' Mr. JUSTICE SHAH ABDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).--The appellant, Syed Muhammad Wajid Ali Shah, was appointed on probation as Assistant Director (Legal and Labour Affairs) in WAPDA in B-17 on 31-8-1982. On the expiry of one year, his probationary period was extended for a further period of six months. His services were dispensed with during the extended period of probation by order, dated 3-3-1984, for the reason that his work was not satisfactory. The present appeal was filed before the Tribunal on 13-6-1984 to challenge the order of 3-3-1984.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that no doubt during the probationary period, the service could be dispensed with without assigning any reason but when the service is dispensed with for reason for unsatisfactory work, which amounts to inefficiency, the procedure laid down under the relevant Efficiency and Discipline Rules was to be followed. In this respect the learned counsel relied on two cases one reported as Zafar-ul-Hasan v. The Republic of Pakistan PLO 1960 SC 113 and the other reported as Muhammad Siddiq Javaid Chaudhry v. The Government of West Pakistan PLD 1974 SC 393.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents contends that the cases relied upon by the appellant's counsel are distinguishable from the facts of the present case, but it is not necessary to examine the issue on merit because the Tribunal cannot entertain the appeal, the same being barred by time. He contended that when the appeal is barred by time no Court or Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain it in view of section 3 of the Limitation Act. It was contended that the impugned order having been passed on 3-3-1984, the appeal filed on 13-6-1984 is hopelessly barred by time as only 30 days were available to the appellant for coming to the Tribunal and there is no application for condonation of delay.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant tried to meet the objection of limitation by saying that the departmental appeal was filed by the appellant on 11-3-1984 and that he came to the Tribunal after exhausting the statutory period of 90 days as provided for in section 4 of the Service. Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973) The waiting period of 90 days is applicable only when there is a provision for appeal, representation or review. The appellant was not dismissed or removed from service under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules which provided for departmental appeal. His services were terminated during the period of probation allegedly on the terms of his letter of appointment and the rules applicable to his service. When confronted with this fact, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that under section 22 of the Civil Servants Act, an aggrieved civil servant can avail of the opportunity of departmental appeal, representation or review even in the absence of specific provision in any rule. In these arguments, there is no substance because it is only the Service Tribunals Act which has been made applicable to the employees of the WAPDA. The employees of the WAPDA are not governed by the Civil Servants Act. The appeal is, therefore, clearly barred by time and the departmental appeal was an exercise in futility. There is no application for condonation of delay. We, therefore, without going into the merits of the case, dismiss the appeal as barred by time.