' This appeal arises from the decision dated 28-11-1977 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for his reinstatement was dismissed.
2. The appellant was Medicine Supervisor. His services were terminated on 28-7-1976 on the grounds that the factory was being closed as the Government demanded that medicines be manufactured in generic names after getting new licence and had refused to issue licence for import of raw materials without getting the said licence.
The services of Shamsher Alam were terminated on 28-7-1976. The grounds on which the appellant challenged the order of his termination were that due to trade union activities, his services were terminated, that the rule of 'first come last go' was not observed by retaining his juniors in service, that no show-cause notice was given and no enquiry was held, that his services were terminated because he had refused to prevail upon his wife to withdraw her petition for reinstatement, that Mian Abdul Aziz, so-called Manager, was not competent to terminate his services. He claimed Rs,8,010 as past wages and benefits of termination of his service. He appeared as P.W. 1 to prove his case. He deposed that initially he was employed as Medical Representative and in 1964 he was made Medical Supervisor at the salary of Rs,400 per month. With regard to his duties he stated that he used to prepare daily reports about the work and progress of the representatives, took permission for using loudspeaker in the area, purchased raw material to get clearance and to get packages printed. He further said that after he was transferred to Lahore in 1964 his duty was to deal with the Bank to obtain L.C., to purchase raw material, to get clearance of the products, to make daily reports of the medical representatives with his own hands. About his termination he said that he was verbally terminated by Mian Abdul Aziz and written order after 15 days without charge-sheeting and holding any enquiry. He further said that he had not been paid wages for four months, that no annual increment was given to him for the last six years and that his promotion was withheld and that when he made demand for them, he was told that the wages would be paid when he would give up the job. He further said that his wife was terminated before him and he was told that if he would press the reinstatement of his wife directly or through the Labour Court he too would be terminated. He also said that besides him the other Supervisor was Saeed-ul-Hasan, who was junior to him, was retained in service at the time of his termination. He further said that although he was appointed by Mohammad Safdar, Partner of the Firm, his services were terminated by Manager Mian Abdul Aziz, who was not competent in this behalf, because he was drawing salary less than him. He gave the break-up of his claims as bonus, three months' pay and prize of Rs,2,000. He also said that he was an enthusiastic member of the Union and was asked by the Manager to give up union activities, otherwise he would be terminated. He further stated in cross- examination that the management had got certain documents signed from him without telling the contents in order to satisfy the Martial Law Authorities. He also said that he had heard that a deed of partnership was prepared treating him as a partner in 1971. He admitted his signatures on Exh. D.1 but added that he had not read it before signing it. He also identified his signatures on Exh. D.2. He admitted the contents of reports Exh.
D.3/1 and stated that they were in his handwriting. He also admitted Exh. D.4/1 to be in his handwriting and stated that he used to visit various medical practitioners daily. He admitted that he had not given any grievance notice. He admitted that 14 persons were terminated in June, 1976. He admitted that the respondent had been allowed to close down the whole of the establishment. He admitted that he had to supervise the work of medical representatives in Lahore. On behalf of the respondent Mohammad Safdar, Partner, appeared as D.W. 1 and deposed that in April, 1976 14 lady workers were terminated due to 'shrinkage of business and financial difficulties, that they entered into a settlement with the C.B. A. And the direction was accepted by the Union.
According to him, in December, 1975 new health policy was introduced by the Central Government as a result of which their businesses were shrinked to great extent. He further stated that the appellant did not do any manual or clerical work during his service as representative. He also said that Mian Abdul Aziz was the Manager under section 91 of the Factories Act and that he had been authorised to terminate the services of the employees vide authority letter Exh. D.8. He also said that in the case of the appellant he had specifically authorised Mian Abdul Aziz to terminate him. He further stated that no licence for import of raw materials was issued to the respondent for February, 1976, therefore, they could not produce codine which was the highest selling drug of their company. He lastly stated that the services of the appellant were not terminated by way of victimization. In cross-examination he said that the duties of the appellant as Medical Supervisor and representative were the same.
3. The learned lower court dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant only on the ground that he was not covered by the definition of workman given in section 2(i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. I have carefully considered the oral evidence and examined documents attached to the file. The finding of the Labour Court to the effect that the appellant was not a workman appears to be correct. The main duty of the appellant was to convass the sale of the medicines, produced by the respondent. He had to go to the doctors and shopkeepers for the purpose. A permission was given to him to play gramophone record on the amplyfire while advertising the drugs prepared by the respondent. He used to send daily reports. The daily reports were not exhibited in evidence but even if they are considered, they do not show that the main duty of the appellant was clerical. Firstly, it was ancillary to his main duty which was of convassing the sale of the drugs and secondly the daily reports are very short. Only the names of the doctors are given which were contacted by the appellant. Every daily report contains the names of three to six doctors. He may have spent hardly one minute in the preparation of the daily reports. Vide Exh. P.10 the representatives were asked to reach on 1-1-1970 so that they may not be require to spend much time in the preparation of statements. There is no evidence about the volume of the said statement. Moreover, they were only annual statements and were not prepared daily. If all the representatives were summoned to prepare the statements, it would not amount to clerical work and further that it was not their main duty. Preparation of annual statements were ancillary to their main duties of convassing the sale of drugs. Occasionally the appellant had to purchase raw material but this was neither a manual nor clerical work. There is no evidence that the purchased raw material was to be carried by the appellant. The list of duties given by D.W. 1 in his statement also shows that the appellant was not doing any manual work. The little clerical work which he had to do was ancillary to his main duties. So as a sale representative and Medical Supervisor he was not covered by the definition of workman as given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. However, he is covered by the definition of workman given in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 because according to the evidence, he is not covered by the definition of employer and was not supervising the work of Sale Representatives, nor his pay, according to the evidence, was more than Rs,800. Learned lower court has not decided the other points. If my finding had been on the reverse, of course there could be necessity of remanding the case for the decision of the remaining controversy between the parties. Even otherwise the appellant does not appear to have any case. Admittedly, the Labour Court had granted permission under Standing Order 11-A to close down the factory. There- is no material on the record to show that more than 50 per cent of the employees were retrenched at a stretch so that it may be said that violation of Standing Order 11-A was made. There is no evidence in support of the contention of the respondent that the import licence and drug licence were not refused by the Government. This being so, there was no other alternative for the respondent but to terminate the services of their employees on account of the shrinkage of work, which, thereafter, ultimately came to an end for which permission to close down the factory was taken. There is also no evidence about victimization. No doubt, the appellant stated that he was asked not to press the reinstatement of his wife and D.W. 1 did not say anything in his statement in this respect, but since otherwise it appears that the termination was justified, it cannot be said that the main motive for the termination of the services of the appellant was that he was asking for the reinstatement of his wife.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant has stated that even if it be taken that the appellant had no case, yet his claim about bonus, three months' pay and prize of Rs,2,000 should have been considered by the Labour Court.
I do not find any force in this argument, firstly because the appellant was not covered by the definition of workman and thus could not ask for even the payment of his dues. Secondly, the details of his claims are not given in his statement. He claim bonus etc. He has not said how much amount is of bonus. There is no reason why he claims three months' pay. There is no explanation about the prize of Rs,2,000. No document has been produced to show that ever any prize of Rs,2,000 was sanctioned to him. There is no evidence if bonus for any year was allowed to other workers and he was refused.
5. As a result of the observations made above, I do not find any force in this appeal, which is dismissed.