This is a petition directed against the order dated the 3rd of May 1962 passed by Mr. Ijaz Hussain Shah, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore, whereby he dismissed the revision petition of the Managing Committee of Masjid Muhajreen in respect of a vacant site comprised in Khasra No. 1134, situated on Amrit Road, Krishan Nagar, Lahore.
2. The facts of the case are that there are two plots Nos. 1131 and 1134, and there is a mosque known as Masjid Muhajreen constructed in Khasra No. 1131. The dispute is only in respect of the plot comprised in Khasra No. 1134. Each of the parties i.e., the petitioner and respondent No. 3 claim a transfer of the plot on the basis that they constructed permanent structure on it. Their claim can be determined with reference to paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, and Settlement Scheme No. VI and also on the statutory order of the Central Government, dated the 16th of May 1961, known as the Religious Property Scheme.
3. The last date for submission of an application under Settlement Scheme No. VI was the 30th of November 1959, but none of the parties applied for its transfer within the prescribed period. Mst.
Zainab Bibi, respondent No. 3, applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore, for the condona--tion of delay in submitting an application for the transfer of the plot under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The delay was condoned under a letter dated the 20th of May 1960, from the Secretary to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore (Annexure R. 5). The application was considered by a so-called Plot Committee, consisting of two members, namely, Mr. A. A. Wasti, Additional Settlement Commissioner, and Agha Aziz Ahmad, Deputy Settlement Commissioner. The Committee ordered the transfer of the plot to respondent No. 3 on the 27th of August 1960 (Annexure R. 3). This order was duly communicated to respondent No. 3 by the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The order was not challenged by any person either in appeal or revision within the period of limitation.
4. Mr. Sanaullah is a representative of the petitioner and he applied for the transfer of this very plot on the 17th of October 1960 (Annexure C). The plot had already been transferred. This fact was known to Mr. Sanaullah because he made a mention of it in his petition and stated that he had learnt about it from the son of respondent No. 3. The basis on which the transfer was claimed was that a residential quarter for the imam Masjid had been constructed on seven marlas of land out of this plot. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner took no action on this petition.
5. In the meanwhile, the Central Government passed an order dated the 16th of May 1961 (Annexure J.) whereby they approved a scheme for the transfer of the so-called evacuee property which had been converted to religious use either in an authorised or unauthorised manner. Paragraph 1(a) of this letter, which is relevant for the purpose of this petition, is reproduced below:- "The properties which have been converted into a mosque or any other religious institutions after Partition may, on application, be transferred by the Additional Settlement Commissioner of the area concerned to the Anjuman or society in possession of the property or responsible for its maintenance subject to a certificate from the Deputy Commis--sioner of the district concerned that there is no objection to the property being utilised permanently for the religious purposes."
The Press-note in terms of this letter of the Central Govern--ment was issued on the 18th of May 1961. Mr. Sanaullah (representative of the Managing Committee, Masjid Muhajreen) applied on the 16th of June 1961 for the transfer of the property in dispute in terms of this order of the Central Government.
6. The Settlement Department published on the 21st of November 1961 a list of the evacuee properties to be sold by public auction on the 28th of November 1961. The property in dispute was mentioned therein. Mr. Sanaullah applied on the 27th of November to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, just a day before the auction, that seven marlas of land be deleted and be not auctioned. The total area of the property is sixteen marlas. Respondent No. 3 also submitted an application on the 28th of November 1961 to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that the plot had already been transferred to her and for that reason could not further be a subject-matter of transfer. Mr. Muqarrab Khan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner, heard both the parties and submitted a report (Annexure G) to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. Mr. Maqarrab Khan stated in his report that the plot had already been transferred to the respondent No. 3 and that his personal inspection of the spot revealed that the plot was across the road and was not in any way connected with the mosque. It may be mentioned here that a part of this property, measuring nine marlas, had been auctioned on the 28th of November 1961 in favour of one Mst. Fatima. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner, therefore, recommended that the auction in favour of Mst. Fatima (not a party to these pro--ceedings) be cancelled. He also observed that Mr. Sanaullah (representing the petitioner) had no case and, therefore, his application be filed. Mr. Saeed-uz-Zaman, Additional Settlement Commissioner, by his . Order dated the 12th of February 1961 (Annexure G) ordered the cancellation of auction fn favour of Mst. Fatima. Thus the transfer made in favour of respondent No. 3 on the 27th of August 1960, remained operative.
7. The petitioner In the meanwhile preferred an appeal on the 20th of January 1962 to the Additional Settlement Commissioner (Judicial) against the order of transfer in favour of respondent No. 3 dated the 27th of August 1960. This appeal was withdrawn by the petitioner on the 24th of March 1962, and it was dismissed on the same day.
8. The petitioner presented a revision petition on the 30th of March 1962 before the Settlement Commissioner, Lahore (Annexure H), and prayed:--
(i) that the order of the lower Courts filing the application requesting transfer of the plots be quashed;
(ii) that the order of the Plot Transfer Committee in favour of Mst. Zainab Bibi and the consequent order (if at all any such order is in existence) No. AS& RC/GB/5014 dated 27-8-60 be declared null and void, and
(iii) that the plot bearing Khasra No. 1.131 and the part of Khasra No. 1134 in possession of Managing Committee, Masjid Muhajrin be transferred to the Managing Committee.
The petition was dismissed by Mr. Ijaz Hussain Shah by his order, dated the 3rd of May 1962 (Annexure 1). The petitioner has challenged this order through this writ petition.
9. The order of Mr. Ijaz Hussain Shah, learned Settlement Commissioner, when analysed boils down to this:-
(a) That Khasra No. 1134 is situate across the Amrit Road, and is separated by the road from Khasra No. 1131 on which the mosque has been constructed;
(b) that Khasra No. 1131 was used as a mosque and steps were taken for its transfer in pursuance of the scheme dated the 16th of May 1961 and that, therefore, the plot should be given to the mosque;
(c) that there is no evidence to prove that there is any such regular institution running as Darul Alum in Khasra No. 1134;
(d) that the petitioner had all along asserted that this was the house of the Imam and that the construction of the rooms for the residence of the Imam of the mosque cannot be described as a building used for religious purpose; and
(e) that Mst. Zainab Bibi, a claimant displaced person, was entitled to the entire Khasra No. 1134.
There is no dispute about Khasra No. 1131 on which the mosque is constructed. The case relates to only Khasra No. 1134. Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of Khasra No, 1134 under Religious Property Scheme and that the transfer in favour of respondent No. 3 was without lawful authority.
10. By way of preliminary objection to was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Managing Committee, Masjid Muhajreen, the petitioner, was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act on the 25th of May 1962 after the petition had been filed on the 21st of May 1962, and if any applications were made earlier for the transfer of the property in dispute under the Religious Institutions Scheme they were only by Mr. Sanaullah Bhatti and the registered Society cannot take any benefit of those applications. The precise point raised was that no application for the transfer had been made by the registered society for the transfer under the said scheme and the petitioner, therefore, was not competent. Under the said scheme, the Additional Settlement Commissioner of the area concerned can order the properties which have been converted into a mosque or any other religious institution after Partition to the Anjuman or society in possession of the property. It is however, not mentioned that any Anjuman or society should be registered. It is true that unless an association of persons is so registered under the Societies Registration Act, it does not acquire the status of a person in law, but all the same there could be no doubt about the fact that association of persons can be termed as Anjuman or' a society. Mr. Sanaullah Bhatti did not submit even one application in his own right. He all along claimed to be representing the interests of the Managing Committee, Masjid Muhajreen. The fact, therefore, that the society was not registered prior to the filing of the writ petition or that no application was made by the registered society for the transfer of the property will make no difference. I, therefore, feel no hesitation in rejecting this contention.
