' SHER ZAMAN CHAUDHRY, J.-This appeal by leave directed against the judgment of the High Court passed on 12-4-1981 dismissing the writ petition of Mst. Nusrat Fatima appellant arises in the following circumstances; that Nusrat Fatima appellant applied for the allotment of I K anal plot in Sector F-3 new Mirpur Town. On lots drawn in March, 1980 by the Allotment Committee the appellant was declared successful by the said Committee. Before the allotment could be made formal and chit of allotment issued amendment had been made in M. D. A. Ordinance on 12-6- 1980. This was followed by a Government Notification issued on 23-6-1980, whereby all the allotments (including that of the appellant) made in the month of March, 1980 by the Allotment Committee stood cancelled. The Government, as appears from the notification, influenced by the general public protest and in keeping with the main object of the allotment i,e, the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Mangla Dam affected persons issued the above referred notification which is now under challenge. It may be stated here that to achieve the main purpose of the allotment under the notification 85% of the plots were to be allotted to the Mangla Dam affected persons, 10% to those belonging to Mirpur District and the rest to other categories of people.
2. In pursuance of this notification applications for allotments were invited from the general public by the Allotment Committee. Many from among the public applied afresh, so did the appellant, She, however, feeling aggrieved by the Government Notification, dated 23-6-1980 also approached the High Court by way of writ petition for the redress. Through this petition filed on 8-3-1981, was challenged the validity of the said notification. The learned Judges in the High Court on consideration that the petitioner-appellant having slept over her right, had acquiesced for a great length of time, dismissed the petition in limine.
3. To challenge this order of dismissal of her writ petition passed by the High Court the appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. From among the various grounds listed in the petition leave was granted to consider :-
(a) as to whether laches rer se was a ground sufficient for refusing a relief in the writ petition ;
(b) whether in fact there was a delay amounting to negligence on the part of the petitioner- appellant which disentitled her to any relief ?
4. On the first point formulated for the consideration Mr. B. A. Sheikh, the learned Advocate for the appellant, argued that the Courts generally would not decline the relief on the ground of laches unless a prejudice, which is wanting in this case, is caused to the other side. If, however, by allowing such a relief the opposite party is found to have been placed in a position of disadvantage because of delay, the Court would refuse its aid to such a petitioner. In the present case there has been a delay of only 9 months, which according to the learned Advocate was neither of such a length of time that could be termed as sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition nor has there any prejudice been caused to the opposite party. The learned Judges of the High Court while accepting the principle that delay, per se, would seldom be a ground for the rejection of the writ petition could not under law dismiss the petitioners writ petition without pointing out if any prejudice was in fact caused to the opposite party. The dismissal of the appellant's petition in limine, according to the learned counsel, was a grave error in law and as such the impugned judgment could not be maintained.
5. Controverting the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Muhammad Taj Chaudhry, the learned Advocate for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3, argued that the appellant had been sleeping over her right for about 9 months. Soon after the Government notification, dated 23- 6-1980 the Allotment Committee through advertisement had invited the general public to apply for the allotments. Large number of people including the appellant applied afresh under the new regulations and had deposited the earnest money. All the proceedings for the final allotments had been completed. The appellant had the knowledge of the cancellation of the previous allotments under the notification and the subsequent proceedings taken by the Allotment Committee. Her application for the fresh allotment is manifestation of her awareness about the notification and cancellations made thereunder. There is not a word of explanation for this inordinate delay in the writ petition. By admitting or allowing such a delayed claim, prejudice will be caused not only to the interest of the respondents but also to the interest of about eight hundred other allottees who had applied under the new regulations and are not before the Court as the appellant never sought any relief against them. The impugned order passed by the learned High Court, argued the learned counsel, was under the circumstances just and perfectly in accordance with law.
6. In view of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and in order to have correct perception of the points involved it must first be ascertained as to what precisely the doctrine of laches means. The doctrine in its essentials is based on the maxim "Vigilantibus, non dormientiks Jura subveninut," which means equity aid the vigilent and not indolent or delay defeats .Equity. The delay which under the given circumstances is considered sufficient to prevent a party from obtaining relief is technically called laches. The High Court would normally, in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, refuse its aid to stale claims where the claimant by sleeping over his right for a great length of time had acquiesced. As to what length of time, would constitute laches depends upon and varies according to the facts of each individual case. The doctrine will not, however, be applied arbitrarily. The delay, per se, would not normally be a ground for refusal of its aid by the Court. Its application will only be resorted to where in the estimation of the Court, it would be unjust to allow the remedy, either because of party as by its conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as amounting to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet has put the other party in a situation of disadvantage in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedies were to be asserted. In either of these situations lapse of time and delay are most important. The principle was followed in Minn Miraj-ud-Din v. The Senior Superintendent of Police Lahore (l).
