' The decision, dated 31-3-1984 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan has been challenged in this appeal, whereby the respondent was directed to be re-instated in service with back benefits.
2. The respondent was retired on completing the age of 55 years. The dispute between the parties is about the age of superannuation. According to the appellant, the age of retirement is 55 years, whereas the respondent claims that he is entitled to serve till the age of 60 years. The status of the respondent as a workman has also been questioned by the appellant.
3. The respondent is an Overseer. His duties are given in Exh. R.6. The duties enumerated in items Nos, 4, 6, 7 and 8 are clerical in nature. He maintained material stock and issue register, prepared bills of the contractors and conveyed progress reports. These duties are clerical. The measurement of work done by the contractors is manual skilled work. So, the respondent is a workman as defined in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.
4. So, far as the definition of workman given in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant is labouring under a mistake. Supervision of subordinate staff mists an employee from the pale of workman whose pay is more than Rs,800.
But the respondent had no subordinate. He used to supervise the work of the contractors to find out if it was according to the. Specifications and of good quality. Contractors are not the employees of the appellant. So, the respondent had no such supervisory powers that oust him from the definition of workman.
5. So, far as merits of the case are concerned, it has been argued that previously there was a provision in rule 33.1 of 1959 Rules that on completing the age of 55 years or on completing 25 years' service, the competent authority would consider the suitability of the employee concerned for further retension in service and that the said provision was not amended while amending Rule 33.1 in 1977. The argument has on the face of it no force. Before the amendment of 1977 there were no separate clauses in rule 33.1. If there had been clauses, it would have been necessary to expressly delete the said clauses. Moreover, when the very age of superannuation was extended to 60 years from 55 years, there remained no necessity to decide the suitability of an employee for retension in service on completing 55 years of age or completing 25 years qualifying service. In another case decided by me about a year or two earlier, some other points had been raised which I duly replied. Those points have not been raised in this appeal, so there is no need to discuss them.
6. In the memo. Of appeal a point has been raised that a retired person ceases to remain a workman, so application under section 25-A was not competent. This point has not been argued at bar, so is deemed to have been not pressed. The words 'is employed' occurring in section 2(xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 do not mean that only those persons are workmen who are in service at the time of making application under section 25-A. They mean that they are in employment when the cause of grievance accrues to them. Not only in section 2(xxviii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 but in other enactments also where worker, employee or a servant has been defined, present tense has been used such as section 2 of Civil Servants Act (Central and Provincial), section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, section 2 of the Factories Act, section 2(i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, sections 3 and 148 of Railways Act. If the words 'is employed' are interpreted to mean that only those persons are workmen who are in service at the time of seeking redress of grievance, then it would mean that retired, dismissed or otherwise persons removed from service have no remedy to ask for re-instatement. If the intention of the Legislature had been this, then there was no need of promulgating special laws such as Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and Factories Act and constituting special Courts because remedy in the form of seeking damages was already available under the ordinary civil law in a civil Court. So, I overrule the objection.
7. As a result, the appeal fails arid is dismissed. b .