This appeal arises from the decision, dated 6th May, 1978 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No, 7, Gujranwala, whereby the grievance petition of the respondent was accepted and he was directed to be re-instated in service, allowing him the wages from 20th August, 1977, the date on which he had reported for duty.
2. The respondent originally was godown keeper in the Bank of Bahawalpur and had been transferred to Gakhar when the Bank of Bahawalpur had been amalgamated with the National Bank of Pakistan. On 28th July, 1976 the respondent took four days' leave but did not resume duty and sent an application for leave for one month for the period from 1st August, 1976 to 31st August, 1976. He did not report for duty on the expiry of the leave applied for and made another application for three months leave from 1st September, 1976 to 30th November, 1976. He did not resume duty and asked for further leave for the period from 1st December, 1976 to 31st December, 1976. He did not resume duty even on the expiry of that period and applied for further leave and ultimately reported for duty on 20th August, 1977. The respondent was informed about the rejection of his leave for the period from 1st August, 1976 to 31st August, 1976 and from 1st September, 1976 to 30th November, 1976 vide letters Exhs. P. 8 and P. 9, respectively. These letters are dated 3rd August, 1976 and 5th September, 1976, respectively, but were despatched on 16th March, 1977 to the effect that the leave had been rejected. A publication was made in the daily `Mashriq' on 17th July, 1977 informing the respondent about the rejection of his leave and calling upon him to report for duty within 15 days. But in spite of it, the respondent did not report for duty. Thereafter, the order of termination was passed on 22nd October, 1977 under paragraph 236 of the first Wage Commission Award. The provisions of paragraph 236 are that where an employee absents himself from duty unauthorisedly or fails to report for duty within a period specified in the written notice, requiring him to report for duty on or before the date specified therein, being not less than seven days, he is to be deemed to have left the employment. The other requirement of paragraph 236 is that the notice is to be sent by registered post with AID receipt on the latest address of the incumbent. The publication made in the daily Mashriq', according to the appellant, was in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 236. The learned trial Judge re-instated the respondent for the reason that he had not remained absent without leave but had been sending applications supported by medical certificates, that he was not informed about the rejection of his leave during reasonable period and further that the publication made in the daily Mashriq was not the due compliance of paragraph 236. The reasons given by the lower Court are very sound and cogent. If the Management did not believe the medical certificates, the respondent should have been asked to get himself medically examined from a doctor suggested by the Management, but it was not done.
Without giving opportunity to the respondent to satisfy the Management about his illness, the ground of leave given in the application could not be disbelieved. No doubt, the respondent admitted in his statement that he had read the publication in the daily `Mashriq' but he said that he did not resume duty, because he was still ill. Since he had made applications for leave supported by medical certificates and was not called upon even through the notice published in the daily Mashriq that he should get himself medically examined from a particular doctor, he could not do anything else but to wait till he was recovered and to report for duty after his recovery. If the appellant wanted to take benefit of paragraph 236, then its provisions should have been followed strictly. As mentioned above, the said paragraph provides that the notice to resume duty within a period not less than seven days should be sent by registered post with A/D receipt but the Management contended itself by making a publication in the daily 'Mashriq'. Paragraph 236 applies only where an employee is absent unauthorisedly and has failed to report for duty within the period specified in the notice. Firstly, the absence of the respondent was not unauthorised since he had been sending applications for leave supported by medical certificates and he was never asked to get himself medically examined from a particular doctor and to send medical certificate of the said doctor. The other flaw was that the notice was not sent by registered post AID. Where the law prescribes a mode in which a thing is to be done, it should be done in that mode and not in any other manner. The notice published in the daily Mashriq, therefore, does not amount to compliance with the provisions of paragraph 236.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the respondent was not a workman as he was a godown-keeper. There is no force in this argument. Since Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 is not applicable to banks, the definition given in the said Ordinance is not to be looked into. So far as the definition of workman given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is concerned, obviously a godown-keeper is covered by it, because he does not come within the exceptions (a) and (b). So even if it be said that the respondent was only looking after the godown and was not discharging any clerical duties, still he was covered by the definition of workman. The authorities cited by the learned counsel on the point are not germane to the facts of the present case. 1980 PLC 622 was based upon the definition of workman given in Standing Orders Ordinance, but, as remarked above, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 does not apply in the present case, therefore, the definition given in it is not to be looked into. In the said authority it has been observed that the workers who have been terminated are excluded from the definition of workman as defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. I have already expressed my opinion on the point in National Bank of Pakistan v. Muhammad Haleem Chohan, that the words is employed' occurring in the definition of workman given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 do not mean necessarily that the employee concerned should be in service. Not only in the definition of workman given in the I.R.O.
But in the definition of the term given in the Standing Orders Ordinance also present tense is used.
In the definition of civil servant also given in the Civil Servants Act, present tense is used. If those words are interpreted to mean that only those persons are covered by the definition who are in service, then it would mean that no removed, terminated or dismissed person can go to any Court for re-instatement. This does not appear to be the intention of law. I, therefore, overrule the objection. In 1980 PLC 964 the definition of workman given in Standing Orders Ordinance was involved and thus the authority is not applicable to this case. 1979 PLC 543 is to the effect that the nationalised banks are being run under the authority of the Government and thus Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable, therefore, application under section 25-A is not maintainable. This is true that upon nationalised banks Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable but there appears to be no reason why an application under section 25-A is not maintainable. In the authority cited no reason is given for the non-application of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. If any other law guarantees any right to an employee, who is covered by the definition of workman, given in the I. R.O. He is entitled to seek redress under section 25-A. Again PLD 1978 Lab. 1065 is based upon the provisions of Standing Order 15 (4) but since the Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable to the banks, the authority is distinguishable from the facts of the present case.
4. Lastly the learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the respondent is not entitled to back benefits. The respondent had been sending applications for leave supported by medical certificates and, therefore, there was no fault for remanding out of service. The fault was of the appellant who without any justification terminated his services. In order to discourage the practice of termination without any reasons, back benefits must be allowed, because there appears to be no other mode for discouraging such a practice. The lower Court has allowed back benefits to the respondent from the date he reported for duty. This order is just and proper. There is no force in the appeal, which is dismissed ex parte.