' AJMAL MIAN, J.-The petitioner owns a Truck bearing No, 803-810 and plies the same in Karachi for carriage of goods. The petitioner has impugned notifications dated 20-6-1982. 25-8-1982, 9-9-1982 and 21-10-1982 issued by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 under section 33-A(l) (m) of the Police Act 1861 (hereinafter to as the Act) prohibiting the goods carrying vehicles from plying on the roads mentioned therein during the periods mentioned therein i, e. During 8-00 a. m. To 11-00 a. m. And 4- 00 p. m. To 7.00 p. m. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the above notifications, has filed the present petition,
2. In support of the above petition Mr. Abdul Khair Ansari, learned counsel for the petitioner, has urged as follows:-
(1) That the petitioner's truck being registered as 'heavy transport vehicle' in terms of section 2 (13) of the West Pakistan Motor Vehicles Ordinance 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) is not covered by the impugned notifications.
(2) That under the Ordinance the power to grant Route Permits or not to grant or even to regulate the vehicles is given to the Road Transport Authority and since the impugned notifications have been issued without consultation with the Transport Authority, the same are illegal.
(3) That the conditions of section 33-A of the Act have not been complied with inasmuch as there is no indication in the impugned notifications that respondent No, 2 has adverted to the question of public safety and convenience before the issuance of the impugned notifications. On the contrary, from the record it is evident that the impugned notification have adversely affected the public interest.
(4) That in any case the petitioner and the other affected persons were not heard before issuance of the above notifications which adversely affected the earning of the petitioner and the other owners of the vehicles carrying goods.
3. On the other hand Mr. Abdul Sattar Shaikh, the learned A. A.-G. Has contended as follows :-
(1) That the Act is independent from the Ordinance and, therefore, the definition of the 'goods vehicles' or the 'heavy transport vehicles' given in sections 2 (11) and 2(13) of the Ordinance cannot be pressed into service for examining the legality of the impugned notifications;
(2) That under section 33-A of the Act respondent No, 2 was not required either to consult or obtain the approval of the Road Transport Authority as the prime consideration was the public safety and convenience;
(3) That factually the conditions of section 33-A of the Act were complied with before the issuance of the impugned notifications; and
(4) That since the impugned notifications are not directed against particular person, but are applicable to all the vehicles carrying goods irrespective of the fact from where they originate and therefore, it was not possible to issue notice for hearing.
4. Adverting to the first contention of Mr. Abul Khair Ansari, it may be observed that he has referred to sectio.Is 2 (11) and 2(13) to high light the fact that there is a distinction between 'goods vehicles' and the `heavy transport vehicles' inasmuch as under clause (11) of section 2 of the Ordinance 'goods vehicles' have been defined as 'means any Motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use of or the carriage of goods, or Motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods, solely or in addition to passengers'. Whereas clause (13) of section 2 of the Ordinance gives the definition of the term 'heavy transport vehicle' as 'means a transport vehicle the registered axle weight of which exceeds 10,600 pounds or the registered laden weight of which exceeds 14,500 pounds'. He has also referred to the other clauses to indicate that there are various types of vehicles in terms of the Ordinance.
5. In our view reference to the definition of the terms 'goods vehicles' or 'heavy transport vehicles' given in the Ordinance is not relevant for the purpose of examining the legality of the impugned notifications for the reason that the same have been issued under the Act and not under the Ordinance. The definitions given in the Ordinance cannot be imported into the Act in the absence of any statutory provision. The impugned notifications refer to 'goods carrying vehicles'. The above expression will include all type of vehicles carrying goods irrespective of the fact whether they can be classified as 'goods vehicles' in terms of section 2 (11) or 'heavy transport vehicles' within the purview of section 2 (13) of the Ordinance.
6. As regards the second submission of Mr. Abul Khair Ansari that under the Ordinance the power to grant Route Permit or not to grant the same or to specify the routes etc. Has been given to the Road Transport Authority and that the impugned notifications could not have been issued without consultation or concurrence of the Road Transport Authority, it will suffice to observed that the scope of the Ordinance is different from the scope of the Act and so also the object. There is no requirement either in terms of the Ordinance or the Act that before issuance of a notification of the nature under section 33-A of the Act, the Road Transport Authority is either to be consulted or its concurrence is to be obtained.
7. Reverting to the third submission of Mr. Abul Khair Ansari that the respondent No, 2 has not fulfilled the conditions pre-requisite before issuance of a notification under section 33-A, it may be observed that he has invited our attention to the fact respondent No, 2 has not adverted to the question of public safety and convenience and that on the contrary from the documents on record, it is evident that the impugned notifications have caused inconvenience to the public and have not served the cause of the public. In furtherance of the above argument he has referred to clause (m) of section 33-A of the Act, which provides that District Magistrate in any town or other place in which he thinks fit, inter alia may regulate the movement of persons, animals and vehicles at such time and such places at which in the opinion of the Magistrate special regulation may be necessary for the public safety and convenience. To reinforce the above submission, he has referred to the case of Syed Latif Hussain Shah Advocate v. District Magistrate, Gujranwala (1) in which a learned Single. Judge of Lahore High Court declared an order passed under section 33-A
(m) of the Act as illegal on the ground that the District Magistrate had not taken into consideration the public convenience and safety. In the above cited case the grievance of the petitioner was that as a result of the impugned order the public has been put to lot of inconvenience as more time is consumed for going to the destination and the journey has become more expensive and inconvenient for the reason that the person has to take a long route. In our view, the above case has no application to the present case, for the reasons referred to herein below:- ' It is true that in the impugned notifications, respondent No, 2 has not
(1) PLD 1981 Lah. 484 used the words 'public safety and convenience', but in our view omission to employ the above words in the notifications will be of no consequence, SO long as the impugned notifications are factually for the public safety and convenience. Mr. Abul Khair Ansari has referred to Annexures 'H' to 'II-4' which are photostat copies of the letters i,e, letter addressed by M/s. Pakistan Flour Mills Association dated 15-9-1982, letter dated 2-10-1982 of All Pakistan Textile Mills Association (Sind- Baluchistan Zone), letter dated 15 9-1982 of Ration Merchants Association, Karachi, letter dated 27- 9-1982 of M/s P. Tejani & Sons, a clearing agent and letter dated 13-9-1982 of M/s. The Karachi Grain and Seeds Merchants Group respectively, to the Deputy Director Food or to the Deputy Commissioner pointing out the inconvenience caused to the business community on account of issuance of the above impugned notifications The Court will have to weigh convenience and inconvenience of the business community on the one hand and the public at large on the other hand. It may be true that because of regulating the timings of the vehicle carrying goods the same may be causing inconvenience to the business community, who are to receive goods from the up- country or from the factories situated out of the city or within the city of Karachi. But at the same time, it cannot C be denied that there is acute traffic problem particularly on the main thoroughfares of Karachi and to regulate plying of vehicles carrying goods will to some extent reduce the confession and will contribute towards the convenience and safety of the public at large. In this regard, it may be pertinent to reproduce herein below para. 3 of the Deputy Commissioner (West) counter-affidavit dated 24-11-1982, which reads as follows:- "That with reference to para. 9 of the petition I say that approval of respondent No, 1 for the issuance of the impugned notifications is not a requirement of any law. In the recent past owing to great congestion on the main road of the metropolis in the morning and evening peak hours, traffic jams had become a common sight. The heavy load of goods traffic during the peak hours aggravated the congestion on the roads. Thus, it had become unavoidable to impose partial regulatory restrictions on the flow of transport vehicles on a few congested reads only during peak hours in order to ensure smooth flow of traffic and minimize accidents. This has been done in consonance with the modern concepts of traffic management whereby goods traffic and passenger traffic are segregated by time so that during peak hours the passengers traffic is not caused hindrance by goods traffic. Before issuing the notification, I had discussed the matter thoroughly with the Traffic Police authorities, and on careful consideration of the same, I formed the opinion that it was necessary for public safety and convenience to enforce regulatory restriction on the movement of goods carrying vehicles during peak hours, and accordingly I issued the impugned notification in exercise of the powers under section 33-A, subsection (1), clause (m) of the Police Act, 1861."
We are satisfied that the impugned notifications have been issued) bonafidely with the object to achieve the safety and convenience of the public at large.
8. As regards the last submission of Mr. Abul Khair Ansari that in any case the petitioner was entitled to be heard before the issuance of the impugned notifications, it may be observed that the Courts lean towards holding that before passing any adverse order, an affected person is entitled to be heard, but the question is, whether in the present case it was possible for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 to have heard the persons, who were to be affected. The impugned notifications are not only applicable to the owners of the vehicles carrying goods, which are registered at Karachi, but are applicable to the vehicles coming from any place of Pakistan, irrespective of the fact whether they belong to private person or Government Departments or Government Organizations. Even in Karachi the number of registered vehicles carrying goods may be into lacs and, therefore, we are of the view that in the instant case it was not possible to give personal hearing to the persons affected by the impugned notifications. In this regard, reference may be made to a full bench case of the erstwhile High Court of Sind and Baluchistan in the case of Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada v.
Federation of Pakistan and another (1) wherein the then learned Chief Justice Tufail Ali A Rahman, while dealing with this aspect, observed as follows:- "Now, this is a rule at best of interpretation or at least whereby one reads into statute, words not expressly used but which are presumed to have been intended unless they are expressly or which under the circumstances of the case could not have been intended. Dealing with a case where, by general order, a whole class of persons, which might even be the entire population of Pakistan, can be prohibited from leaving Pakistan, I find it impossible to read such a rule into the statute in question. To do so would mean that a show-cause notice must be given to every single individual in Pakistan. I think this is one of the cases which the Chief Justice described as being those 'where from the very nature of the action this principle cannot possible have any application."
' We are, therefore, of the view that the petition has no substance and therefore, is dismissed with no order as to costs.