' The facts giving rise to this appeal are that on the allegation of stealing one kilo of sugar belonging to the appellant, the respondent was charge-sheeted. Considering his reply as unsatisfactory, an enquiry was ordered, which culminated in his dismissal.
2. On 29-12-1979 explanation of the respondent was Called alleging that he was caught red- handed while stealing sugar weighing one kilo, which was recovered from his cap. He was called upon to give the explanation on the same day before the closing time. He submitted his reply denying the allegation. On the same day charge-sheet Exh.P-1 was given to him, in which he was asked to appear before Mr. S.M.Rafiq, on 30-12-1979 at 8.00 a.m. For facing the enquiry. Learned counsel has argued that the document titled as charge-sheet in reality is not the charge-sheet, therefore, it cannot be said that without considering the reply of the respondent, an Enquiry Officer was appointed and he was asked to face the enquiry before him. According to the learned counsel, the explanation called on the same day before the charge-sheet was in reality the charge-sheet and that as in the said order the respondent was not called upon to face the enquiry, nor any Enquiry Officer was named, it cannot be said that the appellant had predetermined the guilt of the respondent. I agree with the learned counsel that the document titled as charge-sheet in reality is not the charge-sheet, because the appellant was not asked to give his reply, but rather was informed that the explanation given by him was not satisfactory. In reality Exh.P-2 is the charge- sheet. The requirement of Standing Order 15(4) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is only this that the information in writing regarding the alleged misconduct should be given to the employee concerned. There is no word 'charge-sheet' used in this Standing Order. So for all purposes Exh.P-4 is the information in writing about the misconduct. But the trouble for the appellant does not end here. No sufficient time was allowed to the respondent to consider the charge-sheet and to submit reply since he was called upon to submit reply on that very day before the closing time of the factory. The respondent was prejudiced by this undue haste. He should have been allowed at least three days' time to give the reply.
3. The other thing is that two of the witnesses who had been examined at the enquiry and stated that the respondent had admitted his guilt and sought pardon, were examined before the lower court and there they deposed that the respondent had not confessed his guilt in their presence, although he had sought pardon. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the provisions of clause (5) of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 do not mean that a second enquiry is to be made by the Labour Court after a departmental enquiry has already been held.
The lower court did not actually hold any second enquiry into the matter. Since departmental enquiry is made by an officer of the establishment, impartiality may be presumed, but no such thing can be said as regards the Labour Court. When the same witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry, stated differently before the Labour Court, the Labour Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case had not been proved in the enquiry. This is noteworthy that the alleged stolen sugar is not alleged to have been recovered from the person of the respondent. It is clear from Exh.P-2 that the sugar was lying in a cap near the uniform box and that the cap belonged to the appellant. The charge is not that the respondent was carrying sugar in the cap, but rather the charge was that the cap containing sugar was lying near the uniform box. The possibility cannot be excluded that some enemy of the respondent had put the sugar in the cap in order to falsely implicate him. There was no evidence that the cap containing the sugar belonged to the respondent.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant in the last resort has argued that if there is any defect in the enquiry, re-enquiry may be ordered. This is not that there is any defect in the enquiry, but rather the offence of stealing was not brought home to the respondent. Even otherwise in cases of theft of property of meagre value, re-enquiry is not justified. He has also said that if there is any technical defect, back benefits should not be ordered. I do not think that on account of any technical defect, the respondent has been reinstated. As discussed above, the very offence of stealing and recovery of stolen sugar from the possession of the respondent was not proved. The respondent was rightly reinstated in service. There is no force in the appeal, which is dismissed in limine.