' This appeal arises from the decision dated 29-8-1978 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,4, Faisalabad, whereby the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service with back benefits.
2. The respondent was a Typist in the appellant Bank. On 20-2-1977 a criminal case under sections 467, 478 and 420 read with section 109 P.P.C. Was registered against him and he was suspended on 12-7-1977 for an indefinite period. The respondent served the management with a grievance notice on 18-5-1978 and when the wrong was not redressed, he brought the grievance petition in the learned lower Court.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the grievance notice served on 18-5-1978 was time-barred, inasmuch as the order of suspension was made on 12-7-1977. In this respect the learned counsel has cited PLD 1969 SC 167 and 1980 PLC 568 (ff). None of the two authorities is on the point whether the grievance notice given in respect of the order of suspension beyond the period of one month from the date of suspension, where the suspension continues, is time-barred.
The point involved was that where an appeal has been decided on merits without considering the point of limitation, the mere fact that it was decided on merits, does not make it within time. In the second mentioned authority it has been held that writ jurisdiction can be exercised to set aside the order of the Labour Court accepting application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which was time-barred. Where order of suspension continues, the grievance notice cannot become time-barred, because such a suspension is a continuous wrong giving fresh cause of action on every day on which it continues. Of course where the suspension has come to an end, grievance notice in respect of it should be given within three months from the date on which it ceased to exist. In the present case the suspension continued even after the grievance notice was given, therefore, the grievance notice was not time-barred.
4. The other point raised by the learned counsel is that since there is a provision of departmental appeal, the respondent could not bring grievance petition without exhausting the remedy. In this respect the learned counsel for the appellants relies upon paragraph 258 sub-paragraph (9) of the Wage Commission Award of 1975. He has cited PLD 1964 SC 520. Also subparagraph (9) of paragraph 258 of the Wage Commission Award does not say that without exhausting the departmental remedy the workman cannot come to the Labour Court. The authority is not on the point argued by the learned counsel for the appellants. It has been observed in this authority that right to sue occurs on the date of dismissal but where departmental appeal has been preferred, such a right occurs on the date on which the appellate order is passed upholding the order of dismissal. It is apparent that it has not been observed that without exhausting the remedy of departmental appeal, grievance petition cannot be brought.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has said that the employer has by terminating the order of suspension reinstated the respondent and has paid the back wages. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to deny this fact. Since the respondent has been reinstated and wages right from the date of suspension have been paid, there remains no occasion to challenge the order of suspension any longer. I, accordingly, find no force in this appeal and dismiss it.