' The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of this second appeal are not in dispute and may be briefly stated. Dullah, respondent 2, was the owner of 25 Kanals 6 Marlas of the land in dispute, situate in the area of Chak No,460/G,B., Tehsil and District Sheikhupura. On the 20th December, 1965, he executed the sale-deed, Exh.D.1, whereby he sold the land to Shah Muhammad, respondent 1, for Rs,4,000. On the 23rd December, 1965, he executed another sale-deed, Exh.P.1, transferring the land to Ahmad Din, appellant, against consideration of Rs,3,500. The sale-deed, Exh.P.1, was registered the day it was executed, that is, on the 23rd December, 1965. The other sale-deed, Exh.D.1, was presented for registration before the Sub-Registrar, Sheikhupura, on the 26th February, 1966. The Sub-Registrar summoned Dullah who stated that he had transferred the land by another sale-deed to some one else and, therefore, he would not certify Exh.D.1.
Respondent 1 had to secure the order of the Registrar for getting Exh.D.1 registered and its registration was completed on the 9th May, 1967.
2. On the 26th April, 1967, the appellant instituted suit against the respondents for a declaration that he was the owner of the land in dispute, that the respondents had no concern whatever therewith and for issuance of perpetual injunction restraining them from interfering with the possession thereof. The basis of his ownership was purchase of land through sale-deed, Exh.P.1, from respondent 2.
3. Respondent 1 resisted the suit and set up his own title on the footing of the sale-deed, Exh.D.1. He maintained that the said sale-deed had priority over the sale-deed, Exh.P.1, which had been executed later.
4. Respondent 2 did not choose to put in appearance when the suit was called on for hearing and, therefore, was proceeded against ex parte.
5. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Sheikhupura, seized with the trial of the suit, formed the view that respondent 1 was not a bona fide purchaser of the suit land and decreed the suit on the 25th July, 1968. However, in appeal the learned Additional District Judge, Sheikhupura, vide his judgment of the 22nd March, 1969, reversed the decision of the learned trial Court. He considered the approach of the learned trial Court to the problem to be improper. He found that the sale of the land in dispute in favour of respondent 1 had taken place earlier than the sale in the name of the appellant as the sale-deed, Exh.D.1, had been executed three days before the execution of the sale-deed, Exh.P.1. He concluded that under section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, the sale- deed, Exh.D.1, was to be operative from the date of its execution and not from the date of its registration.
Considering the sale in favour of respondent 1 to be complete when sale in the name of the appellant had not even taken birth, he took respondent 1 to be owner of the land in preference to the appellant and consequently non-suited the latter. "
6. The only point which is determinative of the fate of the appeal and which has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant and respondent 1 is as to which deed of sale is to take precedence over the other.
Quoting observations from the judgment delivered in Gobardhan Bar v. Gunadhar Bar AIR 1941 Cal. 78 to the effect "that it is undoubtedly true that as between the transfer or and the transferee a registered document takes effect from the date of execution; and if there is a competition between two documents relating to the same property both of which are registered, the one executed earlier in point of time will have priority, but as regards third party the point of time at which the deed is to be effective is when it is registered", the learned counsel for the appellant tried to argue that .As against respondent 1, who should be taken as a third party, the deed of sale would be effective when it had been registered and as Exh.P.1 had been registered much earlier than Exh.D.1 the appellant would be taken to have become owner of the property before respondent 1 could be said to have acquired title thereto the registration of Exh.D.1 in his favour much later. I am afraid the observations relied upon by the learned counsel do not help advance the appellant's case. The precedent case pertains to a pre-emption suit wherein the transfer of the pre-emptible property could not be treated to be complete unless the sale-deed was registered. It was with regard to the third party, namely, the pre-emptor, that it was remarked that the point of time from which the sale-deed was to be effective was when it was to be registered. With this proposition there is no quarrel. However, as stated in the earlier portion of the observation and as is apparent from the provisions of section 17 of the Registration Act, a registered document including a sale-deed would operate from the date of its execution and not from the date of its registration; the title relates back to the date of execution for the purpose of priority once registration is effected. The registered sale-deed will not be defeated by another sale-deed executed later but registered earlier. Also if a deed is registered after the suit has been filed, the transfer will not be subject to lis pendens if the deed was executed before the suit was filed as in the present case. The authorities reported as Jainullah v. Anu Mia PLD 1964 Dacca 12, Duraisami Reddi v. Angappa Reddi AIR 1946 Mad. 140, Dost Muhammad Khan v. Imam Bakhsh PLD 1971 Pesh. 150, Ganeshprasad Bhadelal Baniya v. Bhaiyalal Gillelal Agarwal AIR 1938 Nag. 253, Tilakdhari Singh v. Gour Narain AIR 1921 Pat. 150, In re Akki Guru Basappa 87 I C 568, Veerakutty Koundan v. Ramasami Asari 32 I C 431 and Narayan Vankap Shetti v. Laxuman Shantaya Kini I L R 29 Born. 42, support the above proposition.
7. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant namely, Munawar Khan v. Atta Muhammad PLD 1975 Lah. 139, Dost Muhammad v. Mst. Lal Khatun 1975 SCMR 195, and Majid Ahmad v. Chaudhry Muhammad Sadiq PLD 1983 Pesh. 108, are hardly pertinent as they deal with the proposition that when a sale-deed is not registered it does not create title.
8. In view of the above, it follows that the sale-deed, Exh.D.1, should have precedence over the sale-deed, Exh.P.1, executed later than the former. Consequently the title passed to respondent 1 on the 20th December, 1965, and the appellant could not acquire a good title thereafter by virtue of sale-deed, Exh.D.1, on the 23rd December, 1965. The appellant's suit has been rightly dismissed. There is no force in this appeal which is dismissed with costs.
Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.