authority, as it contains no reason for the action taken and no reason exists relatable to the statutory purpose for which the licences could be cancelled under section 12 of the Ordinance."'
28. The necessity for assigning cogent reasons in a matter of this kind had earlier been indicated by the Supreme Court in the case of Adamjee Jute Mills Limited v. The Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272) and was reiterated in Mir Ahmad Nawaz Khan Bughli v. Superintendent, District Jail, Layallpur and others (PLD 1966 SC 357). Although both these cases related to judicial orders made by the High Court, yet the observations made therein have a direct bearing on the validity of even quasi-judicial orders. Their Lordships have emphasised that "a judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved in their proper adjudication."
29. As already stated, the learned Superintending Engineer has not given any cogent reason in his order dated the 11th of September 1966, for rejecting the decision given by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966. The statement that "I have studied the case thoroughly and the decision of the learned Divisional Canal Officer, Montgomery Division, has been studied", hardly carries any meaning and cannot be said to amount to a valid reason for refusing confirmation of the Divisional Canal Officer's order. In these circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the order dated the 11th of September 1966, must be declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. As a consequence, the decision rendered by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966, shall hold the field.
30. It now only remains to consider whether the order made by the Divisional Canal officer sanctioning water supply is in any manner against any provision of law or of rules having a bearing on this point. It was submitted by Mr. Qadir Bakhsh that the authority to include additional area within the irrigation boundary rested with the Chief Engineer and the Provincial Government, and both these authorities had rejected the petitioner's request after fully applying their mind to the matter. The learned counsel referred us to paragraphs 13.1 and 13.19 of the Public Works Department, Punjab (Irrigation Branch). Revenue Manual, Fourth Edition. The first mentioned paragraph lays down that "in the absence of specific delegation, no officer has the power to authorise any change in the water allowance sanctioned by Government for any tract of country".
Paragraph 13.19 contains instructions intended to secure uniformity and efficiency in the record and checking of outlets. One of the registers mentioned in this paragraph is the Chakbandi register. It is stated that the Chakbandi for the relevant outlet was sanctioned by the Superintending Engineer in 1941 and it excluded the area in dispute from the culturable commanded area of the outlet.
31. Reference was also made to certain definitions contained in Chapter I of the Irrigation Practice Manual in an effort to show that the area now in dispute could not be included in the irrigation boundary without the sanction of the Chief Engineer.
32. We regret we do not see any merit in these submissions. In the first place, the order of the Superintending Canal Officer, which is impugned before us does not rest on any of the paragraphs referred to by Mr. Qadir Bakhsh. The Superintending Engineer has treated the case, and rightly, as one failing under section 20 of the Canal and Drainage Act. This section provides for supply of water from a canal which is to be conveyed through an existing watercourse. It is clear that ordinarily an application under section 20 would be for an area which was previously not receiving such irrigation. It cannot be said that any such case must be submitted to the Chief Engineer for sanction, as it need not necessarily involve a change in the irrigation boundary. From the technical data embodied in the closing paragraph of the order of the Divisional Canal Officer, dated the 30th of May 1966, we find that the gross area included in the irrigation boundary of outlet RD-65500-R on Distributory 9-L is 1075 acres and the culturable commanded area is 557 acres. With the inclusion of the area in dispute the gross area still remains the same and the culturable Commanded area (i.e. C.C.A.) is increased to 754-16 acres. It would appear from these figures that there is no change in the gross area. A study of the irrigation map produced by Mr. Qadir Bakhsh left us with the impression that there was no change in the irrigation boundary either. In other words, the only increase is in the area to which water would be actually supplied, within the irrigation boundary already sanctioned as well as the gross area attached to the outlet concerned.
An increase in the C. C. A. Is possible consequence of any sanction accorded under section 20 of the Act. We cannot therefore accept the contention that the order made by the Divisional Canal Officer amounts to changing the irrigation boundary of the outlet concerned.
33. The position which therefore emerges in this case is that in the first place the dispute, which was referred to arbitration, concerned primarily the question of the supply of canal water to the acre in dispute, and the Provincial Government as well as its Irrigation Department are bound by the award given by the Divisional Commissioner on the 25th of November 1959 and made a rule of the Court by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Sahiwal, on the 15th of September 1964. If canal water was not to be supplied, then there was no justification whatsoever for enhancing the price payable by the petitioner. The award given by the learned Commissioner places this matter beyond doubt, and the same position emerges from a perusal of the submission to arbitration as contained in the petitioner's application in this behalf. In the second place, the order made by the Superintending Engineer on the 7th of April 1965, further clinches the issue by clearly stating that the question of filing an appeal against the decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge had been actively considered by the Irrigation Department, but it was decided not to do so, and it was for this reason that the Superintending Engineer directed the Divisional Canal Officer to take proceedings under section 20 of the Act. This officer complied with the essential requirements of the section before passing his order of the 30th of May 1966. The order appears to be justified even on the technical plane in the light of the data contained in its concluding para--graph. The learned Superintending Engineer, who has passed the impugned order, dated the 11th of September 1966, has acted without lawful authority in rejecting the decision of the Divisional Canal officer, as he has not given any cogent reason in support of his order. Valuable property rights could not be allowed to be dealt with in this arbitrary manner. As a result, the petitions is clearly entitled to the supply of water in terms of the decision rendered by the Divisional Canal Officer on the 30th of May 1966, in the light of the arbitration award and the decree of the civil Court. Finally, the case was not one involving change in the irrigation boundary, and therefore no question arose of obtaining the sanction of the Chief Engineer or the Provincial Government.
34. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is accepts with costs, and the impugned order dated the 11th of September 1966 is declared to be without lawful authority and of n legal effect. The Provincial Government and the Irrigation Department are directed to supply canal water in accordance with the decision of the Divisional Canal officer, dated the 30th of May 1966.