' The facts necessary for the disposal of this revision, petition under section 115, C.P.C. Are that the petitioners filed a suit for declarlition that the land in dispute is in their possession and under their cultivation for a very long time and they being the old tenants are owners of the said land in view of the land reforms law and that the respondents have no connection therewith and that the entries in the record of rights as well as in the record of Land Reforms Department are collusive, unfounded and illegal and as such ineffective as against the rights of the petitioneRs, Permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering in the said lands and from transferring the said land to any one else was also prayed for. During the course of trial a compromise application was produced on which the signature of Girdawar Kanungo had also been appended along with the signatures of the other parties. The learned trial Court decreed the suit as prayed on the basis of the aforesaid compromise application. The Provincial Government and the Deputy Land Commissioner, D.G. Khan assailed this decree in appeal. Along with this appeal an application for condo nation of delay supported by an affidavit was also filed. The learned appellate Court accepted the appeal and remanded the suit for trial in accordance with law vide judgment dated 28-5-1983. This judgment of the District Judge was then assailed by preferring the present revision petition.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the appeal against the consent decree was incompetent even if the consent obtained had been procured by fraud; that by virtue of the authority letter signed by the Deputy Land Commissioner, D.G. Khan, Girdawar Kanungo who had appended his signature on the compromise application was vested with the authority to enter into compromise and sign the compromise application and that the act of the said representative of the respondents is binding; that the adequate remedy to challenge the consent decree being available under section 12 (2), C.P.C. The appeal was not competent and that the appeal was barred by time; and that without going into the question of delay and without condoning the delay expressly the learned appellate Court acted illegally in accepting the appeal.
3. The learned Assistant Advocate-General appearing for the respondents controverted the afore noted pleas of the learned counsel for the petitioners and argue that the decree passed by the learned trial Judge was void being without jurisdiction as the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands barred under the provisions of para. 26 of the Land Reforms Regulation (M.L.R. 115); that the appeal was not barred by time as the decree passed was a void decree and the same was challenged as soon as the said decree came to the notice of the respondents that the decree cannot be treated as a consent decree as against the Province of Punjab and the Deputy Land Commissioner at the Girdawar Kanungo had no authority to act or to enter into any compromise; and that the remedy provided by section 12(2), C.P.C. Has not the effect of denuding a party of its statutory right of appeal.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. The first question to be seen is whether the lecree passed by the trial Court can be considered to be a consent decree as against the province and other official respondent. The authority letter issued by the Deputy Land Commissioner, D.G. Khan reads as under:- {{URDU TEXT}} ' Under the aforesaid authority letter Qazi @aim Din Girdawar (Land Reforms) was authorized to appear on behalf of defendants Nos.1 and 2 for one date only, i.e, 15th May, 1982. Such authority according to the well-established rule is to be construed strictly. Girdrwar as such was authorized to appear on the said date and was not authorized to act or to plead. The law maintains the distinction between appearance, applying, acting and pleading. Order III, rule 1, C.P.C. Provides:- "Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader (appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be) on his behalf."
' With regard to suit by or against the Government or Public Officers the relevant provision is contained in Order XXVII, rule 2, C.P.C. Which reads as under:- "Persons being exofficio or otherwise authorized to act for the Government in respect of any judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be the recognized agents by whom appearances, acts and applications under this Code may be made or done on behalf the Government."
' In Punjab, Government pleaders are so authorized to act. They become recognized agent for purpose of appearance, acts and applications. See Nabi Bakhsh v. Pakistan PLD 1969 Kar.
566. In this very judgment it was further observed that the provisions of Order XXVII, C.P.C. Are not subject to Order III, C.P.C. Moreover, the word 'appear' means to represent and 'be present' on behalf of a party at various stages of litigation at which it is necessary for him to be present whilst to act, refers to taking of steps, to lay the case before th Court. For instance, making of an application or the presentation of suit or appeal. See PLD 1980 Kar. 477, PLJ 1974 Lah. 30, PLD 1964 Dacca 543 and PLD 1962 Lah.
830.
5. It is pertinent to note that in the instant case as per authority letter Qazi Qaim Din Girdawar was authorized to appear only on one date of hearing i.e, 15-5-1982. On this very date the application for compromise was presented, signed by the other parties and for the reasons best known to the said Girdawar his signatures were also obtained. I am clear in my mind that under the power conferred on him he had no authority to give consent to the compromise arrangement and to bind the respondents. The learned trial Court was completely oblivious of the legal position obtaining in the matter. It had no authority to accept the said compromise and to pass the decree on the basis of the said compromise so as to bind the Province or the other official respondent. Such a decree cannot be treated as a consent decree as against the Province and the other official respondent.
The appeal as such was competently filed to assail the said decree. Moreover, under the compromise application, the petitioners were accepted as the old tenants of the said land having right to obtain allotment. On the basis of this compromise declaration of ownership as prayed in the suit could not have been granted. The decree passed as such exceeded even the so-called compromise and on this score alone the appeal against the said decree was competent. Again the authority letter quoted above was issued and signed by the Deputy Land Commissioner who obviously had no authority to authorize representation of the Provincial Government. The decree was as such without jurisdiction and void as against the Province. In these circumstances the question of fraud sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is in consequential.
The other plea that the appeal does not lie where the remedy under section 12(2), C.P.C. Is available is also without merit. No precedent or provision of law was cited by the learned counsel in support of this plea. A statutory right of appeal available under law cannot be denied merely because the law provides another remedy. The said remedy under section 12(2), C.P.C. Is available only in the circumstances and on the grounds mentioned in the said section. The plea that the appeal was barred by time and the delay was not expressly condoned has no merit as well. The learned appellate Court was conscious of the question of delay. It was due to this reason that the learned District Judge noted the contention that the learned lower Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and that along with the appeal application for condonation of delay has also been moved. The learned District Judge admitted the appeal subject to all valid objections. This amounts to condoning the delay subject to the right of the petitioners who were respondents before the learned lower appellate Court to raise objection. I find from the record that no objection was raised by the petitioners before the appellate Court though they had submitted an application for initiating contempt of Court proceeding. Even an affidavit to controvert the averment made in the application for condoning the delay and in the accompanying affidavit was not filed. In view of above it is not open to the petitioners now to urge that delay was not condoned because there is no mention of the same in the judgment ultimately passed. In the afore noted circumstances it has to be taken that the delay stood condoned. Even otherwise in view of the total lack of authority on the part of Girdawar to enter into compromise I am not inclined to interfere in the revision jurisdiction as interference in the impugned judgment will amount to perpetuating the illegality.
6. For the reasons given above, this revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs.