' RAMANUJAM, J.-The assessee in this case was deriving income from property, share income from firms and income under other sources for the assessment year 1962-63, the relevant accounting year being the year ending with 13-4-1962. The assessee is owning a building known as 'Lucky Bungalow' at St. Thomas Mount, Madras. The State Government took acquisition proceedings for acquiring the said bungalow and issued a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 24-5-1961. 'Section 6 declaration was issued on 6-9-1961. The Collector gave the award on 14-3- 1962, fixing the compensation payable to the petitioner in respect of the building acquired. The possession of the building was actually taken over on 3-4-1962. There appears to be some dispute regarding the quantum of compensation and the same was finally settled by the Court on 21-4- 1966.
2. For the assessm ent year 1967-68, the capital gains arising out of the compensation received from the Government were brought into account. The Income-tax Officer computed the capital gains at Rs, 1,08,098 by his assessme nt order dated 30-5-1969. The assessment was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the appeal preferred by the assessee. On further appeal to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, the Tribunal held that as the "transfer" took place in the previous year relevant to the 1962-63, the capital gains cannot be assessed in the assessment year 1967-68. . .3. Taking note of the decision of the Tribunal that the capital gains arising out of the acquisition of the assessee's property by the Government can be assessed only in the years in which the acquisition took place, the I. T.
0. Obtained the approval of the Central Board of Direct Taxes and initiated reassessment proceedings under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. To a notice under section 148, the assessee filed a return under protest on 30-11-1974 showing the aforesaid sum of Rs, 1,08,098 as capital gains. The assessee also filed a letter alongwith the return objecting to the reassessment on the ground that reassessm ent could be made only under section 147(b), in which case the reassessm ent will be beyond time. The I. T.
0. Rejected the assessee's contention that the reassessment should be only under section 147 (b) and completed the assessm ent holding that the reassessment is only under section 147 (a). The assessee went up in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner reiterating the objections raised by him in his letter dated 29-11-1974 before the I. T.
0. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, however, rejected the assessee's contention. The assessee filed a further appeal to the 1ncome.Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal after referring to the relevant facts and circumstances held that the reassessment could be taken to have been made only under section 147 (a) read with section 149 (a) (ii), and therefore, the reassessment proceedings in respect of the assessment year 1962-63 made in this case were well within time.
Aggrieved against the order of the Tribunal the assessee sought and obtained a reference to this Court on the following question of law :- "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the reassessment made on 17-1-1975 for the assessm ent year 1962-63 is within the prescribed time?".
4. In this case, the reassessm ent has been made on 17-1-1975 for the assessment year 1962-63. If the assessm ent is taken to be under section 147(a) read with section 14 (a)(ii), as held by the Tribunal, the period before which reassessment has to be initiated is 16 years and completed within 4 years from the end of the year in which it was reopened. Thus, the only question that arises for our consideration in this case is, whether the reassessment in this case has been made under section 147(a) as alleged by the revenue or under section 14704 as alleged by the assessee.
5. As already stated, there is no dispute in this case that the capital gains arising out of the acquisition of the assessee's property can be brought to tax only in the year of transfer, i. e. In the assessm ent year 1962-63. In this case, it is not also in dispute that in the return filed for the assessm ent year 1962-63, the assessee did not indicate either the factum of acquisition or the amount which has been awarded as compeusation by the Collector in respect of the building acquired. For the first time in the assessment year, 190-68 he submitted a return showing the receipt of the compensation from the Government in relation to the acquisition of his property.
Though be submitted a return showing the capital gains, he contended before the assessing authority that the capital gains should be taken to have accrued only in the year when the building was acquired, i. e. In the year 1962-63 and not in the assessment year 1967-68. Though he failed in his attempt to exclude the capital gains in the assessment year 1c67-68 on that ground before the lower authorities, he ultimately succeeded before the Tribunal and the capital gains relating to the property acquired were excluded from assessment in that assessment year. Taking note of the Tribunal's view that the capital gains could be taxed only in the assessment year 1962-63, proceedings for reassessm ent were initiated and these proceedings have been questioned on the ground that they are time-barred. The Tribunal in this case has given the following findings for its conclusion that the provision applicable to the facts of this case is section 147(a) and not section 147(0 :
(I) That there is no indication in the return or any statement accompanying the return for the assessm ent year 1962-63 regarding the acquisition proceedings in respect of the property "Lucky Bungalow".
