' MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J.--This is a petition under Article 9, of the Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 whereby, Nizam Din petitioner wants this Court to declare the meeting to consider the no- confidence motion which under the direction of respondent No,1, was to be convened on 25-8-1982, to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
2. The facts leading up to this petition in brief are that on 26-10-1981, Nizam Din petitioner assumed the office as Chairman of Town Committee, Makhdoompur Pahoran. On 11-8-1982, a requisition for the consideration of no-confidence motion was made by the members of the Town Committee under rule 2 of the Punjab Local Council (Vote of No-confidence Motion against Chairman and Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1980. On this the Assistant Commissioner, Kabirwala respondent Nr).1 directed that a meeting be convened on 25-8-1982 to consider the no-confidence motion against the petitioner. Hence this petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us that since Nizam Din assumed the office on 26-10-1981, therefore, under subsections (2) and (3) of section 31 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, no-confidence motion could be moved against him within 30 days beyond 6 months i.e, by 26-5-1982 and as such the meeting to be convened on 25-8-1982 being barred by law was without lawful authority. He explained that since the predecessor of the petitioner had vacated the office because no-confidence motion had been passed against him on 7-9-1981, therefore, the motion against the petitioner has to be treated as "a second or subsequent motion" within the meanings of subsections (2) and 3 of section 31 of the Ordinance and as such the meeting which was convened after 11-1/2 months of the meeting, dated 7-9-1981 (no- confidence motion) against the predecessor being barred by law was illegal. Furthermore, assuming that it was first meeting for considering no-confidence motion against the petitioner even then, the requisition having been made after the expiry of 30 days beyond 6 months of the assumption of the office, it shall be deemed to have been moved and rejected and as such, the meeting sought to be convened on 25-8-1982 was hit by subsections (2) and (3) of the Ordinance.
' As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent has defended the impugned action of convening meeting on 25-8-1982, on the ground that as against the petitioner it being the first meeting, the same could be convened at any time after 6 months.
4. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties in the light of material available before us. It would be convenient to reproduce the relevant provisions of law:- ' Section 30.
' Vote of no-confidence.-- (1) A Chairman or a Vice-Chairman shall vacate office if a vote of no- confidence is passed against him in the manner prescribed, by two-third majority of the total number of members of the local council electing him.
' Subsection (2).
' A motion of no-confidence against a Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall not be moved before the expiry of six months from the date of his assumption of the office and a second or subsequent motion shall not be moved except with an interval of six months between the first and the second motion or any two subsequent motions.
' Subsection (3).
' A motion of no-confidence shall not be competent after the expiry of thirty days beyond every interval of six months provided under subsection (2) and in such a situation it shall be deemed to have been moved and rejected for the purposes of subsection (2)
The plain reading of these provisions and particularly, the word "from the date of his assumption of the office" used in subsection (2) makes crystal clear that meeting which was to be convened against th petitioner for the first time from the date, of his assumption of the office cannot be termed as a second or subsequent meeting" against him within the meaning of subsections (2) and (3) of section 31. We are convinced that for the purpose of second or subsequent meeting within the meaning of these provisions of law, no-confidence motion passed against the predecessor on 7-9-1981 is wholly irrelevant. It is, therefore, held that the meeting, dated 25-8-1982 was the first meeting of no-confidence against the petitioner under subsection (2), section 31 of the Ordinance and the same as laid down in Mufti Sana Ullah and another v. Deputy Commissioner, Sargodha and 8 others reported as PLD 1982 SC 256, could be convened at any time after 6 months the charge of the office. There is thus no force in submission made b learned counsel for the petitioner. Resultantly, the meeting, which admittedly, was being held after the expiry of 6 months of the charge of the office by the petitioner was quite in accordance with law and cannot be declared to be without lawful authority.
' For what has been stated above, there being no force in the petition, the same is dismissed in limine.