This Criminal Appeal arises from the judgment of learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption whereby he on 4-9-1976 convicted Sardar Ali appellant under section 161, P.P.C. And section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and sentenced him to six months, R.I. And a fine of Rs,100 in default thereof further R.I. For three months.
2. The appellant was working as Overseer in the Municipal Committee, Kasur. This is a raid case.
The charge against the appellant is that he demanded Rs,600 and then accepted Rs,50 as illegal gratification for passing bill of Contractor namely S.L. Joseph P.W.3. The appellant denied the charge and claimed to be tried.
3. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as ten witnesses, out of whom S.L. Joseph P.W.3 appeared to prove demand and acceptance of bribe by the appellant Sufi Ghulam Mustafa M.I.C. P.W.7 and Faqeer Ullah S.I. Anti-Corruption were produced to prove the recovery of the tainted money from the appellant. The rest of the evidence is more or less of formal nature. The witnesses have supported the prosecution case.
4. When examined under section 342, Cr.P.C., the appellant admitting the receipt of tainted currency notes. He explained that the same was given to him for the purchase of cake and pastery for S.L. Joseph's sons's birthday function. In defence he produced Muhammad Bashir D.W.1 and Muhammad Munir Ahmad D.W.2.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the prosecution has failed to prove that the appellant had received Rs,50 as bribe. No one is present on behalf of the State. It appears that the State is not interested.
6. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant with care. I find that receipt of money having been admitted, the material and important question is as to whether the same was paid as illegal gratification. Since the Magistrate and the Inspector Anti- Corruption had not heard talks between the complainant and the appellant which preceded the passing on of the tainted money, therefore, uncorroborated testimony of a decoy witness remains in field upon which I am not prepared to place implicit reliance. In the circumstances of the case, it would be highly unsafe to maintain conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant.
7. For what has been found above, giving him the benefit of doubt the appellant is acquitted of the charge. He is on bail. Bail bond stands discharged.