This is an appeal against the order of the learned Chairman. Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone, Lahore, passed under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
2. Mr. Mazhar Ali, appellant, was appointed as Personal Assistant to the Manager Incharge of "the Heavy Mechanical Complex, Taxila District Rawalpindi on 26-7-1966. In 1967, vide order dated 2-11- 1967, the appellant was given additional duties of general supervision of the office. According to the appellant sometime in 1967 he appeared as a witness for one Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan in an inquiry against him. Mr. Muhammad Zareef Manager, and some other officers on this account felt annoyed with him. On 9-6-1969, the appellant made an application to the Chairman, West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation for an interview, which was not granted and instead he was charge sheeted for insolvent behaviour with the General Manager and other officers of the respondent establishment. Ultimately he was dismissed from service on 17-12-1969 without any Inquiry. It appears that thereafter he sent a notice to the General Manager and when no reply was received, he filed an appeal before the Chairman, West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation and made several petitions to the Government but no reply was received. He also filed some civil suits against the Chairman, West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation. After the amendment of section 34 of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 16-10-1970, the appellant on 11-2-1971 filed an application before the Labour Court. Northern Zone, Lahore. The learned Chairman on 15-9-1971 dismissed the application, holding that the, appellant had no locus stands to make an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hence this appeal.
3. Now the first point for consideration is as to whether the application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was competent. Section 34 of the said Ordinance reads as follows:- "Application to the Labour Court:- Any collective bargaining agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
Admittedly the appellant is neither a collective bargaining agent nor a workman because in his cross-examination he stated that he was not a worker or a workman but belonged to super-- visory staff. According to section 34, a person, either a collec--the bargaining agent or employer or a workman can make an application. Since the appellant is neither a collective bargaining agent nor a workman, he in order to snake application under section 34 must fall in the category of an employer for filing an application against a workman. In the present case the application is not by an employer against workman but by a member of the supervisory stall' against his employer and there--fore no relief can be granted to the appellant under section 34 of the Ordinance.
4. Lastly I find that the appellant is guilty of laches. He was dismissed on 17-2-1969 but he filed the application before the Labour Court on 11-2-1971. In paragraph 13 of the application filed by the appellant, he has given an explanation as to why his application was belated. He stated that in the original Ordinance, only a bargaining agent could file an application. Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 originally framed, reads as under:- "Application to Labour Court:-Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any law for the the being in force or any award or settlement may apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
In view of section 43 of the said Ordinance, no industrial dispute would be deemed to exist unless it had been raised in the pres--cribed manner by a collective bargaining agent, therefore, any party to an industrial dispute had either to be a collective bar--gaining agent or an employer. In other words an individual workman could not file an application under section 34 of the said Ordinance.
On 16-10-1970, section 34 was amended a9 follows:- "Application to Labour Court:-Any collective bargaining agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
From the above, it is clear that an addition to a collective bar--gaining agent and an employer, an individual workman is also given a right to make the application. Unfortunately this provision has no retrospective effect, but even if it had, it would not have helped the appellant, because he on his own showing is not a workman.
For the aforesaid reasons I find no merit in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.