1. ' By this judgment all the three appeals will be disposed of as the facts and question of law are common. The appellant in all these appeals is the landlord of the building No, 57 S.B. Church Street, Karachi, in which the respondents are the tenants in separate tenements. The property was previously owned by another landlady which was purchased by the appellant on 20-2-1974. The appellant served a notice on 20-2-1974 informing each respondent separately that it had purchased the building and rent was to be paid to it. According to the appellant as the rent was not paid in terms of section 13-A, the respondent has committed default. The respondent filed written statement admitting the letter, dated 20-2-1974 was received. It was pleaded that he has been depositing rent in the Court of the Controller under his order and denied that he is in arreaRs, It was also pleaded that the landlady had left her residence without informing about the transfer of the property. The respondent informed the appellant about the payment of rent by registered letter on the incomplete and inadequate address provided by the appellant but it was returned. The learned Controller dismissed the ejectment application.
2. ' Mr. Abdul Majid the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that having come to know about the transfer by notice, dated 20-2-1974 the deposit was thereafter in the name of the previous landlord cannot be termed as a valid tender and, therefore, default has been committed.
3. According to, the learned counsel as notice was served on 20-2-1974 the respondent in terms of section 13-A was bound to deposit rent within the specified time which he has failed to do.
4. ' In order to ascertain whether the respondent has defaulted, certain facts have to be taken into consideration. The admitted position is that the notice, dated 20-2-1974 was served and it is also not denied that in the notice the appellant's address was given as Saddar, Karachi. No specific address or particular place or office of the appellant was mentioned in the notice. According to the respondent he tried to find out the address but it could not be ascertained. The respondent in First Rent Appeal No, 403 of 1981 coming to know about the address in September, 1974 by letter, dated 21-9-1979 sent a cheque but the same returned undelivered. Mr. Abdul Majid Khan states that the address on which the letter was addressed was the correct address where the office of the appellant is situated. In First Rent Appeal No, 405 of 1981 the respondent had obtained the same address earlier on 2-3-1974 and informed the appellant about the deposit of rent in Court and expressed his willingness to pay the rent due to the appellant but this letter was also returned undelivered. The undisputed fact is that the respondent has been depositing rent in miscellaneous rent proceeding instituted against the previous owner before the transfer was made in favour of the appellant. The respondent was faced with the situation where the appellant claiming to be the transferee had served a notice without furnishing any address on which the rent could have been remitted. The attempt made by the respondent to find out the correct address of the appellant had failed. In these circumstances only three courses were left with the respondent (1) to deposit the rent in the name of the old tenant, (2) deposit the rent in the name of the new transferee, and (3) deposit the rent in the joint names of both the landlords. The respondent was depositing the rent in the proceeding which he had instituted earlier and, therefore, he continued to deposit in the same proceeding. The bona fide impression was created in his mind that if fresh application for deposit of rent is filed without a proper address of the landlord it may not be entertained or may not be a valid proceeding. The fact however, remains that the respondent continued to deposit the rent in the previously instituted proceeding in the name of the previous landlady. According to Mr. Abdul Majid this conduct of the respondent was contumacious and does not entitle him to any benefit. In this regard he has referred to Muhammad Ashraf v. Abdul Majid and another 1982 SCMR 237 where it was held that if the tenant on being informed of the transfer of property files an application and deposits rent in the name of the previous owner then such conduct of the tenant has to be termed as contumacious. The facts of this case are completely different from the present one. In the first place the respondent did not start depositing the rent in the name of the previous owner after the service of notice. He had been depositing rent in the name of the previous landlady even before the notice under section 13-A was served. Secondly, the appellant's failure to provide proper address had left the respondent in a quandary and he could not have ascertained the sale in favour of the appellant. In these circumstances if the respondent chose to continue to deposit the rent in pending proceeding, it will not militate against his bona fide. At this stage it is pertinent to refer to an unreported judgment in Second Rent Appeal No, 68 of 1978 M.A. Malik v. Suleiman and another, relied upon by the Mr. Muhammad Sadiq. In this case the ejectment application had been filed against the tenant in which he was depositing the rent. During the pendency of the case the property was transferred to new owner who served a notice calling upon him to pay the rent. The tenant informed him that he is depositing the rent in the Court but he was held to be a defaulter.
5. However, in appeal on question of default it was observed that as the document of title was not furnished to the tenant who continued to deposit rent in Court he could not be termed as a defaulter. It was observed as follows:- "In my view, the tenant is clearly within his rights if he demands a copy of the title deeds from a person who demands rent from him. It may well be that if he is obliged to pay the rent to every person who makes the demand he may run the risk of paying rent to the wrong person and incurring the penalty of eviction for default or at least the risk of paying the money twice ever.
6. Obviously, that could not have been the intention of the Law-maker. Tenant in my view would be completely in his rights to ask the new landlord to furnish him with the substantial information which should satisfy him about the change of ownership of the property."
7. A tenant served with a notice under section 13-A is entitled to be satisfied of the transfer which can be done by obtaining title deed from the new owner or making proper inquiries from the previous owner or in any other manner by which such fact can be ascertained. Such inquiry should however, normally be made within a period of 30 days from the date notice is served or ought to have been served. A tenant cannot delay in payment of rent on the plea that he is making inquiries. The present case is completely different as the appellant had not furnished its address and the previous landlady was also not available. The respondent found out the appellant's address but the letter and cheque sent by registered post A.D. Were returned undelivered. In these circumstances it was not possible to tender rent to the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that after service of notice the rent should have been deposited in Court within 30 days of the service. The question of payment of rent within 30 days would have arisen if the appellant could have furnished proper address to the respondent and the transfer if necessary could have been ascertained. The deposits were being made is the pending proceeding and when the respondent came to know about the address, the rent was tendered. In such situation the responde9t cannot be deemed to be defaulter.
8. ' Mr. Abdul Majid Khan the learned counsel for the appellant contended that in First Rent Appeal No, 405 of 1981 the respondent even after knowledge of the transfer did not pay rent to the appellant and continued to deposit in the name of the previous owner. This knowledge of transfer was through the letter of the appellant which did not provide any address. It is not the case of the appellant that independent of this notice the appellant had contacted the respondent and advised him of the address. In these circumstances in my view the case of this respondent stands on equal footing with the respondents in other connected appeals. All the three appeals are dismissed.