(2) Even though the original assessme nt was made on 19-2-19o3 and further reassessment was made on 26-6-1963, the assessee at no stage gave any indication about the acquisition of the property or the passing of an award granting compensation in relation to that property by the acquiring authority.
(3) It was after the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal by its order held that the transfer took place during the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1962-63, the Department came to know that the capital gains arising out of the sale of the above property had escaped assessment, and as the amount of capital gains which escaped the assessmeut amounted to more than a lakh of rupees, the proceedings attracted section 149 (a)(ii).
6. On the facts found by the Tribunal that in the assessment year 1962-63, the assessee did not put the I. T. O. On notice of the acquisition proceedings or the amount awarded as compensation, as a result of which there has been escapement of income in that assessment year, no other conclusion is possible except to say that the provision that is applicable in this case is section 147(a). The learned counsel for the assessee would say that though there may be a non-disclosure of a transaction in the year 1962-63 that cannot be construed as non-disclosure of income which alone will attract the provision of section 147(a). According to the learned counsel for the assessee, the assessee himself was not aware of the actual amount of compensation awarded, and therefore, it was not possible for him to include the capital gains in the return filed for the year 1962-63, nor was it possible to disclose the actual capital gains before the assessing authority as the quantum of compensation was in dispute. However, we find that this submission does not gain support from the facts of this case. We see that the award was passed by tae Collector on 14-3-1962 and the possession of the building was taken only thereafter on 3-4-1962. It is thus clear that before the close of the account year, the Collector had fixed the compensation amount in his award on 14-3- 1962 and had also taken possession of the property. Thus it is clear that the assessee was aware of the compensation awarded to him by the collector in respect of the building acquired. Even assuming that the Land Acquisition Court enhanced the compensation, that will not justify the assessee's conduct in not disclosing the compensation awarded by the Collector at the first instance in the year 1962-63.
7. The assessee is not also right in stating that since there is only non-disclosure of a transaction, Section 147 (a) will not stand attracted. Section 147 (a) is as follows :- "147. Income escaping assessment.-If (a) the I. T.-0. Has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the part, of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessm ent year to the I. T.
0. Or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year........
The said provision contemplates two situations. (I) The non-disclosure on the part of the assessee fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year and (2) as a result of the said non-disclosure income chargeable to tax has escaped for that assessment year. In this case, either the transaction related to the acquisition of the building or the compensation awarded for that building by the Government has not been disclosed. Therefore, it can be said that the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year. Admittedly in this case the capital gains chargeable for assessment escaped assessment in view of such non-disclosure of all material facts necessary for the assessment. The assessee's learned counsel is not correct when he says that only section 147 (b) could be invoked when there is a non-disclosure of a transaction. This contention completely overlooks the language adopted in section 147(a). It contemplates non-disclosure of material facts which has led to the income chargeable to tax being escaped from assessment for that year. It is not possible to construe the expression "material fact" as 'income'. Whether the non-disclosure is of a single transaction or of a multiple transaction, the question is, whether those are necessary materials, for assessment. We are of the view that the non-disclosure of the factum of acquisition and the amount awarded as compensation in the return submitted before the assessing authority will amount to non- disclosure of the material facts necessary for making the assessment for the year 1962-63. In this case, we have to say that there was not only non-disclosure of the income chargeable to tax in the assessm ent year, but also non-disclosure of all material facts necessary for completing the assessm ent for that year. We entirely agree with the view taken by the Tribunal in this case that the proper provision applicable is section 147 (a) read with section 149 (a) (ii). Since re-assessment has been initiated within 16 years contemplated by section 149 (a) (ii), re-assessment was held in time. In this view of the matter, we have to answer the question in the affirmative and against the assessee. The revenue will have the costs from the assessee. Counsel's fee at Rs, 500.
Question answered in affirmative.
1985 PTD 728 [Kerala High Court (India)] K. S. Paripoornan, J A. S. SURESH SHENOY versus WEALTH TAX OFFICER
0. P. No, 2343 of 1983-K, decided on 28th June, 1983. Wealth tax- -- Valuation-Valuation Officer ignoring sale consideration in sales of five properties located nearabout properties to be valued-Sale proceeds relating to one property, compensation awarded by Land Acquisition Officer-Valuation report is void. [pp. 731, 732, 733]A, B & C (1982) 135 I T R 29; 11511 R 648 (Delhi) ; (1976) 102 I T R 366; (1972) 83 T R 508 and A I It 1970 SC 150 ref.
C. M. Devan, V. Chithambaresh and K. S. Sundararaman for Petitioner. P. K. R. Menon and N. R. K. Nair for Respondent.
' The petitioner is an assessee to Wealth tax. He is a partner in two firms, namely Messrs New Guna Shenoy Co., and Sasidhara Shenoy & Bros. For five years, 1978-79 to 1982-83, the 1st respondent- Wealth Tax Officer, A-Ward, Ernakulam-referred the question of valuation of the petitioner's properties to the 2nd respondent-Valuation Officer to assess the net wealth of the petitioner. The 2nd respondent requested the petitioner to furnish certain details as per Notice dated 20-12-1982 (Exh. P. 1). The petitioner filed objections. Before the 2nd respondent, Exh. P. 2 dated 2-3-1983, and Exh. P. 3 dated 15-3-1983. The Valuation Officer effected a preliminary valuation report dated 28-2- 1983 (Exhs. P. 4 and P. 4(a)) which was served on the petitioner on 1-3-1983. The petitioner was directed to file his objection to the estimate of valuation on or before 10-3-1983 as is seen from para. 7 at page 43 of the counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent. The petitioner took time. Time was granted upto 25-3-1983. In the meanwhile, by notice dated 19-3-1983 evidenced by Exh. P. 5, the Valuation Officer replied to the petitioner stating his views regarding the objections raised by the petitioner in Exh. P 2 and Exh. P.
3. The petitioner filed his objections, Exh. P. 6, on 21-3-1983. The 2nd respondent passed the final Valuation Report ev.Denced by Exh. R 2 (a), and Exhs. R. 2(b), (R. 2(A) and R. 2(B) ) on 21-3-1983 itself and later communicated the same to the petitioner. In the meanwhile, the petitioner tiled this 0. P.
On 18-3-1983 prating for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash Exh. P. 1 notice dated 20-12-1982 and also the provisional valuation report Exhs. P. 4 and Exhs. P. 4-A. Notice was ordered in the 0. P.
On 21-3-1983. When the O. P. Was pending in this Court, the final valuation report was effected by the 2nd respondent evidenced by Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2 (B) dated 21-3-1983. The petitioner has filed a petition, C. M. P. No, 16023 of 1983, praying to quash Exhs. R. 2 (A) and (B) also.
2. This Court passed an order in C. M. P. No, 11165 of 1983 and other connected petitions on 11-5-1983 to the following effect :- "Heard counsel on both sides. The assessment of the petitioners will be completed only after considering all objections filed by the petitioners. Subject to these observations these C. M. Ps. Are dismissed. Post the Original Petitions for hearing on 13-6-1983."
' The 1st respondent has filed a detailed counter-affidavit dated 15-6-1983. The 2nd respondent has filed a detailed affidavit alongwith Annexures dated 24-6-1983. A reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner.
3. Mr. C. M. Devan, coui..Sel for the petitioner, raised many grounds to assail the initiation of proceedings by the Wealth-tax Officer referring the matter of valuation of the petitioner's assets to the Valuation Officer and also the procedure adopted by the 2nd respondent in effecting the provisional and final valuation reports-Exhs. P. 4 and P. 4atA and Exhs. R. 2(A) and (B). The main points raised are :
(1) The 2nd respondent has failed to act judicially and fairly in passing Exhs. P. 4 and P. 4 (a) and also Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2(B).
(2) In the facts and circumstances of this case, the 2nd respondent has totally failed to apply his mind to the matters in issue and in any view of the matter, Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2 (B) were passed in under haste and without observing the rules of natural justice and fair play.
