1. ' In this appeal the decision dated 16-2-1982 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,6, Rawalpindi has been challenged, whereby he had accepted the grievance petition of the s respondent and had directed the payment of group insurance.
2. ' It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in Standing' Order 10-8(4) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, group insurance for disability is not provided, therefore, the respondent was not entitled to it. I do not find any force in this argument. In Standing Order 10-B(1) it is clearly mentioned that the employer is bound to get his employees insured under the group insurance scheme for natural death and disability and death and injury. Clause (4) gives the remedy in cases where the employer has failed to get the permanent workmen insured in the manner laid down in clauses (1) to (3) of Standing Order 10-B. The word 'injury' used in clauses (4) includes disability. Clause (1) gives a right to the permanent workman that they should be got insured by the employer and clause (4) gives the remedy. If clause (4) is interpreted to mean that it does not give any right to the employee or his heirs to get group insurance amount in cases of disability, then it would mean that the right has been given without any remedy. According to the well-known maxim 'ibi jus ibi remedium', there can be no right where there is no remedy. It is, therefore, necessary that where a right has been given to a person, he should be given remedy if that right is infringed. If the other interpretation is given to clause (4) then it would mean that no remedy has been given for the wrong committed by the employer in failing to get the employee insured. It cannot be presumed that the Legislature created a right but did not give remedy. The words 'arising out of contingencies mentioned in clause (1)' further make it clear that the word 'disability' used in clause (1) applies to clause (4) also and in order to avoid repetition the words used in clause (1) were not repeated in clause (4). Learned counsel has cited 1978 PLC 363, 1980 PLC 222 and 1980 PLC 239 in which contrary view has been taken, but, as I have discussed above, if the other interpretation is given to clause (4) of Standing Order 10-B it would render the right given to the employee without any remedy, which cannot be the intention of the Legislature. If the intention of the Legislature had been not to give any right in respect of disability to the employee then the words 'natural death and disability would not have been included in clause (1) of Standing Order 10-B. By the inclusion of those words the intention is quite clear that the Legislature wanted to give a right to the employee that he should be insured by the employer for natural death as well as for disability. So where the employer fails to get the permanent employee insured, for natural death and disability, he is liable to pay that sum to him which would have been payable to the employee by the insurance company, if he had been insured. I, therefore, overrule the objection raised by the learned counsel and hold that the learned trial Court has rightly directed the appellant to pay group insurance amount to the respondent. There is no force in the appeal, which is dismissed in limine.