' MUHAMMAD IRSHAD KHAN (MEMBER).-- This appeal is directed against the order notified on the 30th of January, 1980, whereby the appellant was retired from service under clause (ii) of section 13 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The appeal having been filed nearly three years beyond the prescribed limitation, is obviously time-barred. An application for condonation of delay was, however, filed.
2. We have given our anxious thought to the submissions made by the parties. An attempt was first made on behalf of the appellant to urge that time for filing the appeal is to count from a letter of the Department dated 11-1-1983 addressed to one Mr. Abdul Bari, an appellant before us in Appeal No, 25 (K) of 1982. But this is rather an over-simplication of the appellant's helpless case for condonation of delay. The argument over-looks the stark facts that the said letter was issued to Mr. Abdul Bari and not to the appellant, hence, the appellant cannot avail it in his case for enlarging the period of limitation. Even otherwise we have held in the case of said Mr. Abdul Bari that the said letter, not being a final order, cannot be of avail of reckoning the period of limitation. It is, however, interesting to note that the present appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation even if the limitation is taken to have started therefrom. It is a cardinal principle of law of limitation that no delay howsoever short, can be passed over, unless satisfactorily accounted for. The contention thus being fallacious is repelled.
3. Another reason advanced for delay was that the appellant had constantly been ailing for serious diseases like "heart-ailment" and "kidney trouble. " Illness normally is not recognized as sufficient cause for condoning an inordinate delay. In the instant case, it is a matter of common knowledge that the aforesaid diseases were not such which may suspend or paralyse the senses of its victim to such an extent that he may not be able to attend such an important matter. Therefore, the illness of the appellant also does not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is well-known that in cases of delay it is not for the appellant merely to explain the actual delay beyond the period of limitation but to show that his conduct throughout the period, has been vigilant enough. In the instant case, we are convinced that the conduct of the appellant has been negligent throughout and he first time thought of seeking remedy against the impugned order when one S. Aijaz All had obtained a relief from this Tribunal vide its judgment dated the 15th of July, 1982. The appellant, therefore, does not deserve any leniency in the matter of condonation of delay.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant laid much emphasis on the contention that the impugned order was void being incompetent, the question of limitation would not arise. This contention too is liable to be repelled without going into the question whether the order impugned in the instant appeal is void or not. For, an order of a public authority, even if void, shall be presumed to be genuine and valid unless the presumption is rebutted in competent legal proceedings by a party entitled to sue, and there might be no one entitled to sue if a statutory time limit had expired. In other words, even a void order is capable of legal consequences and shall operate simply because it bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead, and unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders. To dub an order as void or incompetent without having a recourse to the due process of law, will be nothing more than a fanciful private opinion. We are, therefore, of the firm view that the question of limitation cannot be ignored even if the impugned order be termed as void and the limitation period provided in a statutory provision for invoking a remedy runs against an order which is claimed to be void from the date of the knowledge of such order. The aggrieved person must, therefore, invoke his remedy against such presumed void order within the prescribed time. If any authority is needed to the point PLD 1977 SC 599 may be referred to wherein a similar question came up for consideration and it was enunciated by the Supreme Court:- "However, in view of the frequency with which gross negligence is sought to be condoned on the plea that the impugned order was void or without jurisdiction, we would observe that a void order or an order without jurisdiction is only a type of an illegal order passed by a Court and the fact that it has been passed and that it may, therefore, create rights cannot be altered by describing it as void or without jurisdiction. And, further, the expressions void orders and orders without jurisdiction are overworked expressions. No doubt they are relevant in some contexts but as suggested by Lord Reid in Anosmatic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission and others (1969) 2 AC 197 it would be better to use these expressions in the narrow and original sense of the lack of competence of the Court or the Tribunal to enter on the enquiry in question."
The legal position being so clear and settled, we have no option but to hold that there is no case for condonation inordinate and inexcusable delay occurred in filing the present appeal. Accordingly the appeal being hopelessly time-barred, is dismissed as incompetent.
5. No order as to costs.