' This regular second appeal arises from the judgment/decree dated 10-4-1969 of the learned District Judge, Sargodha.
2. The land in dispute was allotted to the respondent Sher Muhammad in 1951-52 by the appellant- T.D.A. On conditions, inter alia, that he shall keep himself away from criminality. -He, however, was imprisoned for 1i years under section 325, P.P.C., in 1965. Consequently the allotment was cancelled by order dated 18-2-1967. He brought the present suit for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with his possession over the land or transferring it to someone else. His contention was that he had been given no notice before cancelling the lot, nor had it been sanctioned by the Provincial Government. He explained that although he had been implicated in the criminal case, yet it involved no moral turpitude so as to render him ineligible to retain the lot.
Cause of action according to him accrued on 17-4-1965 when the respondent finally refused to accept him as allottee of the land.
3. The suit was resisted assailing the jurisdiction of the civil Court as also the form of the suit for failing to seek the relief of possession. Bar of limitation was also pleaded and the resumption was justified, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant's petition before the Board of Revenue had been dismissed. It was -observed that the cancellation had taken place owing to violation of the conditions of the allotment and further that after resumption even the symbolic possession had been taken away from the appellant. Entries showing the respondent still to be in possession were claimed to be ineffective in law as he had been described therein to be illegal occupant.
4. The trial Court dismissed the suit being barred by time though it held that the resumption of land was bad in law for want of approval of the Government. In appeal, however, the judgment of the trial Court was reversed and the respondent was allowed the decree.
5. Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Khan, Advocate supporting the judgment of the trial Court contended that the limitation of six months as prescribed by section 75(3) of the Thal Development Act, 1949, started running from the accrual of the cause of action which on the respondent's own showing in para.6 of his plaint was 17-4-1965 when the Colonization Officer had cancelled the lot. He urged that the suit having been brought on 21-2-1967 was much beyond the prescribed period of six months and that the contrary view adopted by the learned District Judge making the limitation run from the date of entry made in Roznamcha as to dispossession of the respondent was untenable.
Accrual of cause of action has not been defined to carry any specific meanings in the context. It may mean also the order of cancellation passed on 17-4-1965 but since there was no evidence to show that it had been passed after notice, it may not mean much. The respondent continued to avail the possession till 18-2-1967 when by taking formal action an entry was made in the Roznamcha Waqiati to dispossess him. The learned District Judge was right in observing that unless the respondent was dispossessed, limitation will not start running against him. Naturally such a dispossession shall constitute another ingredient of accrual of cause of action, the more so when the expression is susceptible of admitting this phenomenon too. There was no reason to deny its benefit to the respondent. As a result the suit filed within three days of the dispossession was quite squarely within time fixed in section 75(3) of the Thai Development Act, 1949.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant relying upon the replication filed by the respondent argued that a remedy had been taken before the Board of Revenue as well and that the same suggested a clear comprehension on the part of tilted respondent as to the accrual of cause of action.
7. Be that as it may section 75(3) of the said Act does not specify the date of order of resumption as terminus a quo for such a suit. It used rather a more elastic or pragmatic expression, namely, "accrual of cause of action" which for obvious reasons includes bundle of facts giving rise to a remedy. In such a bundle of facts could be included both the order of resumption itself as also its consummation taking place subsequently in the form of actual or even symbolic dispossession of the occupant. For this reason there is room to agree with the conclusion drawn by the learned District Judge and hence the suit was within time.
8. It could not be shown if the resumption was made with the approval of the Provincial Government which was a sine qua no according to the conditions. The trial Court found it to be missing. It made the order illegal. A suit envisaged to challenge such an order could be brought from the date of dispossession as the same formed a part of the cause of action.
9. There is no merit in the R.S.A. And the same is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.