SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.--Leave to appeal was granted to examining a question of law viz. Whether a revision provided under a Special Ac. Section 21 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) empowered the High Court to review its decision given in exercise of that power.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that one Allah Ditta decease right-holder had left property in India. The appellants claiming to be his collaterals, and the only successors-in-interest, filed their claim forms in district Gujranwala and received it after the verification and got allotment of land against his verified claim. The contesting respondent Faqir Muhammad claiming to be a son of the same Allah Ditta filed the claim form in Chak 117-SB in district Sargodha and got allotment against the verified claim of the same Allah Ditta. Fateh Muhammad intervened as an informer reporting about the fraudulent allotment obtained by Faqir Muhammad who, it was said was not the son of Allah Ditta. It appears that on 10th of June, 1964 the Deputy Commissioner as Additional Settlement Commissioner dealing with the case of double allotment of the claim of Allah Ditta in district Sargodha and Gujranwala upheld the allotment in Sargodha and gave directions that the allotment obtained in Gujranwala was liable to be cancelled. Subsequently, on a report submitted by Director, Enforcement, Evacuee Property and Claims, West Pakistan, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner exercising the delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner under section 10, 11 of the Act on 6-8-1964 resumed the allotment obtained by Faqir Muhammad as son of Allah Ditta in Chak 117 Janobi District Sargodha on Khata Nos. 46 and 181 and directed its allotment to genuine claimants. The Additional Settlement Commissioner on appeal reversed this order on 28-1-1965. The Settlement Commissioner set this order aside on 9-11-1965 and directed the respondents before him "to file a writ petition against the order of Ch. Muhammad Hussain in the High Court if they so desired."
3. In this background of events the respondents filed a revision under section 21 of the Act against the order, dated 6-8-1964. Alongwith the revision petition was filed an application expressed to be under section 5 of the Limitation Act stating as follows:--
(1) That the above mentioned case was decided by Ch. Muhammad Hussain D.S.C. With the delegated powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 6-8-1964.
(2) That the petitioner's counsel advised the petitioner to file the appeal against the order of the D.S.C. Which was filed by him within the and that was accepted on 28-1-1965.
(3) That respondents filed a Revision against the order of Additional Settlement Commissioner, dated 28-1-1965 which was accepted by the Settlement Commissioner on 9-11-1965.
(4) That the petitioner was persuing his remedy before the authorities under an erroneous advice of a counsel hence the delay has been caused in filing the revision petition under section 21 of the Land Settlement Act.
It is, therefore, prayed that the delay caused in filing the appeal may kindly be condoned."
4. This application and the revision petition came up for hearing before a bench of to learned Judges of the High Court on 8-7-1971 and was disposed of in the absence of respondent and his counsel with the following observation:-- "The limitation period laid down under section 21 of the Act for filing a Settlement Revision, is sixty days. The impugned order was passed on 6-8-1964 and the present Settlement Revision was filed on 2-12-1965. The petition as such is barred by about one and a half year. It has been vehemently argued that since there is no provision in the Act to condone the delay in filing the Settlement Revision, therefore the delay in the present revision cannot be condoned under the law. The Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, is admittedly a "Special Law" and as such section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to revision filed under section 21 of the Act.
As a result of the above discussion, the settlement revision is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs".
5. On 30-7-1971 a review petition was filed by Faqir Muhammad taking up a number of grounds explaining the nature of the proceedings, its background and also accounting for the absence of his counsel at the the of the hearing. On the material point of limitation it was said that the benefit sought, as was clear from the recital in the application seeking condonation of delay, was on the strength of section 14 of the Limitation Act which admittedly applied to the proceedings rather under section 5 of the Limitation Act which did not apply.
6. The High Court examined at great length its own power to review the earlier order and mainly on the basis of decision in Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi PLD 1970 SC 1, held that the proceedings before it were of a civil nature and on the strength of section 117 of the C.P.C. Power to review was available to it. This power was held to be in addition to the inherent power of the Court to correct errors apparent on the face of the record or patent errors. It then proceeded to examine the law applicable to the case and held that section 14 made the revision petition within the and restored it on 22-12-1972 for disposal in accordance with law.
7. The learned counsel for the appellants has taken up the ground that the power of review was not at all available to the High Court in exercising powers under section 21 of the Act, that it was not a case of invoking section 14 of the Limitation Act and in any case the requirements or Order XLVII, rule 1, C.P.C. Were not established for reopening the disposal of the revision petition.
8. Section 21 of Act provided for a revision in the following words:----- "Section 21.-- Power of Revision by the High Court.
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner, involving a question of law may, within sixty days of the order, file a petition for Revision to the High Court.
(2) A petition filed under subsection (1) shall be heard by a Bench of not less than to Judges of the High Court and in respect of such petition the provisions of section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) shall, so far as may be, apply"
9. Section 22 of the Act provided for finality of the orders in the following words:-- "Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Chapter any order made under this Act, shall be final, and save as provided in section 21, shall not be called in question in any Civil or Revenue Court".
10. If section 21 as reproduced above would have stopped at subsection (1), all the powers and procedures available to the High Court as a revisional Court including the powers to ensure the verity and finality of its record would have been unquestioningly conceded to it. Subsection (2) qualifies that power in one respect and that is that such a petition shall be heard by a Bench of not less than to Judges of High Court. The second qualification is consequential, as what is provided in section 98, C.P.C. Was otherwise available to the High Court under Civil Procedure Code only in respect of appeals and not revisions. Considering that the Act provides for the enforcement of civil rights, rights concerning property-its compensation settlement and transfer, the proceedings brought to the High Court under section 21 were civil in all respect. The principle of law governing such a situation was considered by the House of Lords in National Telephone Co. v His Majesty Post Master-General (1913) AC 546, in the following words:-- "When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches".
11. It was held by this Court in Hussain Bakhsh's case that "A civil proceeding in a Court of Civil jurisdiction is governed by the Code of Civil Procedure". "By virtue of section 117 of the Code, a civil proceeding in a High Court is also governed by the provisions of the Code other than the provisions which are specially excepted". The power to review its order enjoyed by the High Court under section 114 would, therefore, be available. The High Court in coming to this conclusion has in fact followed the law laid down by this Court in the case of Hussain Bakhsh. The decision of this Court in Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi, PLD 1981 SC 94, is distinguishable on the express language of section 15 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance which provided for a first appeal or where the first appellate authority had not been appointed by the Government, for second appeal to the High Court. In that very decision after analysing the express provisions made in various subsections of section 15 it was held that clearly the intention was to apply only the specified parts of the Civil Procedure Code and that to with such modification as the context may require. Besides, all the powers enjoyed by the appellate authority under the Civil Procedure Code were not granted to the appellate authority by making provision that "no stay order shall be made in respect of the payment or deposit of rent determined by the Controller" and also that the orders made by the Controller, Appellate Authority or the High Court under the provisions of the Ordinance were not to be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise except is provided under this Ordinance. The conclusion drawn, therefore, was that the Rent Restriction Ordinance neither expressly nor by reference bestowed any powers of review on the High Court.
12 We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed.