KHUDA BAKHSH MARRI, J. -This constitutional petition is directed against the order of respondent No. 1 the Secretary of the (the then) Government of West Pakistan Excise and Taxation Department dated 20th June 1967, ordering the peti--tioner's retirement from service w. e. f. 3rd July 1967, which order is as under: "NOTIFICATION No. 2057-67/2021-E(E & T)II.-In exercise of the powers conferred by paragraph (2) of clause (4) of Article 178 of the Con--stitution, I, S. Manzoor Illahi, C. S. P., Secretary to Government of West Pakistan, Excise and . Taxation Department in respect of Excise and Taxation Inspector after consultation with the Division Advisory Committee, Khairpur, direct that Mr. Mahboob Ali Ansari.
Excise and Taxation Inspector, Khairpur, who has complete3 25 years of qualifying service for pension on 21st June 1966, shall retire from service with effect from 3rd July 1967. "
The petitioner also challenges the order of respondent No. 3, the Chief Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, whereby his appeal has been rejected by an order dated the 20th February 1968.
2. Briefly the facts are that the petitioner yeas recruited as an Assistant Inspector of Excise and Taxation in the former Province of Sind in the year 1941. In the year 1948 he was promoted as Excise Inspector Grade I and, in the same post he was confirmed on 18-6-1955 vide an order dated 11-5- 1961. He has completed his 25 years qualifying service on 21st June 1966 and in view of his completing 25 years of qualifying service, the impugned order stated above for his retirement was passed.
3. We have heard Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Kazi Akhtar Ahmad, learned Advocate --General, Sind for the respondents. Out of the several grounds namely, that the principles of natural justice were violated; the Public Service Commission has not been consulted prior to his removal, that only the Member, Board of Revenue was the competent authority and not the respondent, that the order was mala fide and had been passed by influence of some interested persons who are against the petitioner and that the petitioner was not given personal hearing while dismissing his appeal, Mr. Khalid Ishaque has abandoned most of the grounds and argued only on two points i. e. That under the law petitioner has vested right to be heard in person before his appeal was dismissed and secondly the impugned order has been passed in viola--tion of Article 186 (2) (f) under which according to him a specific order by the Governor has to be passed before the impugned order of retirement could be passed by the respon--dents. He further stated that as Notification dated 18-10-1966 does not show that such an order has been passed by the Governor himself, the respondents could not in law exercise the powers conferred by paragraph (a), clause (4) of Article 178 of the Constitution, therefore, according to him the impugned order was illegal, ultra vires and of no legal effect. In effect he challenged vires of the Notification by Government of West Pakistan No. S. O. IV (S & GAD)-4-23/66, dated 10th October 1966, issued on behalf of Chief Secretary, Government of West Pakistan with regards to retirement of Provincial Government Servants under Article 178, clause (4) of the Constitution under which the Governor has the power to retire Provincial Govern--ment Servants after completion of 25 years qualifying service. Mr. Khalid Ishaque in this regard heavily relied on the case of Muhammad Ayub Khuhro v. Pakistan (PLD1960 SC237) wherein the word "order" contained in Laws (Continuance in Force) Order (1 of 1958) came for interpretation before their Lordships of the Supreme Court where it was held that- "the word `order' with a capital 'O' wherever it occurs in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order means a body of rules or an order of a general nature such as 'a conferment of jurisdiction or authority' and not an order made in a particular case."
To our mind this case does not help the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner because in the case cited by him the word "order" came for interpretation with regards to Martial Law Orders only and that also prior to the Constitution of 1962. In the present case the word "order" contained in Article 186 of Constitution 1962 is to be interpreted in a different context i.e. The instance of exercise of powers by the Governor of West Pakistan with regards to the retirement of Government servants. The word "order" in the present context to our mind does not imply that a specific order has to be passed by the Governor of West Pakistan and that it must be shown in the notification as contended by counsel for the petitioner that such an order prior to the notification has been passed. The word "order" has to be construed in its ordinary meaning in the present context and its being written in capital "O" in Article 186 does not in effect necessitate that it must be passed by the Governor of West Pakistan in each and every case. Notification of 18th October 1966, was issued on behalf of the Governor in exercise of his powers under Article 187, clause (4) and the Article does not say that it has to be indicated in the notification itself that such an order must be incorporated in the notification. It is quite logical to assume that the Governor did pass an order to issue the requi--site notification and that must be on the original file in the Department, and after such an order the Chief Secretary issued the requisite notification regularizing the compulsory retirement of the Government servants. It has been held in AIR 1948 Bom. 20, that the word "order" applies to the exercise of power by a competent authority who in this case is the Gover--nor. We therefore repel above argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
4. In reply to his argument that in each and every case the petitioner has a right to be heard in person at the time of hearing of his appeal, the learned Advocate-General relied on Abdul Latif v.
Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 62wherein it was observed: "In the matter of dismissal of a Government employee from service the requirement of the Constitution is that there should be a reasonable opportunity given to show cause. Where the procedure laid down In relevant rules prescribe a charge and a reply at the outset and the official concerned has had, at the inquiry stage, the choice of being heard in person (which choice has been duly exercised) it seems an excessive require--ment that a personal hearing should also in every case be given in relation to show-cause notice. It is conceivable, no doubt, that in a departmental case, where there is more than one official involved in the transaction, the particular official who is brought under enquiry and who hopes as a result to be restored to his former position, may not wish to put down in writing matters calculated to implicate other officials and particularly those senior to himself. His further service in the department could be seriously affected if such a matter stood on the record against his own superiors, as coming from his mouth.
For such and other reasons, there can be occasions where an official might find it necessary to reserve the state--ment of certain matters relevant to the appropriate punishment in the case, for oral presentation before the dismissing autho--rity. But where such is not the case and when no personal hearing has been asked for and where nothing appears in the entire facts which could provide any reason why the dismissing authority should of its own volition adopt such a course, personal hearing, before passing order of dismissal is not necessary."
He also relied on Mumtaz Hussain v. University of Sind (PLD 1966 Kar. 429wherein it was held: "The maxim 'no man shall be condemned unheard' no doubt is not confined to Courts but extends to all proceedings by whomsoever held which may affect the person or property or other right of the party concerned in the dispute, yet, in cases where the appellate authority is the Governor of a Pro--vince or the President of the country who by virtue of their office are immune from processes of law in the discharge of their duties, appeals made to them by Government servants or members of Statutory bodies, who are controlled by their own rules and regulations determining the conditions of their service, cannot require that the appellant be heard in person.
A personal hearing before deciding a matter is not a neces--sary requirement of the principle of natural justice. All that is necessary is a full said fair opportunity of making a repre--sentation of showing cause. What is a full and fair opportunity depends upon the facts of each case. In some cases it may be enough if the consideration of the authority, and no pre--judice is shown to have been caused:"
Admittedly the petitioner's appeal was entertained by respondent No. 3 and it was rejected after due consideration and in view of the above cited decisions we are of the opinion that the petitioner has no right in law to be heard in person. This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner therefore, in our opinion has also no force.
5. In view of the above discussion we are of the firm opinion that this petition has no merits which is hereby dis--missed with costs.
S. A. H.