11. The statement of facts shows that the respondent No. 3 had applied for the transfer of the property in dispute under Settlement Scheme No. VI and it was transferred to her on the 27th of August 1960. The petitioner, on the other hand, does not base its claim on Settlement Scheme No. VI nor had it applied under that scheme. It, however, so happened that Khasra No. 1134 was once included in the auction list published in August 1960. Mr. Sanaullah in his representative capacity for the society submitted on the 23rd of August 1969, an application for deleting this property from the auction list. There was no prayer in that application for the transfer of the property, nor was there any other application made for the transfer of this property by the petitioner as an open site under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The petitioner applied subsequently for transfer only under the Religious Institutions Scheme of the Central Government referred to above. The petitioner obviously could not take benefit of the Scheme unless the property had been available at the time when the Religious Institutions Scheme came into force on the 16th of May 1961. This property, however, had been transferred to respondent No. 3 on the 27th of August 1960.
12. Both Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan and Mr. S. M. Zafar objected to the competence of the petition. It was con--tended by them that the petitioner was not an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Article 98 of the Constitution so as to challenge the order of transfer which had been made in favour of respondent No. 3 0n the 27th of August 1960. The property in dispute being a building site at that time could be transferred only under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The petitioner admittedly had not applied for its transfer under that scheme, and according to the learned counsel for the petitioner it failed to do so on the assumption that the petitioner being not a person in law could not apply for it. Major Ishaq Muhammad Khan argued that the word "person" in paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and as defined in the General Clauses Act includes a body of persons, and the petitioner, therefore, could apply under that Scheme. The question whether the petitioner was or was not a person within the meaning of law does not call for any determination in this case, because what was necessary to know was whether the petitioner had contested for the transfer of the plot under Settlement Scheme No. VI. It had not. The Anjuman, there: fore, at the relevant time of transfer on the 27th of August 1960 could not challenge the validity, propriety or legality of the transfer made in favour of the respondent under Settlement Scheme No. VI. The right to challenge by way of appeal under section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, is given only to an aggrieved person, and the petitioner, in the circumstances of the case, could not be an aggrieved person at the relevant time. The transfer made in favour of respondent No. 3, therefore, vis-a-vis the petitioner became final and conclusive.
13. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the cause of action accrued to it from the order of the learned Settlement Commissioner dated the 3rd of May 1962, and till then the rights of the respondent No. 3 had not become final. I am not impressed by this argument. The fact that the petitioner filed the revision petition itself 4s not sufficient to make him an aggrieved person. The petitioner would have been aggrieved if it could show that the transfer was made 4n favour of the respondent on the 27th of August in disregard of its rights which it had at that time or that subsequently a law was passed creating rights in its favour and affecting a vested right in favour of the respondent with a retrospective effect. The petitioner had no valid claim for transfer on the 27th of August 1960 and the Religious Scheme, on which it relies, was not to operate retrospectively. It may be noticed that the Settlement Commissioner acted in his revisional jurisdiction not in pursuance of a right vested in the petitioner but by virtue of a power vested in the authority itself to examine the propriety or legality of the order passed by a subordinate authority. Dismissal of a revision petition filed even by an aggrieved person without hearing him cannot furnish him with a cause of grievance because no right is vested in him. It was held in Mst. Amir Begum v. Umar Din and others (P L. D 1961 Lah, 360) that "the Act did not confer on a party a right to lodge an application for revision because it does not anywhere say in so many words that an application for revision can be presented to the Chief Settlement Commissioner". The refusal of the learned Settlement Commissioner to interfere with the order of transfer, therefore, could not give the petitioner a fresh cause of action to bring him within the category of an aggrieved person. The objection of the respondents, therefore, that the petitioner was not in the field at the time when the transfer was made in favour of the respondent No. 3 and it, therefore, has no locus stands to challenge the order under Article 98 of the Constitution being not an aggrieved person, is formidable.
14. As to who is an aggrieved person, I may with advantage refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Tariq Transport Company, Lahore v. The Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service (PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437), which are as follows :- "In a petition for a writ, the first question that the Court has to consider is whether the petitioner has the locus stands to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court, and I consider it to be a basic principle that a person seeking judicial review of administrative or quasi judicial action must show that he has a direct personal interest in the act which he challenges before his prayer for review is entertained. A petitioner' says Mr. Justice Frankfurt in his concurrent opinion in Giant Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Mc-Grath 341 U S 123, 151) does not have standing to sue unless he is interested in and affected adversely by the decision of which he seeks review. His interest must be of a personal and not of an official nature. An application for an order of certiorari can only be made by an aggrieved party and not merely by one of the public, R. v. Nicholson (1899) 2 Q B 455 and in the case of an application for an order of mandamus, it is an established rule that the applicant must:how that there resides in himself a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought, R. v. Lewisham Union (1898) 1 Q B 398."
This is the law declared on the point. Applying it to the facts of the present case there remains no doubt that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person. The petitioner cannot successfully urge that it is aggrieved by the order of the learned Settlement Commissioner inasmuch as he did not interfere with the original order of transfer in favour of respondent No. 3. His order is only one of confirmation of the order of transfer in favour of Mst. Zainab Bibi. To bring itself within the category of the aggrieved persons, the petitioner, therefore, has to show that it was it ''interested in and affected adversely by the decision of transfer dated the 27th of August 1960 in favour of respondent No. 3. It was also held in Badur-ul-Haq Khan v. The Election Tribunal (PLD 1963 SC 704) that the power of the High Court to interfere under Article 9 of the Constitution depends, inter alia, upon the circumstance that the application should be by an aggrieved party.
15. It was next contended on behalf of the petitioner that the transfer in favour of respondent No. 3 was without jurisdic--tion and being void ab initio it was no transfer at all in the eye of law and can never be deemed to have taken place. To sub stantiate it, it was argued that the respondent was neither an allottee nor in possession of the building site and that she had not raised any permanent construction, much less one-fourth of the total area, to entitle her to its transfer under paragraph 13 of the Schedule to the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act.
There is hardly any doubt to the proposition that the determination of these matters is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement authorities. Even if it be assumed that they committed some error in deciding these matters, it t could not lead to the result that the order 4s without jurisdiction or is void ab initio. It is mentioned in the order of transfer, dated the 27th of August 1960, that the respondent No. 3 was an allottee. This is also the finding of Mr. Muqarrab Khan, learned Deputy Settlement Commissioner, when he was considering the whole case with a view to determining the dispute between the parties (Annexure R. 2). The Rehabilitation file was produced in the Court by the learned Settlement Commissioner (Legal). It contains the original allotment order, dated the 22nd of February 1952 (a copy of which is Annexure R. 4). There can be no doubt about the allotment in her favour. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, referred to her application, dated the 23rd of August 1960 (Annexure B), where she made an admission that the allotment was in the name of her son. The counsel for the respondent explained her admission by saying that the allotment order was in the joint name of respondent No. 3 and her son, and in view of the fact that the affairs were managed by her son, she wrongly assumed a certain fact and made an erroneous admission which she could withdraw at any time as it had been made gratis. She had, however, clearly mentioned in the petition that she was in possession. The admis--sion in contrary to the actual fact of an allotment which is proved beyond doubt by the original allotment order. The petitioner, therefore, cannot take advantage of such an admission. The questions as to allotment and possession of the respondent are concluded by findings of fact.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner did not deny construction raised on the site, but said that it had not been raised by respondent No. 3 but by her son. This stand is contrary to the petitioner's own admission made in paragraph 6 of the application dated the 17th of October 1960 (Annexure C to the writ petition), admitting that she had raised the construction. It was next contended that the respondent had not constructed at least one-fourth of the building site. In support of his argument, the learned counsel relied on the order of transfer to contend that it made no reference to this fact and it should, therefore, be infer--red that this condition had not been satisfied. All official acts are deemed to have been done regularly and in due course, and I can reasonably presume that the transfer was made in her favour after the authorities had satisfied about her entitlement and also as to the fact that she Lad raised one-fourth of the construction. The transfer was made by a committee consisting of Agha Aziz Ahmad, Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and Mr. A. A. Wasti, Additional Settlement Commissioner. They did so after perusal of a report dated the 6th of July 1960 of the field staff. The report of the field staff and some documents are not forthcoming, and they were missing from the file even when Mr. Muqarrab Khan, Deputy Settlement Commissioner, heard the case on the 17th of February 1962 (Annexure R. 2). 1 can reasonably presume, particularly when there is no allegation of mala fides against any of the members, that they must have satisfied themselves that the respondent No. 3 fulfilled the conditions of transfer contemplated in paragraph 13 of the Schedule, and that the report of the field staff, obtained in this case in the nature of things, could not have been for any purpose other than the verification of these things.
17. It was next contended that the committee consisting of Agha Aziz Ahmad, Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and Mr. A. A. Wasti, Additional Settlement Commissioner, was not competent to make the transfer in favour of the respondent. It is true that Settlement Scheme No. V I do not contemplate of any committee and the Deputy Settlement Commissioner has been given the authority to make transfers of building sites. Doubtless, the order of transfer, dated the 27th of August 1960, is signed by both the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Additional Settlement Commissioner. A question, however, arises whether the association of the Additional Settlement Commissioner in passing the order of transfer can make any difference when in fact the order had also been made by the Deputy Settle--ment Commissioner, who was legally empowered to do so: On behalf of the petitioner it was argued that the Additional Settlement Commissioner was an appellate authority and by his association the mind of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner must have been influenced and that the petitioner was also deprived of an effective right of appeal: He had nothing else to argue on this point. The grounds advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner at least is not available to the Anjuman in the present case. As already observed, the petitioner had no locus stands to prefer an appeal. The order was made on the 27th of August 1960 and the appeal had to be preferred within fifteen days, but the petitioner being not an applicant for the transfer at that time under Settlement Scheme No. V1 or for the matter of that an applicant for transfer in any other capacity; could not c be an aggrieved person within the meaning of section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, to avail of a right of appeal provided therein. It is therefore, not competent for the petitioner to urge that it had been prejudiced by being deprived of aright of appeal. No actual prejudice, there--fore, was caused to it. The order, at any rate, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. If the Deputy Settlement Commissioner had not been a member of the committee alone argument might have been available to the petitioner, but that question does not arise in this case. It may, however, be noticed that the Chief Settlement Commissioner by his memorandum No. 945--F&M-Reh-60, dated the 2nd of April 1960, had directed in paragraph 2(3) that the prices of building sites which were to be transferred under Settlement Scheme No. VI on the basis of permanent construction could be determined with the approval of the Additional Settlement Commissioner concerned. By another Memorandum No. 9907-Ph. Dated the 9th of June 1960, the Central Government empowered the Additional Settlement Commissioner to determine the nature of plots for the purposes of evaluating under paragraph 4 of Settlement Scheme No. VI, as amended. It appears that with a view to avoiding duplicity of proceedings, a committee consisting of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the Additional Settlement Commissioner was formed so that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner should be able to transfer the property and the Additional Settlement Commissioner without a separate reference might fix the prices. Whatever may be the reason for the constitution of the Committee the fact remains that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was a member of the Committee and since he was competent to pass orders, no exception can be taken to the transfer on the ground that the Additional Settlement Commissioner had also been associated with him as a member of the Committee.
18. In the view of the matter I take, the transfer made in favour of the respondent cannot be held to be without jurisdiction or void ab initio. The Settlement Authorities in transferring this property to respondent No. 3 have not acted in any way without lawful authority. There is no doubt in my mind that at the relevant time when the transfer was made the petitioner was not an interested party nor it could be considered to be aggrieved persons. Assuming that some right was created in its favour under the Religious Institutions Scheme which came into force on the 25th of May 1962, this scheme could not in any way affect the rights which had already been created in favour of a person in respect of any property which might be covered by it. Respondent No. 3 Mst. Zainab Bibi stood vested with a valuable right by a final order passed in this behalf on the 27th of August 1960.
