1. The respondent submitted a petition under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act on 2nd April 1964 complaining against some illegal deductions from his salary. The claim eras for Rs. 572.57 for the amount deducted and for Rs. 5,725.70 as compensation at the rate of 10 times as provided by section 15, subsection (3) of the above Act. A number of objections were raised in defence by the petitioner and the following preliminary issues were framed:----
(1) Whether the petition is the barred.
(2) Whether the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 is not applicable to the petitioner or to the present case.
(3) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the petition?
(4) Whether the petition is defective and what is its effect?
2. It was held by the learned Special Authority under the Payment of Wages Act that there were sufficient grounds for admitting the application as within the and accordingly issue No. 1 was decided in favour of the respondents. On issues Nos. 2 and 3 he held that the provisions of Payment of Wages Act applied only to an employee whose wages do not exceed Re. 200 and the case was covered by the above Act for the period from April 1962 to June 1962 .Hen the wages of the respondent were Rs. 192 p.m. While for the remaining period the petition under Payment of Wages Act was not competent as the wages were Re. 207 p.m. Issue No. 4 was also decided against the petitioner as no defect in the petition was found out.
3. However, while deciding issue No. 1, the learned Special Authority observed that in view of the condonation of delay the respondent had to forego his claim for compensation, under subsection
(3) of section 15 as it is in equity that the application has been admitted after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and under the same equity the respondent has a right to seek exercise of discretion in his favour regarding the award of said compensation up to 10 times.
4. After the decision on the preliminary issues, the following issues on merit were framed:
(1) Whether the deductions made from the wages of the petitioner for the period from April 1962 to June 1962 are illegal?
(2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the refund of any amount, if so, to what amount?
(3) Relief.
5. On issue No. 1 it was held that the deduction of Rs. 144.83 was illegal. Under issue No. 2, the petitioner was held entitled to this amount of Rs. 144.83 only and the same was directed to be refunded to the respondent. However, no compensation was allowed.
6. The respondent filed an appeal before the Additional District Judge, Lahore, at Sheikhupura, who in a way held that the question of condonation later on could not be made subservient to the question of payment of compensation as the question of payment of compensation could only be considered after the application was admitted. He also found that once the delay was condoned the compensation should not have been disallowed. He, therefore, allowed the respondent the amount of ten times of compensation which comes to Rs. 1,448.30 and in this manner the Divisional Superintendent of the West Pakistan Railway was ordered to pay Rs. 1,593.13 to the respondent.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions.-
(1) That proviso (2), subsection (3) of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, the compensation could not be paid because this was a case of bona fide error on bona fide dispute or of existence of exceptional circumstances. It is submitted that in view of this, the order of the learned Additional District Judge was without jurisdiction.
(2) That while dealing with the preliminary issue the Special Authority had disallowed the compensation and no appeal against that order had been filed with the result that the decision on preliminary issues had become final and it could not be agitated now before the District Judge.
(3) That in any case, the discretion to award compensation bas not been exercised judiciously.
8. The proviso relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not at all attracted to this case.
9. With a view to clarify this position, it is necessary to reproduce the first three subsections of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936:- "Section 15. Claims out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and penalty for malicious or vexatious claims. --(1) The Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid in that area.
(2) Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deductions has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered Trade Union authorised in writing to at on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under subsection (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under subsection (3): Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
(3) When any application under subsection (2) is entertained the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer or other person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3 or give them an opportunity of being heard and, after such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may without prejudice to any other penalty to which such employer or other person is liable under this Act, direct the refund to the employed person, of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding ten rupees in the latter: Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to--
(a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or
(b) the occurrence of an emergency, or the existence of exceptional circumstances, such that the person responsible for the payment of the wages was unable, though exercising reasonable diligence, to make prompt payment, or
(c) the failure of the employed person to apply for or accept payment."
10. It is apparent from subsection (1) that to types of cases are contemplated, one of deductions of wages and the other of delay in payment of wages. Under subsection (3) also, this distinction has been maintained in regard to compensation as it is provided that the compensation can be given up to ten times of the amount deducted, but in case of delayed payment the compensation was not to exceed ten rupees. The proviso which has been relied upon relates only to delayed wages and not to a case of deductions and as such is not applicable to the facts of this case where the learned Special Authority has given a categorical finding that the amount of Rs. 144.83 has been illegally deducted.
11. The objection that the decision on preliminary issues have become final is also not correct.
12. According to law it is open to party to appeal against the whole case including all the interim orders made in a case. This matter has been considered by then Supreme Court is a case falling under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance VI of 1959 in Mian Muhammad Abdullah v. Sheikh Nawab Din (1971 SCMR 336). Their Lordships observed as follows:- "The appellant has next contended that inasmuch as the aforesaid interlocutory order for deposit of rent was appealable and no appeal had been preferred from it and the appeal having become barred by the the respondent could not legally challenge the order of deposit in an appeal from the order of eviction. The contention is untenable. Firstly, because the respondent is not compelled by law to appeal from every interlocutory order. He can wait until the final decision and then appeal against it on all such grounds as are available to him. The interlocutory order, no doubt is an order constituting the final decision and it seems unreasonable that its legality cannot be challenged in an appeal from the final decision.
13. This view finds support from a decision of the Privy Council in Maharaja Moheshur Singh v. The Bengal Government 7 M I A 293. In the case under report, in a similar situation, the Privy Council has observed thus:- We are not aware of any law or Regulation prevailing in India which renders it imperative upon the suitor to appeal from every interlocutory order by which ha may conceive himself aggrieved, under the penalty, if he does not so do, of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the appellate Court. No authority or precedent has been cited in support of such a proposition, and we cannot conceive that anything could be more detrimental to the expeditious administration of justice than the establishment of a rule which could Impose upon the suitor the necessity of so appealing; whereby on the one hand he might be harassed with endless expense and delay, and on the other inflict upon his opponent similar calamities. We believe there have been very many cases before this Tribunal In which their Lordships have deemed it to be their duty to correct erroneous Interlocutory orders, though not brought under their consideration until the whole cause had been decided, and brought either by appeal for adjudication."
14. This case was followed by the Privy Council in the case of Alexander John Forbes v. Ameeroonnissa Begum (10 M I A 340) and in the case of Shah Mukkun Lall and others v. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh and others (12 M I A 157). In the case of Jiando Khan v. Muhammad Ishaq (PLD 1964 Kar.. 61), it has been observed:- "In the present case, the District Judge and the High Court have been designated as appellate authorities under the Ordinance and it is clearly open to them to examine the legality and correctness of orders passed by the learned Rent Controller under subsection (6) of section 13 of the Ordinance, and it cannot be said that because the defence of the tenant was struck of by the learned Rent Controller, the tenant now cannot be heard in any superior forum as well"
15. Lastly, the learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to assail the discretion exercised by the learned District Judge. No interference is possible with the exercise of discretion by the learned Additional District Judge. Even if it had been possible for me to interfere I have not found that this is a fit case of interference. The order of the Special Authority disallowing the compensation was based upon the proposition that in view of the condonation of, the-limit in the filing of the petition, the respondent is not entitled to any compensation. This amounts to saying that the condonation has been granted to him in consideration of the forfeiture of the amount of compensation. There is no warrant for taking this view at all particularly when it is apparent even from the proviso (2) to subsection (2) of sec--tion 15 referred to above that the Special Authority can condone the delay if there is sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The consideration is only whether there is sufficient cause or not and any other consideration will be extraneous to this and cannot be maintained or upheld.
16. In view of this, there is no force in this Revision petition which is dismissed with costs.