1. ' This First Rent Appeal is directed against the impugned order, dated 3.12-1984 of learned VI Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller at Karachi, whereby application for ejectment filed under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter to be referred as the said Ordinance) has been dismissed.
2. ' Briefly stated the relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that appellant Abu Bakar Khan is landlord and Respondent Qamruddin is tenant (hereinafter to be referred as such, respectively) in respect of demised premises consisting two Shops Nos. 12 and 13 in Chand Cloth Market, Liaquatabad, Karachi. On 8-5-1984 landlord filed application under section 14 of the said Ordinance for eviction of tenant from the demised premises on the ground that landlord has attained the age of 60 years and required the premises for his personal use. Such statutory notice was served on the tenant but premises were not vacated during the period stipulated therein.
3. Tenant filed written statement in which the facts were controverted and allegation of the landlord was denied. Authenticity of High School examination certificate produced by the landlord was called in question and averment was made that need of the landlord as expressed by him was not bona fide. In the evidence landlord examined himself and produced a number of documents in respect of his age and notice of Advocate dated 1-2-1984 sent to the tenant. Tenant examined himself and he also produced some documents. Tenant further examined three witnesses namely Barkat All Qamar, Muhammad Zakir Ali and Bashir Ahmad. From them first two witnesses named were cross-examined but so for the third witness Bashir Ahmed is concerned, his affidavit in evidence is on the record but he was not subjected to cross-examination.
4. I do not wish to make any comment on the evidence produced by the parties as mentioned above for the reason that the impugned order suffers from legal infirmity as the learned Rent Controller has dismissed ejectment application due to misconception of law acting on the assumption that if the landlord owned other premises, then he was precluded from seeking ejectment on the ground of personal need. It very clearly appears from the perusal of the impugned order that the learned Rent Controller has made no difference between "occupation" and "ownership", while interpreting the import of subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance, which envisages that the landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of subsection (1) if he is in occupation of building owned by him in any locality. Now if subsections (1) and (2) of section 14 are read in conjunction with each other, it would appear undoubtedly that benefit of subsection (1) will no be available to the landlord, if he is already in occupation of a building which is owned by him in any locality Here the emphasis is on the A occupation by the landlord. The landlord may own a number of tenements in the building or buildings but if all are rented out and no tenement is in occupation of the landlord then he is entitled to the benefit o summary eviction under section 14 of the Ordinance on the ground o personal need if he fulfils the requirements contemplated therein. If the landlord is already in occupation of similar accommodation in a building owned by him, then he is not entitled to the benefit under section 14 0 the Ordinance on the ground of personal need. Both words, "occupation" and "owned" have been used in subsection (2) of section 14 on purpose to make very clear the intention of the law-maker that the emphapis o requirement is on "occupation" and not the "ownership". There difference between "ownership" and "occupation", A person may own' a number of tenements in a building or buildings but he may not be in occupation of any one of them for the reason that they are in occupation of other tenants in spite of the fact that "ownership" is vested in the landlord. Requirement of personal need goes with "occupation" and not "ownership".
5. ' In the instant case the learned Rent Controller has made a mistake in interpreting the legal requirement of section 14(2) of the said Ordinance and has given a mistaken finding that if the landlord owns other shops then he cannot take of benefit of section 14 but can apply under section 15 of the Ordinance. Reliance on two cases cited in the impugned Order 1'. 84 CLC 2291 and Charles Villiams Scott v. Ch. Faqir Muhammad (F.R.A. No, 302 of 1981), decided on 24-8-1981 is misplaced. 1, therefore, set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the same Court of the learned Rent Controller for hearing fresh arguments to be advanced on behalf of the parties and then to decide the case strictly according to law and merits.
6. ' Before this Court this appeal was fixed for regular bearing alongwith hearing of two Miscellaneous Applications. C. M. A. 1880 of 1985 is application under Order XLI, rule 27, C. P. C. In which it is prayed that the tenant be allowed to produce P. T. I. Of Property Form showing that Shop No, 9 is in occupation of landlord and Shop No, 10 is vacant. Tenant is allowed to produce this document before the learned Rent Controller, who would decide the question strictly according to law and merits. Both the parties can be heard on the factual and legal sides arising from this document. In the result this application stands disposed of as allowed.
7. ' C. M. A. No, 1806 of 1985 is again an application under Order XLI, rule 27, C. P. C. In which the prayer is that the tenant be allowed to produce P. T. I. In respect of House No, P-19, Block No, 10 Federal 'IV Area, Karachi showing that property is owned and occupied by the landlord. Tenant is allowed to produce this document before the Rent Controller who would hear both sides on this point and then decided strictly according to law and merits. This application stands disposed of as allowed.
8. ' In the result as stated above impugned order is set aside and the case is remanded for hearing of fresh arguments to be advanced by both the parties and production of documents in the terms stated above, after which the learned Rent Controller can pass whatever order, he deems fit and proper strictly according to law and merits of this case. The learned Rent Controller is also directed to dispose of this case within two months.