1. ' This judgment would dispose of the eight petitions (No, 1 to 8 of 1985) filed on behalf of the persons against whom proceedings under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 have been initiated by the respondents herein, before the Presiding Officer-Ill Labour Court, Quetta. The facts are identical and common questions of law are involved in all these petitions.
2. ' The respondents herein, have filed applications challenging separately the order of termination of their services. The matters were fixed at Hub and the notices for the petitioners' appearance were issued for 7-3-1985. A reply statement to the application duly signed by the petitioner No, 1 was presented on his behalf by an Advocate while an application on behalf of the petitioner No, 2 was made in which it was said that the rejoinder filed by petitioner No, 1 is being adopted and no separate rejoinder therefore is being filed. An Advocate duly authorised by both the petitioners put in appearance and filed Vakalatnama jointly executed in his favour by the petitioners.
3. ' An application was also made wherein it was prayed that the petitioners be permitted to be represented by the legal practitioner named in the Vakalatnama filed in the Court.
4. ' From the perusal of the record it is found that an ex parte order was recorded against the petitioner No, 1 on 7-3-1985 which was however recalled on. 10-3-1985 on the conditional cost of Rs,50 and though the application for permission to be represented through the legal practitioner was accorded to the petitioners but it was on payment of Rs,2,000 in each case to meet the expenditure in engaging the senior counsel from Karachi for prosecuting the matters against the petitioners. These orders were passed on 10-3-1985 and are impugned in these petitions.
5. ' The notices under registered cover for the date fixed in this Court were sent to the respondents but they have not put in any appearance. It appears that they are not interested. I, therefore, examined the cases for the purpose of satisfying as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned orders.
6. ' From the perusal of the record it is found that on 7-3-1985 one Mr. M.A. Khan Advocate appeared on behalf of both the petitioners (the respondents before the Labour Court) and filed power. The petitioner No, 2 was also present in person. The rejoinder to the grievance petition was filed duly signed by the petitioner No, 2 while an application on behalf of the petitioner No, 1 was made saying therein that the rejoinder/reply statement filed by petitioner No, 1 is being adopted by him.
7. As observed above an ex parte order against the petitioner No, 1 was recorded on 7-3-1985 which was however recalled on 10-3-1985 on the cause shown by the petitioner No, 1 but on conditional cost of Rs,50 in each case. The application seeking permission to be represented through legal practitioner was allowed in the interest of justice.
8. ' The respondents herein had already appointed persons to act and plead on their behalf and no desire was expressed that they would require any other person (Advocate) against team of lawyers engaged by the present petitioners, yet it was considered necessary by the Presiding Officer to appoint lawyers for them and it was ordered that a sum of Rs,2,000 shall be deposited by the petitioners herein to enable the respondents to engage a counsel in the matter as they have to bear travelling expenses for coming and going to Karachi besides professional fee. According to the estimation of the Court locally no counsel of standing of the counsel engaged by the respondent, was available. The fee/amount was to be deposited within seven days.
9. ' Mr. Iftikhar Muhammad, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the representative of the petitioner No, 1 (M.A. Khan Advocate) duly armed with the authority to appear, act and plead was present on 7-3-1985 as such there was no legal justification to record an ex parte order. The order on the face of it was uncalled for and was certainly bad in law. But still the serious objection has been raised about the other part of the order whereby his clients have been penalized and forced to meet /defray the expenses of the lawyer to be engaged from Karachi and to be further burdened with the travelling expenses.
10. ' The relevant provision is contained in section 49 of the I.R.O. And reads: "Section, 49.-- Representation of parties:-- (1) A workman who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a collective bargaining agent and subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and subsection (3) any employer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any such proceedings by a person duly authorised by him.
(2) No party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Ordinance.
(3) A party to, an industrial dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner in any proceedings before the Labour Court, or before an Arbitrator with the permission of the Court or the Arbitrator as the case may be."
11. ' It was the applicant before the Labour Court who had to explain the necessity for representation by a legal practitioner and then only the occasion could arise for the Court to apply its mind. The Court certainly was not to act as a benevolent despot. It is obligatory on its part to act according to law applicable to the matter in dispute. The Labour Court is not required to show undue consideration to the party at the expense of the other and nothing should be done suggesting remotely that any undue favour was being extended to any one before it. The power under section 49, I.R.O. Is limited only to the grant of permission if the workman or employer is found entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner. The order of the Labour Court burdening the petitioners to pay the amount of Rs,2,000 in each one is certainly an infraction of the accepted rule of natural justice and is beyond its jurisdiction and outside the limits prescribed by law. The order, therefore on the face of it is perverse and is liable to be quashed.
12. ' In view of the above the petitions are accepted and the impugned orders are set aside. The record of the case shall be remitted to the Presiding Officer concerned for proceedings in accordance with law and decide the applications under section 25-A, I.R.O. On merits. Since the respondents have chosen not to contest in this Court there shall be no order as to costs.