' The revision captioned above gives information that the order, dated 8th August, 1983 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 2, Lahore in his appellate jurisdiction under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is illegal and void.
2. The dispute between the parties is about the pay for the period from 12th June, 1977 to 18th October, 1979. The respondent allowed leave to the petitioner for the said period 6without pay. The petitioner firstly brought an application under section 25-A but withdrew the same and applied to the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The respondent had raised an objection of territorial jurisdiction but the same was decided by the Authority in favour of the petitioner and accepted the claim. In appeal the learned lower appellate Court has returned the petition to the petitioner on the ground that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Lahore had no territorial jurisdiction. The appeal was time barred but the learned lower appellate Court refusing to condone the delay held that as the very order of the Authority challenged before it was without jurisdiction, no question of limitation arises.
3. The reasons given by the learned lower appellate Court for holding that the Authority at Lahore had no territorial jurisdiction are that the respondent was at Faisalabad and as the order of allowing leave without pay was issued from Faisalabad, the cause of grievance accrued at that place. This reason is erroneous. Admittedly, the petitioner was working at Lahore when the order challenged by him was passed. It was admittedly served upon him at Lahore where he was posted and thus though the order had been issued from Faisalabad, yet part of cause of action arose to the petitioner at Lahore and the Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act at Faisalabad as well as at Lahore had territorial jurisdiction and the petition was rightly brought at Lahore. Section 20, C.P.C. Is clear on the point. When the point as to where cause of action/grievance arises is to be decided, it is necessary to see if any part of cause of action arose at the place where the petition has been filed. If a part of cause of action has arisen there, it cannot be held that the Authority working at the place has no territorial jurisdiction.
4. Since the order of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act at Lahore had territorial jurisdiction, the order passed by it was not a nullity and thus even if for the sake of arguments, it is conceded (although I differ) that in such cases no question of limitation arises, the question of limitation did legally arises and since the learned lower appellate Court refused to condone the delay, the appeal was liable to be dismissed as time-barred.
5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that there being no provision of revision in the Payment of Wages Act, the revision is not, competent. This is true that so far as Payment of Wages Act is concerned, there is no provision of revision, but since the order in appellate jurisdiction passed by the learned lower appellate Court is covered by section 35 (5) (d) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, so the revision as provided in section 38 (3-a) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 lies. Previously there was no provision in section 35 recognising the powers given to the Labour Courts under other laws, therefore, the order passed by the said Courts were not covered by any provision of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. But subsection (5)
(d) of section 35 was amended by Ordinance XIX of 1970 by adding the words "or any other law".
The amended clause (d) of subsection (5) of section 35 reads thus :- "..... Exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance or any other law."
' So now appellate powers given by section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act are exercised by the Labour Courts after the said amendment duly allowed and recognised by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Since the appellate powers are exercised by virtue of section 35 (5) (d), also such an order can be scrutinized by this Tribunal under section 38 (3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This amendment was made purposely. Needless to say that no provision or amendment made by the Legislature is redundant or superfluous but carries on intention and wisdom behind it. So, I overrule the objection. The other point argued is that the Authority has even otherwise no jurisdiction. It is also urged that a legal point with regard to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage. This is true that it can be raised but there, is no stage for it. In appeal before the learned lower appellate Court or before the Authority such a point could be raised. Now at the stage of arguments of revision it is too late. And there is another difficulty. The petitioner had intentionally brought an application under section 25-A in the Labour Court but it was withdrawn.
Learned counsel for the petitioner says that on the objection of the respondent the said petition was withdrawn. If such an objection had been raised before the Authority, the petitioner may have produced the written statement filed by the respondent in answer to the petition lodged under section 25-A to show that the objection was that the Authority had jurisdiction. Needless to say that if on the objection of the adverse party a petition is withdrawn for want of jurisdiction than that party cannot D raise the same objection when the petition has been brought in another forum suggested by him. Since at the stage of revision such an objection has been raised for the first time, the petitioner has no opportunity to show that against the petition given under section 25-A an objection of the respondent was that not the Labour Court but the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had jurisdiction. So, such an objection cannot be allowed to be raised at this stage.
6. So far as the question of the entitlement of the petitioner to the wages for the period he was allowed leave without pay, is concerned, the Ending of the learned lower appellate Court appears to be correct and that of the Authority wrong. The petitioner was transferred to Islamabad and he did not comply with the order. He was transferred to Faisalabad but that order was also not complied with. He joined at Lahore when he was transferred there. The ground for which the petitioner did not join at Islamabad and Faisalabad are that there were domestic troubles and he was ill. It is clear that the order of transfer was not said to be without jurisdiction or mala fide. There is no evidence to prove the grounds for which the petitioner is alleged to have been prevented from obeying the two transfer orders. No certificate of illness is on the file. Needless to say that absence without leave is misconduct. The petitioner was charge-sheeted also but on compassionate grounds the matter was dropped and his absence was treated as leave without pay. The learned Authority without any evidence allowed the wages for the period of absence. The petitioner failed to make out a case for setting aside the order of granting leave without pay. He should have reported at the new place of his duty and requested for being transferred to Lahore or at some other place. But the difficulty is that since the appeal was time-barred and the delay was not condoned by the learned lower appellate Court, it could not interfere with the order passed by the Authority on merits even though the order was wrong.
7. As a result, the revision is accepted and setting aside the order of returning the petition of the petitioner made under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, the appeal of the respondent made to the learned lower appellate Court is dismissed as time-barred. As the order of the Authority has not been challenged before me nor it could be legally challenged, there being no provisions of revision against the order of Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, I cannot interfere with the said wrong order.