1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-The respondent is an Inspector in the Central Excise and Land Customs Department. He was placed under suspension vide order dated 18-6-1979 and issued a charge- sheet on 25-9-1979 with the direction to reply within 14 days. He requested for permission to be represented by a counsel, which was declined on 12-12-1979. Subsequently he again repeated this request relying on a judgment of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court (in Habib Ullah Tatar v.
2. M jamilullah Khan etc. L. P. A. No, 90974), but the request was refused on the ground that it could not be accepted in view of the provisions of rule -A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. He then filed a writ petition before the Lahore High Court (W. P. No, 2776/S of 1980) and an interim order was passed in his favour on 19-5-1980 that he should be re-instated in service.
3. ' In view of the above interim order, the respondent was re-instated with immediate effect vide order dated 21-5-1980 but was again suspended on 24-5-1980 and was asked by the authorities to submit his reply to the charge-sheet, which he did on 3-6-1980.
4. ' The respondent, in support of his writ petition before the High Court urged three points : firstly, that the order of suspension dated 24-5-1980 was illegal for the reason that it did not show that it was passed with the prior approval of the authority as required under rule 5(1)(i) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 ; secondly, that the respondent was re-instated with immediate effect vide order dated 21-5-1980 though he should have been re-instated from the date he was suspended, namely, from 28-6-1979 ; thirdly, that the responding. Should be allowed to be represented by a counsel.
5. ' The learned Judge in the High Court who decided the writ petition held that the record showed that the order of suspension was passed with the prior approval of the authority. As regards the plea that the order of suspension itself was not justifiable it was held that this question, relating as it did to the terms and conditions of service, pertained to the domain of the Service Tribunal and since the High Court could not interfere with the final order in this respect- which could only be challenged through an appeal before the Service Tribunal-the High Court could also not be approached in connection with an interim order in this regard.
6. ' So far as the second contention was concerned, the Deputy Attorney-General accepted its correctness and submitted that the respondent would be deemed to have been re-instated from the date of his original suspension, namely, with effect from 28-6-1979 and not from 21-5-1980-the date on which the order for re-instatement was passed.
7. ' As regards the third and last contention that the respondent was entitled to be represented by a counsel in departmental proceedings the learned Judge concluded, alter an elaborate discussion, that an accused employee, while defending his case before the inquiry officer, was entitled to be represented by a counsel and held that if it was decided to conduct an enquiry the respondent would be entitled to be represented by a counsel in these proceedings.
8. Leave was granted by this Court to consider whether the view taken b the High Court that the respondent was entitled to be represented through counsel in the departmental proceedings being held against him was correct, in the face of the specific provisions of rule 10-A of the Government Servant. A (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. However, before us, the learned Deputy Attorney-General also sought leave to raise the contention tha the High Court did not have any jurisdiction to decide this issue. According to him, the intention of the provisions o' Article 212 of the Constitution (of 1973) was that the terms and conditions of service of civil servants shall fall exclusively in the domain of Service Tribunals and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with any question pertaining to the terms and conditions of service of an employee. Hence it could not interfere with any interlocutory order of the departmental authorities. Consequently, the respondent was precluded from invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court on this issue. We allowed the learned Deputy Attorney-General to raise this point during the appeal proceedings although leave had not been specifically granted for its consideration as this question related to, the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain and decide the matter.
9. ' In support of the abovementioned contention it is pointed out that according to section 3 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 "the terms and conditions of service of civil servant shall be provided in this Act, and the rules framed thereunder". Section 16 of the Act lays down that "a civil servant shall be liable to prescribed disciplinary action and penalties in accordance with the prescribed procedure". Under the Act 'prescribed' means as prescribed by the rules. The rules framed in this behalf are, inter alia, the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. - Rule 10-A (which was added to the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 by Notification No, S. R.
0. 1412/1/74, dated 16-11-1974) provides "No party to any proceedings under these rules before the authority, the authorised officer' an Inquiry Officer or an Inquiry Committee shall be represented by an Advocate."
10. It is, therefore, obvious that the question whether a Government servant can be represented by an Advocate before the Inquiry Officer is a matter relating to the terms and conditions of his service.
11. Now section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, provides that any appeal by any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in connection with a matter relating to his terms and conditions of service lies to the Service Tribunal.
12. Indeed, according to clause (2) of Article 212 of the 1973 Constitution all matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons in service of Pakistan including the disciplinary matters shall be adjudicated by the Service Tribunals and no other Court can entertain any proceeding in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Tribunal extends. Consequently, the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition with regard to this matter. Tbis Court in Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v. Engineer-in-Chief Pakistan Army G. H. Q. And another (1) has already taken the same view and the following observations made by this Court in this said case may be reproduced here with advantage "It is not disputed either that the petitioner's grievance is germane to the terms and conditions of service and a dispute with regard thereto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction .Of the Tribunal under clause (2) of Article 212 of the Constitution. Non obstante clause in Article 212 (2) gives it overriding effect and consistently with the principle of harmonious interpretation of the Constitution the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition moved by the petitioner for want of jurisdiction."
13. ' We feel that the High Court, in the present case too, should have dismissed the respondent's writ petition for want of jurisdiction.
14. This appeal must succeed on the short ground that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the question raised before it. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to examine the correctness or otherwise of the view expressed by the High Court that notwithstanding the provisions of rule 10-A of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 to the contrary an accused employee has the right to be represented by a counsel in the enquiry proceedings because this matter falls for determination in the first instance by the Service Tribunal.
15. ' This appeal is, accordingly, allowed, However, the parties will be left to bear their own costs.