1. ZAFFAR HUSSAIN MIRZA, J.-- The dispute in this petition relates to half a square of land in Chak No.107/W.B. Tehsil Mailsi, District Multan. Sundar Singh evacuee held this land in his capacity as Lambardar by way of Lambardari grant. On his migration the land was leased out on temporary cultivation basis under the policy then in force from 1947 to 1959. In the year 1960, the Provincial Government notified a scheme for the grant of land not exceeding 25 acres for Breeding Pedigree Livestock. One Mukhtar was granted this land under the last mentioned scheme on 2-7-1960 by the Collector. In the events that happened, however, on the migration of the Hindu evacuee petitioner Sikandar Ali had been appointed the permanent Lambardar in his place. He was, however, suspended and the first respondent Khushi Muhammad was appointed as the temporary Lambardar.- The first respondent and one Ismail who was the occupant and temporary cultivator of this land, therefore, filed appeals against the order granting the land in favour of Mukhtar, who was not a resident of the Chak. By an order dated 30-9-1960 the Additional Commissioner decided the matter in favour of Khushi Muhammad and allowed his appeal, on the ground that in terms of .The Government instructions Lambardars were to be given preference for allotment. Thus first respondent came to hold under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme of 1960 until 1965, when the petitioner was exonerated of the charges and re-instated to his office as Lambardar. Upon his re-instatement the petitioner claimed the grant of the land in his capacity as the Lambardar. But by then a revised policy of Government had come into effect which stipulated that the Lambardar as such Could claim the Lambardari grant if it was available or other land in lieu thereof. As the disputed land had already been granted to the first respondent and was not available, it was held that the first respondent had to be accommodated on other land. Against this order of the Collector an appeal was preferrred, which was allowed by the Additional Commissioner on 26-8- 1965. Aggrieved by this order the first respondent went up before the Lahore High Court, Lahore in a Constitutional petition challenging the validity of the order as having been passed without lawful authority and being of no legal consequence.
2. The learned Single Judge who heard the Constitutional petition held that on the departure of Sundar Singh evacuee holder of the land, the grant became evacuee property in terms of the Evacuee Laws and that it was wrong on the part of the departmental authorities to have assumed that the land was resumed by the Government the Government had no authority to resume the grant which had become evacuee property this view of the matter the learned Judge further held that the land must remain attached to the office of Lambardar and once that office was filled up the holder of the office was entitled to the grant. In this context it was pointed out that even the, first respondent was granted the land by virtue of the fact that he was the temporary Lambardar at the relevant the, and upon his vacating the office, it followed that alongwith the office of Lambardar the grant also devolved upon the petitioner. Accordingly the constitutional petition, was dismissed on 28-2-1972.
3. The first respondent then challenged the order of the learned Single Judge in a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the Court which was accepted vide the impugned judgment dated 14-3-1977. It was held by the learned Division Bench as under:- "It is clear to us that the grant made to the evacuee Lambardar was a personal grant inhering in him only as long as he remained a Lambardar rendered service to the community as such and the moment the severance of the office and the individual took place A the land reverted to the Government and became just like any, other Government land retaining no trace, color, character of evacuee who once held it. Besides, the authorities concerned and the parties involved in this litigation at no stage treated it as having evacuee taint."
4. The petitioner being aggrieved is seeking leave to appeal from the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly contended that the learned Judges of the Division Bench have erred in holding that there was no evacuee interest left in the land and that the land was not attached to the office of Lambardar. In his submission the claim of the petitioner for grant of this land was justified inasmuch as he had been restored to the office of Lambardar with which the grant was attached.
6. After hearing the learned counsel at some length we are, however, unable to find force in his submission. 1t was conceded before the learned Division Bench that there was no evacuee interest involved in the controversy relating to the grant of this land and that the grant made in favour of Mukhtar on 2-7-1960 was not a Lambardari grant, because Mukhtar was never a Lambardar. These admitted factors of the case, in our opinion, clinch the issue. It is clear to us that the grant was made under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme of 1960 and when first respondent substituted Mukhtar there was actually a legal bar, as held by the learned Division Bench, and grants being made to Lambardars ex officio. We agree with the conclusion arrived at in the impugned judgment in the passage quoted above and in the process no right could accrue to the petitioner by virtue of his holding the office of Lambardar. Indeed when the grant was made in favour of the petitioner, there was an embargo on the grant to be made to a Lambardar ex officio, which fact is clear from the action of the department itself in making the initial grant in favour of Mukhtar who was a non-Lambardar under the Pedigree Livestock Breeding Scheme. The case of the petitioner, therefore, cannot be appropriated to the Lambardari grant and no such ground of right can be held contrary to the then existing scheme meant for breeders. The 1963 instructions on which much reliance was placed were rightly held to be prospective in operation and having no bearing on the grant in dispute, which took effect much prior to the promulgation of the said instructions.
7. After having carefully considered the points raised by the learned counsel we find no merit in this petition and there is no other ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.
8. The petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.