' This appeal arises from the decision dated 4-2-1979 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent for the recovery of pay for the period of August and September, 1978 and increment from 1-1-1978, was accepted.
2. The non-payment of the pay for the above-mentioned period and the increment is an admitted fact as mentioned in the written statement and the only ground for non-payment is that the respondent did not attend his duty for the period for which he claims pay and increment. Certain preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the appellants, which have been repelled back by the learned lower court.
3. The first objection is that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction and that the authority prescribed under the W.P. Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 is competent to give the relief. The lower Court decided this point against the appellants relying upon P L .7 1979 Tr.C. (Lab.) 305 Learned counsel has not been able to cite any authority to the contrary. For every right guaranteed by law, award or settlement a party can come to the Labour Court under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It has, not been said that no law has guaranteed right to the respondent to recover pay for the disputed period. The lower court, therefore, is competent to grant relief if otherwise on facts the entitlement is proved.
4. The other objection was that no grievance notice was given. The reply to the grievance notice was attached with the written statement. The lower court, therefore, held that this objection was not maintainable. Before me a different point has been argued which is that the notice should have been given to the Senior Vice-President, Zonal Office, Multan, as he is the employer of the respondent according to some changed position. This is a question of fact as to who is the employer and since this point was not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be raised during arguments in appeal.
5. The other objection was that the respondent had no cause of action. In this respect the case of the appellants is that where an employee is absent from duty without leave for more than seven days during a month, his wages for the said period can be withheld, according to the Bank's rules.
Such a plea was taken in the written statement. The respondent in answer to his grievance notice was informed that he could get pay for the disputed period, if he had satisfied by giving good cause for his absence. This is a question of fact whether the respondent had actually remained absent without leave. The Lower Court has not given any finding on this point, nor had given any opportunity to the parties to produce their evidence on the question of fact. The lower court has wrongly held that the facts are admitted. The factum of deduction of salary is admitted, but the reason for which it was deducted is not admitted by the respondent. This point could be decided only after affording opportunity to the parties to produce their evidence or getting this point admitted by the respondent. However, so far as the question of increment is concerned, written statement is silent on the point, which means that increment for the year 1978 was not allowed.
Since no ground is given for withholding the increment, the respondent obviously is entitled to it and to this extent the order of the lower court is correct.
6. The other point raised by the learned counsel is that since the ground of victimization was raised by the respondent, only the National Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction and the Labour Courts have no jurisdiction. In this respect he relies upon PLD 1976 Lah. 1085 and PLD 1976 Kar.
279. N.I.R.C. No doubt has jurisdiction in matters of victimization for trade union activities, but when this allegation is made as a motive for the action taken, it can be entertained and adjudicated upon by the Labour Courts. However, if any criminal action is brought in matter of victimization on the ground of trade union activities, only the N.I.R.C. Has jurisdiction. I, therefore, hold that the Labour Court was competent to hear the case.
7. None has appeared on behalf of the respondent to answer the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants. So, the arguments have been heard ex parte.
8. As a result of the observations made above, I partly accept the appeal and setting aside the order of the lower court to the extent it directed the payment of wages for the months of August and September, 1978, remand the case with the direction that after affording opportunity to the parties to produce their evidence, on the point of entitlement to get the pay of the said months, the point be decided afresh.