' The petitioner by this writ petition seeks a declaration to the effect that an order dated 7-7-1982 passed in appeal from an ejectment order, by the learned District Judge, Gujranwala respondent No.1, is without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. Respondent No.3 filed an ejectment petition against the petitioner for his eviction from Shop No.B-XXIII-4S-39 Nowshera Road, Gujranwala. The eviction of the petitioner was sought on the ground that the petitioner was a defaulter as to the rent for a period of three years; the son of respondent No.3 namely Shahzad Nadeem after having completed his education was unemployed who wanted to run his own business in the shop in question, so the shop was needed in good faith for the son of respondent No.3. It was also averred that the disputed shop was in disrepair and a small one which was insufficient to cater the need of the son of respondent No.3, so respondent No.3 for the need of his son after demolishing the shop in question wanted to add the same to the adjacent shop already in possession of respondent No.3, by way of re-construction for which respondent No.3 had secured a sanction plan from the Municipal Corporation concerned.
3. The petitioner resisted the application by controverting each ground.
4. The learned Rent Controller after his findings that the petitioner was not a defaulter, the landlord/respondent No.3 required the disputed shop in good faith for the use of his son, the disputed shop was required in good faith for re-construction, ordered the eviction of the petitioner vide his order dated 25-11-1981.
5. The petitioner being aggrieved filed an appeal therefrom before respondent No.l. Respondent No.3 also filed an appeal in respect of the finding recorded against him as to the default in the payment of rent. Both the appeals were consolidated and disposed of by a single judgment. The finding of the learned Rent Controller as to the default was upheld and the appeal of respondent No.3 was dismissed. In the appeal of the petitioner the finding relating to the requirement of the shop for the son of respondent No.3 was reversed. The finding on the issue that whether the landlord/respondent No.3 required the disputed shop in good faith for re-construction, was maintained as a result thereof the District Judge dismissed the appeal, sustaining the order of ejectment only on the ground of respondent's requirement of the shop for re-construction in accordance with the sanctioned plan. This was vide judgment dated 7-7-1982.
6. Both the learned counsel for the parties addressed this Court and referred to certain pieces of evidence to show as to what was proved and what was not proved, no mind can be lent to that within the scope of the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
7. This writ petition was admitted only to examine the impact of a decision of the Supreme Court reported as Abdullah Baloch v. Adam Ali PLD 1961 SC 28 on the question that since the landlord/respondent had linked up the requirement of the shop for re-construction with the personal need of his son whether the finding of the learned District Judge negativing the personal requirement of the shop on the ground that the landlord/respondent was in possession of a suitable contiguous shop for the use of his son, militated against the bona fide requirement of the landlord qua re-construction.
8. In the above-cited Supreme Court case the landlord had in his application to the Rent Controller linked up the requirement for reconstruction with his personal requirements expressly and in a most specific manner and the findings of the Rent Controller specifically negative each of the personal requirements alleged by the landlord, it was observed by the Supreme Court.-- "These findings must necessarily react upon the allegation of reasonable and bona fide requirement for reconstruction. Requirement for reconstruction, for the sake of reconstruction, is not a valid requirement to enable a landlord to obtain ejectment of a tenant under the Act. It must be a reasonable and bona fide requirement."
' The decision of the Supreme Court was also followed in Sh.Muhammad Yousaf v. Mst. Zohra Bibi PLD 1973 Pesh.
185. The other decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not meticulously applicable, therefore, need not to be mentioned here.
9. The learned counsel for respondent No.3 has cited a number of authorities on the bona fide requirement for personal use and the bona fide requirement on the ground of reconstruction. Since the point under examination here is on a different plan, there is no necessity of referring to the decisions so cited. However, the learned counsel has objected to the competence of the writ- petition on the ground that there are involved no jurisdictional defects. He has also submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court viz. PLD 1961 SC 28, was delivered in a civil suit and the law applicable was Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953 in which there was no penal provisions, as is in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 which is to the effect that a landlord after taking possession of the building or the land, failing to construct the premises within the period specified there, is liable to be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine or with both.
10. The decision of the Supreme Court is no doubt under section 10(2) of the repealed Karachi Rent Restriction Act, the language of the relevant provision being in 'pari materia' with the language of section 13(2)(vi) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the said dictum is applicable with all the force. As to the argument of the learned counsel for respondent No.3 that the absence of the penal provision in the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, makes the case as not applicable to the present one, is misconceived. It has been repeatedly held that irrespective to the penal clause of the Ordinance, 1959, the case must be proved independently on the ground which is set up in the ejectment petition and that will not absolve a person from proving the same simply because a penal provision is there.
11. The learned District Judge as a result of his discussion did observe that respondent No.3 was in possession of a suitable shop forA the use of his son, therefore, one of the conditions entitling a landlord to get vacated a non-residential property on account of bona fide personal requirement had not been proved.
' The case of respondent No.3 in his ejectment petition as well as in the evidence was that of reconstructing the building by amalgamating two shops for providing his son to run the business whereas the sanctioned plan Exh.A/1 showed that two shops were to be reconstructed at the proposed site apart from other structure. As has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, there is obviously a contradiction between the case as set up in the application and through the evidence and the sanctioned plan since the plea taken is for absorbing two shops to make with as one to cater the need of the son. In view of the above-cited decision of the Supreme Court the requirement for reconstruction altogether fails being interlinked, with the failure to establish the requirement of the shop for the use of the son of respondent No.3 before the District Judge, hence the finding of the learned District Judge sustaining the ejectment order on the ground of re-construction after having reversed the finding on the son's need, is without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
12. As to the competence of the writ petition suffice it to say that the principles and the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all the other Courts in Pakistan as is obvious from Article 189 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which says that any decision of the Supreme Court shall to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law be binding on all other Courts in Pakistan and since a principle declared by the Supreme Court in the above-cited decision has not been applied by the learned District Judge, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction by him cannot be regarded as without a legal defect. Hence, this writ petition is accepted with no order as to costs.