' In this appeal the decision dated 16-1-1979 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,7, Gujranwala, has been challenged, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted and he was directed to be reinstated in service with full back benefits.
2. The respondent was a Ledger-keeper/Bill Clerk in WAPDA (Electricity). On the allegation that in the ledger less amount as price of the energy consumed by the various consumers was shown causing loss to the employer, he was charge-sheeted on 6-11-1977. Show-cause notice, thereafter, was given but no enquiry was held. The learned trial Judge has reinstated the respondent for the reason that the procedure given in Standing Order 15(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 was not followed. In every case it is argued on behalf of WAPDA that WAPDA Efficiency and Discipline Rules apply and that Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable, but in the present case it has been argued that even if it be said that the Standing Orders Ordinance is applicable, since the punishment awarded was not of dismissal, but of compulsory retirement, following of the procedure given in Standing Order 15(4) was not necessary. It has also been contended that the appellant was a civil servant and, therefore, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction.
3. The learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that compulsory retirement is not provided as a punishment under Standing Order 15(3), therefore, it is to be taken that the action was taken under the WAPDA Efficiency and Discipline Rules and not under Standing Orders Ordinance. It has further been argued that since the Standing Orders Ordinance is applicable, WAPDA could not proceed against the respondent under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules. I have held in various decisions that the Standing Order a Ordinance, 1968 is applicable and so I hold in this case. There are two conditions given in proviso to section 1(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and in cases where both the conditions are fulfilled, Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable. First condition is that the establishment concerned must be running by or under the authority of the Government and the second condition is that it should have its own statutory rules. WAPDA has been set up under WAPDA Act and gets authority directly from the said Act. An establishment, which has no statutory authority for its existence and work, may require authority of the sovereign body, but an 'establishment formed under a statute and working by the authority of a statute, does not require any further authority from any other quarter. Simply because the Government appoints certain officers of the WAPDA and to some extent interferes with the working does not mean that the control amounts to authority. The other thing is that there should be statutory rules. Section 18 of the WAPDA Act authorizes WAPDA to lay down its procedure for the appointment of the employees and for taking action against them, but the rules framed under section 18 have not been notified in the official gazette. Nationalised banks and financial institutions are governed by the Wage Commission Award made under section 38 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
They become effective from the date on which they are notified in the official gazette. The mere fact that rules are framed under the authority of an Act is not sufficient and the other requirement is that they should be notified in the official gazette. WAPDA Efficiency and Discipline Rules framed under section 18 of the WAPDA Act have not been notified in the official gazette and thus have no force of statutory rules and both the conditions given in the proviso to section 1(4) of Standing Orders Ordinance do not stand fulfilled. Standing Orders Ordinance, therefore, is applicable to the WAPDA and not its Rules.
4. This is true that in Standing Order 15(4) it is mentioned that only in cases of dismissal, information about the alleged misconduct is to be given to the workman concerned within one month of the commission of misconduct, or within one month of the knowledge of the commission of the misconduct, but Standing Order 15(4) is to be read alongwith Standing Order 12(5), which states that no person can be terminated, dismissed, discharged or removed from service on the ground of misconduct, except in the manner provided in the Standing Order 15(4), it means that where an employee has been stigmatized with the commission of misconduct, he cannot be dismissed, terminated or in any other manner removed from service, without following the procedure given in Standing Order 15(4). The compulsory retirement of the respondent obviously amounts to removal from, or termination of service and since he was compulsory retired on account of an alleged misconduct, it was necessary by virtue of Standing Order 12(5) to follow the procedure given in Standing Order 15(4). Since admittedly no enquiry was made, the order of compulsory retirement was invalid and was rightly struck down by the learned trial Judge.
5. The respondent was a Ledger Keeper in the Electricity Department of WAPDA meaning that he was doing clerical job in the transformation and distribution of electrical energy and thus comes under clause (xix) Schedule-II appended to section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act and since there is an exception in the definition of civil servant given in the Civil Servants Act, which is that the persons covered by the definition of workman as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Factories Act are not civil servants, the respondent stood excluded from the definition of civil servant. The term "civil Servant" has not been defined by section 17(B) of WAPDA Act. It has only excluded the deputationists from the term, therefore, we have to look for the definition of the term 'civil servant' WAPDA employees have been deemed to be civil servant for the purposes of Services Tribunal Act. The purpose of the Service Tribunals Act is to provide a forum in the shape of Service Tribunal to hear appeals against the orders involving terms and conditions of service. The term 'civil servant' used in the Service Tribunals Act has been defined in the said Act by borrowing its definition from the Civil Servants Act. As I have observed above, there are certain exceptions given in the definition of the term 'civil servant' in the Civil Servants Act, therefore, those exceptions cannot be ignored and only those employees can be taken as civil servants who do not fall within those exceptions. Since the respondent comes under the exceptions, he is a workman and not a civil servant.
6. As a result of the observations made above, I do not find any force in the appeal and dismiss it.