19. The petition merits to be dismissed on the grounds mentioned above. I may, however, observe that I am not convinced by the fact that the petitioner was entitled to the transfer of Khasra No. 1134 under Religious Scheme dated the 25th of May 1962. The petitioner could apply for the transfer of the property under paragraph I (a) of the Scheme, reproduced in paragraph 5 above. There are two Khasra Nos. 1131 and 1134. There is a mosque constructed on Khasra No. 1131. The petitioner may be entitled to its transfer under the Religious Scheme dated the 25th of May 1962. The plot in dispute bearing Kharsa No. 1134 is, however, separated from the mosque on Khasra No. 1131 by a thirty feet wide metalled road. Both the plots are, therefore, not contiguous. It is difficult for me to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the said plot bearing Khasra No. 1134 is a part of the mosque.
20. On behalf of the petitioner, it was next contended that the construction raised on this plot was being used as Darul Aloom for imparting religious instructions and it was, therefore, a religions institution within the meaning of the said scheme. It has boon hold by the Settlement Commissioner that there was no such regular institution running as Darul Aloom in these premises.
It is not the case of the petitioner before me either that there wars any such regular institution being run. All that was contended was that the Imam Masjid was living in these premises and he also imparted religious instructions to the children of the mohallah. On these premises, it cannot be held that this was a Darul Aloom. If on these promises a particular place can be a Darul Aloom, then I am afraid every house of a maulvi or an Imam will be termed as Darul Aloom. Darul Aloom is an educational institution and only because at a particular place a person imparts religious instructions to someone, he does not thereby convert that place into a Darul Aloom. It may, moreover be noticed that if an Imam of the mosque imparts religious instructions to the children of the mohallah in his house it is not because the place itself is an educational centre but it is for the reason he himself is residing there. The Imam of the mosque might, in the circumstances, have been imparting at times religious instructions to the children In his house but that does not mean that he has not been doing the same in the mosque. In all likelihood he could conveniently use the mosque for this purpose rather than his house. According to the petitioner itself it is a small place constructed in seven marlas. It is not possible to believe that the petitioner had the intention to make this place as a residence of the Imam and also to make it a Darul Aloom. The place is basically for the residence of the Imam. The learned Settlement Commissioner has also held that the petitioner had all along asserted that this was the house of the Imam. Learned counsel for the petitioner took exception to this observation and contended that this was against the facts on the record and the order, therefore, was bad for an error apparent on the face of it. I am afraid, I cannot agree with this contention. No doubt Mr. Sanaullah in his petition dated the 17th of October 1960 (Annexure C) asserted that the building was used also as maktab, but the tenor of the application leaves no doubt that the place was used primarily as a residence of an Imam. Paragraph 2 of the petition reads thus: "The Imam of the Masjid resides in these rooms and also Imparts religious education to the children of the mohallah. This building is thus being used as a house for the Imam as well as a maktab."
At no time and in no application it was asserted that this place was used only as a maktab. On the contrary, the petitioner's representative Mr. Sanautlah in his application dated the 26th June 1961 (Annexure "D") categorically stated that the place was only a residential quarter of the Imam. He stated in the application as follows:- "Since a residential quarter for the Imam of the mosque was absolutely necessary, the Managing Committee of the mosque has also built a small house for this purpose."
It was an application subsequent to the one dated the 17th of O0tober 1960 (Annexure C) wherein he had claimed that the place was used both a9 the residence of the Imam and as a maktab, The findings of the learned Settlement Commissioner, under the circumstances, are not open to any exception and the factual position also is that the place is used for the residence of the Iman.
Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to argue that this being the hujra of the Imam should be considered to be a part of the mosque. I could not be persuaded to agree to this contention.
The contention that the residence of the Imam should be considered to be a religious institution is equally devoid of force.
21. The upshot of the whole discussion is that at a time when the transfer was made in favour of respondent No. 3 on the 27th of August 1960, the petitioner was not an interested party, being not an applicant for the transfer of the plot under Settlement Scheme No. VI. It, therefore had no locus standi to challenge its transfer. By the mere fact that some rights were created by the Religious Scheme on the 25th of May 1962, the rights already created in respect of the property covered by such scheme could not be affected. The petitioner, at any rate, has no right to the transfer of Khasra No. 1134 under the Religious Scheme, because the property in dispute had not been converted into a religious institution. The petition has no merit and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.