' The decision, dated 21-3-1984 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,1, Lahore has been challenged, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant union brought under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 had been dismissed on the ground that the appellant has no locus standi to bring the petition.
2. The respondent has not allowed NPS-12 to the Assistant Telephone Supervisors and Draftsmen, who are said to be the members of the appellant union. The question involved in this appeal is whether the appellant union could espouse the cause of the workers under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. I have already expressed my view on the point in various cases, one of which is reported in 1982 PLC 483. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited certain rulings of the Karachi High Court and Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal but with great respect I do not find myself in agreement to the Views expressed therein. In the said rulings the word 'it' occurring in section 34 and the word 'proceedings' used in section 22(12)(b) have been interpreted.
In 1975 PLC 230 his Lordship Mr. Justice Inamullah Khan, Chairman, Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal has not given reasons for interpreting the word 'it' to mean that a union can bring a grievance petition for the cause of the workers as a whole. Only this much is said "I am inclined to give wider interpretation to the word 'it' In 1979 PLC 178 reference has been made to section 22(12)(b) and it has been held that since a union can represent the workers, so they can bring an application for him under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It has been observed in 1980 PLC 316 making reference to the same section 22(12) (b) that the word 'it' in section 34 denotes collective rights of workmen as are enforceable by agency of collective bargaining agent within the meaning of section 22(12) (b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Some other rulings have also been cited but since almost the same grounds are given, so I feel no need to discuss them separately. I think this cannot be a disputed issue that while interpreting any provision of law, the intention of Legislature is to be found out. Where the Legislature w has made an amendment in law and while amending, certain words have been substituted and some deleted, there is a particular intention and wisdom behind it. Previously in the unamended section 34 the word 'workman' was also appearing with the words 'employer' and 'collective bargaining agent'. While amending the section the word 'workman' was deleted. This is also noteworthy that this amendment was made in section 34 after section 25-A was inserted in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, whereby right was given to the individual workers to challenge the order affecting them adversely, under section 25-A. This also is noteworthy that the provision of giving grievance notice prior to the bringing of an application under section 25-A, has been made. Periods of limitation have also been fixed for giving notice and lodging the petition. This is also noteworthy that in section 34 there is no provision for giving grievance notice nor is fixed any period of limitation for bringing an application under section 34. If we give a thorough consideration to these developments we find that the Legislature was inclined to give a controlled and to some extent restricted right to the workers to seek remedy from the Labour Courts. But so far as C.B.A. And the employer are concerned, the status quo was maintained. An interpretation that disappears, the intended control is against the intention of the Legislature and would defeat the purpose which was intended to be achieved by making the amendment in section 34. If by propounding a case law allowing the' C.B.As. To fight for the cause of workers as a whole, the purpose of inserting section 25-A would be defeated. If the intention of the Legislature had been that whereby an order of the employer the bulk of the workers had been affected, the union can bring application for the benefits of the workers under section 34, then after the word 'it' the words 'to the workers as a whole' would have been inserted. Purposely it was not done because under section 25-A the shop steward of the C.B.A. Have been authorised to bring the grievance of the workers, if they have approached him or it as the case may be. A fear has been entertained in the above mentioned rulings that if C.B.A. Is held to have no right to bring application for all the affected workers, every aggrieved workers will be coming to the Court or there would be multiplicity of proceedings. I am sure there can be no possibility of such an eventuality. All the workers having common cause of grievance can bring one application to the Labour Court under section 25-A(10).
3. Now I may say few words about section 22(12) (b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The basis of the interpretation of the word 'it' occurring in section 34, made by my learned brother in the rulings mentioned above is section 22(12)(b). No doubt this section empowers the C.B.A. To represent the workers in a proceeding but without carefully examining the word 'proceedings' and interpreting it properly we cannot come to a right conclusion to say that the word 'it' occurring in section 34 read with section 22(12)(b) means that the C.B.A. Can espouse the cause of the workers as a whole. The word 'proceedings' means the proceedings before some authority. Before a' matter in dispute goes before an Authority competent to resolve it, we cannot say that any proceedings have come into existence. So, when it is said that a C.B.A. Can represent workers in a proceeding, it presupposes that some proceedings are already pending before some competent authority before which the C.B.A. Can represent the workers. No proceedings can be said to be pending before a petition is brought. So, C.B.A. Can represent a worker after the latter has brought some application or case before some authority. The section does not say that C.B.A. Can bring some proceedings before an authority. Bringing of proceedings is different from representing in some proceedings. The section, therefore, does not authorise C.B.A. To bring cases before some authorities for or on behalf of the workers. The workers have to bring cases with their own signatures and when they are brought or simultaneously with their bringing, the C.B.A. Can represent them in the proceedings. Comparison of section 25-A(4) with section 22(12) (b) makes it clear that the former empowers the C.B.A. To bring grievances of the workers with its signatures to the Labour Courts, whereas the latter authorities the C.B.A. Only to represent the workers in the proceedings that come into being after the workers have brought the case. So, if the intention of the Legislature had been that C.B.A. May bring the grievances of the workers with its own signatures, then instead of providing that C.B.A. May represent the workers in the proceedings, it would have been provided in section 22(12) (b) that the C.B.A. Can bring cases or disputed matters to the competent authorities. It is thus not the intention of the Legislature that the C.B.A. May bring disputes of the workers to the Labour Courts under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. However, where the interest of the C.B.A. Has been adversely affected by some action of the employer, it can apply 'under section 34. Suppose sufficient number of posts have been abolished unjustifiably, resulting in the termination of services of the bulk of the members of the union reducing the membership to such an extent that the very existence of the union is at stake, then the C.B.A. Can invoke the provisions of section 34. As the decision of the respondent in not allowing NPS-12 to the Assistant Telephone Supervisors and Draftsmen has not adversely affected the C.B.A., it could not bring application under section 34. If the C.B.A. Is interested that the above mentioned categories should be allowed NPS-12, it may raise an industrial dispute or to have brought application under section 25-A on the asking of the affected workers after service of grievance notices within time. The decision of the learned lower Court, therefore, is unexceptional and cannot be interfered with.
4. As a result, the appeal is dismissed.