7. The question, in view of the principle discussed above, now requiring determination is whether in the present case the other side has been put to a position of disadvantage because of inaction or neglect of the appellant. The perusal of the record in the present case reveals that the Government notification dated 23-6-1980 whereby the allotments made during the month of March, 1980 stood cancelled was followed by invitation by the Allotment Committee to the general public for fresh applications under the new regulations. In pursuance to this call through advertisement quite a large number of persons from the general public Applied for the allotments of plots and deposited the part of the stipulated price as required under rules. The appellant too applied afresh. All the necessary
(1) PLD 1970 Lah. 569 formalities had been completed and the proceedings taken by the Allotment Committee. What was left was only the drawing of lots. So, therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant had no knowledge of the cancellation of the allotments nor has such a plea been taken by the appellant in her writ petition before the High Court. She for no valid reasons kept sleeping over the matter from 23rd June, 1980 till 8th March, 1981 when the writ petition was finally filed. During this period of inaction and neglect on the part of the appellant fresh applications had been called, people applied and deposited the earnest amount of the price. The formalities had been completed, proceedings finalized and only the drawing of lots as said earlier remained to be done. This formality was completed first in the month of March and then in November, 1981. So, therefore, the delay and neglect of about 9 months on the part of the appellant under the circumstances constitute laches. The principle can well he illustrated by reference to an observation made by Lord Camdon in Smith v. Kiay (1). While deciding that case the learned Judge observed :- "Nothing can call forth this Court into activity but conscience good faith and reasonable diligence, where these are wanting, the Court is passive and does nothing."
Diligence in the present case, we find is hopelessly wanting. We, therefore, are in agreement with the learned counsel for the respondent that the appellant if aided in pursuit of her stale claim it would not only place the respondent in a position of disadvantage but would also cause prejudice to about at least eight hundred allottees of the plots, many of whom, might have by now constructed their houses as and against whom the appellant neither claimed any relief nor have they been impleaded as party in the proceedings.
8. We have with care gone through the reports of the cases referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. The facts in those cases are quite distinguishable arid are of no help in the present case. In Mohsan Khan and another v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, West Pakistan Lahore, and others (2) a plot claimed by the petitioners to have been allotted to them was transferred by the Additional Settlement Commissioner to a lady who was a Manager of a School to be used as playground for the school children. The appeal of the petitioners, before the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner failed and the learned Settlement Commissioner finding that neither the appellants nor the school manager were entitled to the transfer ordered the auction of the plot in 1964. Their application for transfer of the plot filed in 1966 was rejected by the Settlement Commissioner. The writ petition filed in the High Court in 1968 failed on the ground of laches. The delay in that case was of two years. But then as already stated in the earlier part of this judgment, what period of inaction or neglect would constitute laches, varies with the facts of each case.
Similarly the fact in cases Burmah Oil Co. v. Trustees of the Port of Chittagong (3) and Mst. Zainab Bibi and 3 others v. Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 3. Others (4) are as already observed distinguishable from the one in the present case.
9. On careful consideration of the available record we find that delay and neglect for about 9 months on the part of the appellant was of such a length of period in the circumstances of this case that constituted laches
(1) 1767 3 Bro c.c.
639. n at 640 (2) 1969 SCMR 306 (3)PLD 1962 SC 113 (4) PLD 1976 Lah. 820 and caused prejudice to the other side. Although the impugned judgment does contain no such mention of the prejudice to the opposite party nevertheless as on record it has been found that by allowing the claim of the appellant other side would be placed in a position of disadvantage because of delay and neglect which amounts to laches on the part of the appellant. We do not think it proper to interfere with the finding arrived at by the learned High Court. The order under appeal is just and judicious. It is, therefore, maintained.
' For the afforested reasons the appeal is. Dismissed with costs.