' The decision, dated 18th June, 1984 passed by learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore has been challenged in this appeal, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant was dismissed in limine holding that the appellant was not employed in any industrial or commercial establishment.
2. No cogent reasons have been given by the learned lower Court in support of its impugned order, nor the definitions of 'industrial establishment' and 'commercial establishment' given in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 have been interpreted and discussed. However, the finding is correct. The definition given in section 2 ( f) reads as under :- "Industrial establishment" means--
(i) an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936) ; or
(ii) a factory as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934) ; or
(iii) a railway as defined in clause (4) of section 3 of the Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890) ; or
(iv) the establishment of a contractor- who, directly or indirectly, employs workmen in connection with the execution of a contract to which he is party, and includes the premises in which, or the site at which, any process connected with such execution is carried OD ; Or
(v) the establishment of a person who, directly or indirectly, employs workmen in connection with any construction industry. In Section 2 (ii) of the Payment of Wages Act, the term 'Industrial establishment' is defined as under :- "Industrial establishment" means any-
(a) tramway or motor omnibus service ;
(b) dock, wharf or jetty ;
(c) inland steam-vessel ;
(d) mine, quarry or oil-field ;
(e) plantation ; ( f) workshop or other establishment in which articles are produced, adapted or manufactured, with a view to their use, transport or sale :
(g) establishment of a contractor who, directly or indirectly, employs persons in any industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or reward in connection with the execution of a contract to which, he is a party, and includes the premises in which, or the site at which, any process connected with such execution is carried on.
' The word 'factory' is defined in section 2 (j) of the Factories Act, which reads as under :- "Factory" means any premises, including the precincts thereof, whereon ten or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily carried on with or the operation of the Mines Act, 1923 (IV of 1923) without the aid of power, but does not include a mine, subject to So far as the definition given in Payment of Wages Act is concerned, it is clear that the office of the Deputy Commissioner is neither a tramway or motor omnibus service, nor a dock, wharf or jetty, an inland steam vessel, nor a mine, quarry or an oilfield, nor a plantation, nor a workshop, nor an establishment of a contractor. So far as the definition of 'factory' is concerned, this is nobody's case that manufacturing process is done in the D.C. Office. Obviously, the Deputy Commissioner does not employ workmen in connection with any construction industry as he does not do any of the acts enumerated in the definition of 'construction industry' defined in section 2 (bb) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. This being so, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable and the appellant cannot take benefit of any of its provisions.
3. Now let us pass on to the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The term 'establishment' has been defined in section 2 (ix). No doubt, the respondent has an office but it is to be seen if the Deputy Commissioner engages workmen to carry on an 'industry'. The term 'industry' is defined in clause (xiv), according to which, the term means any business, trade, manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation. Obviously, the office of the Deputy Commissioner cannot be called a business, trade, manufacture, calling, employment or occupation, therefore, these terms need not to be discussed. However, the term 'service' needs some discussion. The purpose and function of the D. C. Office is not to provide service or occupation to the people. Rather in order to perform public and official duties some persons are employed in the office, D. C. Office does not render any service on or without charging anything. Its main purpose is not to render any kind of service although the Deputy Commissioner is a public servant.
4. In order to decide the point, no evidence is required as judicial notice can be taken of the functions performed by the Deputy Commissioner. So the learned lower Court did not commit any error in disposing of the grievance petition without allowing opportunity to the appellant to lead evidence. The grievance petition thus did not disclose any cause of C grievance that could be redressed by the Labour Court.
5. As a result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.