(3) Reliance is placed by Revenue on section 16 A(1) (b)(i) & (ii) of Wealth-tax Act to initiate the proceedings to refer the valuation to the 2nd respondent. There is no basis or material to invoke the said - provisions. The 1st respondent has acted at his ipse dixit and has also failed to give effect to the circulars No, F. No, 6/8/68 W T, dated 20-9-1968 and F. No, 6/11/68, dated 3-7-1969. This being a jurisdictional issue, the 1st respondent has acted illegally and without jurisdiction. Counsel for the Revenue Sri. P. K. R. Menon sought to sustain the orders impugned and also the procedure adopted by the respondents.
4. After hearing both sides, it turned out that the matter can be disposed of on Point No, (2) urged by the petitioner. It is common ground that the petitioner filed Exh. P. 6 objections on 21-3-1983. In the final valuation report (Exhs R. 2 (A) and (B)) the above objections have no doubt been adverted to Alongwith Eh. P. 6, the petitioner filed an annexure wherein details of five sales which have taken place nearabout the properties which are to be valued, are furnished. The extent of the properties, Survey number, document number, its location, and the consideration are all mentioned Four of them are sale-deeds by private parties. One of them is the award passed in land acquisition proceedings dated 11-6-1980 (See pages 18 and 19 of 2nd respondent's counter-affidavit) The 2nd respondent has discussed the objection in the following way in para.
8. 3.
3. (see page 20 of the-2nd respondent's counter-affidavit) : "The contention that the land values adopted are excessive cannot be sustained. The sale instances given by the assessee in his objection are not the real sales reflecting the market rates of Ernakulam. There may be stray cases of sales which may be tenanted property sold to the same tenant or disposed of to near relations or gifted to wife or children. Set against these sale instances, there is a long list of sale instances which approximate to the market rates of land in these localities relating to the areas for my valuation. The reference to valuation is received from the Wealth-tax Officer. From the very fact that the W.T.O has taken up this case for valuation, it is clear that he was not satisfied with the earlier considerations..
8.3.4. The comparable sales quoted are correct and the steep rise in unit rate of land is not my creation, but actually based upon the statistical data available in this office for uniform application to all suitable cases of valuation. Because a few sales instances have been quoted which are pitched low, it cannot be concluded that they are the correct sales.
8.3.5. The valuation of the various theatre buildings are also based on the construction costs of such theatre building relevant to the period of valuation...........The rates are consistent with the specification followed for the buildings and hence do not call for any change."
' It is common ground that the "long list of sale instances" referred to in para 8.3.3., the "statistical data available in the office", as also the rates with the specification followed for the buildings, etc. Rem red to in paras.
8.3.4. And 8.3.5. Were never put to the assessee at any time before passing Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2 (B) final orders. On the face of it, failure to do so, violates the principles of natural justice. Moreover, the conclusion of the 2nd respondent to the effect, that "the sale instances given by the assessee, are not the real market value of Ernakulam", "there may be stray cases of sales which may be tenanted property sold to the same tenant or disposed of to near relatives or gifted to wife or children," was arrived by totally ignoring the fact that one of the documents relied on by the assessee in the annexure to the objection filed on 21-3-1983, is the Land Acquisition Proceedings of the G. C. D. A.
And the award dated 11-6-1980. That is an award passed by a public authority. It has to be presumed that the amount awarded in L. A. Proceedings represented the market value at the relevaut date unless there are cogent materials to the contra. To say casually that the property (even the one acquired by the Greater Cochin Development Authority) did not reflect the market rates of Ernakulain or that the sales may be of tenanted property sold to the same tenant, or disposed of to near relations or gifted to wife or children, is really a non-application of mind by the 2nd respondent in the facts and circumstances of this case, Nothing has been ascertained or said about the other four documents also referred to in the annexure. It is unknown as to why they are discarded. It is obvious that the 2nd respondent has acted mechanically. He did not apply his mind to the vital aspects arising in the case. The observations contained in para. 8.3.3. Are of a general and sweeping nature, lacking in precision or application of the judicial mind and perhaps disposing of arbitrarily the materials placed by the petitioner before the 2nd respondent.
5. The provisions of section 16-A of the Wealth Tax Act are relevant in this context :- "16-A (1) For the purpose of making an assessment (including an assessment in respect of any assessm ent year commencing before the date of coming into force of this section) under this Act, the Wealth-tax Officer may refer the valuation of any asset to a Valuation Officer-
(a) in a case where the value of the asset as returned is in accordance with the estimate made by a registered valuer, if the Wealth-tax Officer is of opinion that the value so returned is less than its fair market value ;
(b) in any other case, if the Wealth-tax Officer is of opinion-
(1) that the fair market value of the asset exceeds the value of the asset as returned by more than such percentage of the value of the asset as returned or by more than such amount as may be prescribed in this behalf ; or
(ii) that having regard to the nature of the asset and other relevant circumstances, it is necessary so to do.
(4) Where the Valuation Officer is of opinion that the value of the asset is higher than the value declared in the return made by the assessee under section 14, or 15, or where the asset is not disclosed or the value of the asset is not declared in such return or where no such return has been made, the Valuation Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee intimating the value which he proposes to estimate and giving the assessee an opportunity to state, on a date to be specified in the notice, his objections either in person or in writing before the Valuation Officer and to produce or cause to be produced on that date such evidence as the assessee may rely in support of his objections.
(5) On the date specified in the notice under subsection (4), or as soon thereafter as may be, after hearing such evidence as the assessee may produce and after considering such evidence as the Valuation Officer may require on any specified points and after taking into account all relevant material which he has gathered, Valuation Officer shall, by order in writing, estimate the value of the asset and send a copy of his order to the Wealth-tax Officer and to the assessee ...... ..."
A reading of section 16-A, clauses (4) and (5) leaves no room for doubt that the 2nd respondent- Valuation Officer-while exercising the powers referred to above, exercises a quasi-judicial function.
He has to act judicially. He should act fairly and bona fide, as is the case, with all statutory functionaries. If so, he should take into account only relevant materials, and eschew from consideration irrelevant materials. It should be borne in mind that the Wealth-tax Officer has no power to alter the value of the assets as estimated by the Valuation Officer The assessing authority is bound by the report of the Valuation Officer (section 16 (a) (6) of the Act). The only remedy of the aggrieved assessee is to file an appeal from the order of the Wealth-tax Officer, wherein the report of the Valuation Officer can also be challenged. As stated, the Valuation Officer functions as a "quasi-judicial authority" in exercise of the powers vested in him under section 16-A (4) and (5) of the Wealth-tax Act. The decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Bireshwar Mookerji v.
Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax (1) and of Delhi High Court in Werger & Co. v. D. V.
0. (2) are instructive in this regard. The duties enjoined on such quasi-judicial authorities have been stated by the Supreme Court in the decision Kraipak v. Union of India (3) and there is no need to repeat what has been stated in the said decision. Suffice it to say, that even a statutory authority, should exercise his powers in accordance with law. He should act fairly, bona fide, honestly and with due care and caution, since the exercise of power by such authorities affect persons with civil consequences. Can it be said that the 2nd respondent when he passed Exh. R.
2(A) and (B) did so, bearing in mind the above norms? From the facts stated above, it is clear that the 2nd respondent acted arbitrarily and not "fairly" and also did not conform to the principles of natural justice in passing Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2 (B). The facts also disclose that the 2nd respondent acted casually, mechanically and without a proper application of the mind. In passing Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2 (B), in the way, he did, the 2nd respondent has totally failed to observe the normal and minimal norms which should have been adhered to, in the excrcise of quasi-judicial functions. The portions quoted from his final Report Exhs. R. 2 (A) and R. 2(B), referred to as Paras.
8.3.3,, 8.1.4. And 8.3.5. Demonstrate that the 2nd respondent has failed to act in accordance with law.
6. Counsel for the Revenue conceded that the above aspects adverted to above were never put to the assessee (petitioner). It is so evident from Exhs. R 2 (A) and (B) and also the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent himself. The decision Ponkunnam Traders v. Additional Income-tax Officer (4), is instructive in this context. In that case the material relied on by the officer was the assessm ent of the assessee for the previous year. It was held that even though the relevant material relied on by the Income-tax Officer was the assessment of the assessee (himself) for the previous year, it should be put to the assessee. Failure to do so, was held to be a violation of principles of natural justice. The following extracts from the decision reported in Ponkunnam Traders case (supra) are apposite and may be usefully referred to, in construing section 16-A (4) and (5) of Wealth-tax Act :- "The contention of the assessee is that he was entitled to notice under section 142(3) of the Act as to materials gathered by the Income-tax Officer and to have his say about them, and as no such notice was given or his explanation heard, the order of assessment is void to the extent objected to by him. Section 142 reads : "(1) For the purpose of making an assessment under this Act the Income-tax Officer may serve on any person who has made a return under section 139 or upon whom a notice has been served under subsection (2) of section 139 (whether a return has been made or not) a notice requiring him, on a date to be therein specified,-
(i) to produce, or cause to be produced, such accounts or documents as the Income-tax Officer may require, or {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) (1982) 135 IT R 29 (2) (1978) 115 IT R 648 : 1979 Tax L R 367
(3) AIR 1970 SC 150
(4) (1972) 83 1 T R 508 (Ker,) : (1976) 102 1 T R 366 (Kar.) {{FOOT NOTE}}
(ii) to furnish in writing and verified in the prescribed manner information in such form and on such points or masters (including a statement of all assets and liabilities of the assessee, whether included in the accounts or not) as the Income-tax Officer may require
(2) For the purpose of obtaining full information in respect of the income or loss of any person, the Income-tax Officer may make such enquiry as he considers necessary.
(3) The assessee shall, except where the assessment is made under section 144, be given an opportunity of being heard in respect of any material gathered on the basis of any enquiry under subsection (2) and proposed to be utilised for the purpose of the assessment."
' Counsel for the revenue contended that it was only in respect of the materials gathered by the Income-tax Officer as a result of his enquiry under subsection (2) of section 142 that he was bound to give the assessee an opportunity of being heard, that the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer of the previous return submitted by the assessee was sufficient material for a best judgment assessm ent and such knowledge cannot by any stretch of imagination be regarded as materials gathered on the basis of enquiry within the meaning of section 142(3), and, so, no opportunity of being heard in respect of that material was required. I think that when an Income-tax Officer gathers material from a source other than the records relevant to the year of assessment, he has gathered materials on the basis of enquiry within the meaning of section 142(3), and, therefore, he will be bound to give an opportunity to the as essee in respect of the materials so gathered. In this case the assessee may have a thousand explanations to offer as to why he could not make the same profit in the year in question as in the previous year."
' And at page 512, Matbew, J. As he then was, held :- "Although the Income-tax Officer was entitled to use his knowledge of the previous return by the assessee, that must have been put to the assessee and his explanation asked for."
' I should state, that the above salutary principles laid down by this Court were totally ignored by the 2nd respondent. The 2nd respondent has not acted fairly either. I am not expressing any opinion about the averments regarding the haste with which the 2nd respondent passed Exhs. R.
2(A) and (B) detailed in paragraph 4 of the reply affidavit dated 27-6-1983 and paragraph 2 of the petition, C. M. P. No, 16023 of 1983. In the light of the above, I hold that Exhs. R. 2 (A) and (B) final valuation reports of the 2nd respondent, cannot stand. They were passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and so were void and infirm. I declare that Exhs. R. 2 (A) and (B) are null and void. They are quashed. The other points raised by the petitioner are left open.
7. The 2nd respondent is at liberty to make a fresh final valuation report "de novo" in accordance with law and after affording the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to put forward his objections.
The 2nd respondent will supply all the materials on which he proposes to rely, to the petitioner within three weeks from the date of receipt of this judgment. Apart from the objections now filed, the petitioner can file additional objections, if any, and also tender all the materials on which he proposes to rely to substantiate his contentions within three we-ks from the date of receipt of the corn n unication from the 2nd respondent. In view of the complicated questions involved for adjudication, the petitioner, if he so desires, may also be heard. The final valuation report itself will be completed, as far as possible, within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment.