1. ' This accused is charged for causing death of Madad Ali at 3-00 p.m. On 5th December, 1983. The F.I.R. Was lodged about 50 minutes after the incident. As many as four bail applications have been moved on behalf of this accused but all of them have been rejected. I have read the last order, dated 11th of December, 1984 in which it is mentioned that one such application was moved before the High Court as well but it was withdrawn and was dismissed. The learned Sessions Judge while rejecting the last bail application by his order, dated 11th December, 1984 has simply mentioned the number of applications moved on his behalf for securing bail but has not given any reasons for rejecting this bail application. Mr. Ali Murad Abro, learned counsel for the applicant has laid much emphasis on the fact that according to the F.I.R. This accused/applicant using his gun has caused an injury on the right upper arm of the deceased. According to the medical report the injury which proved to be fatal was .Caused by one Ghulam Nabi from his gun. On these premises the legened counsel proceeds to argue that as the fatal injury was not caused by the present applicant he cannot be convicted under section 302, P.P.C. Unless it is shown that he had a common intention to cause death of the deceased alongwith other accused to whom the fatal injuries are attributed. For this contention he relies on two cases reported in 1980 SCMR 784 and PLD 1978 SC 236. I have been granting bail in such matters on the principles laid down in 1980 SCMR 784. Recently a Division Bench of this Court has examined expression "further inquiry" and have given a detailed appreciation and analysis of the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the case reported in 1980 SCMR 784. The learned Chief Justice in his detailed judgment observed that:- "Before words "further inquiry" the subsection states that it should appear to the Court that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence.
2. Unless a Court comes to the conclusion that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence the Court cannot enter into the question of sufficiency of grounds for further inquiry. In fact the question of further inquiry would only arise if the Court first comes to the conclusion that reasonable grounds do not exist for believing that a person has committed a non-bailable offence. On the other hand if the Court comes to the conclusion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has committed the offence there is no question to Court holding a further inquiry into that matter for the purposes of grant or refusal of bail. Taking the other view would be pulpably absurd. In these circumstances the only reasonable conclusion is that the question of a case requiring further inquiry can come up for consideration only if the Court is of the view that reasonable grounds do not exist for believing that the accused has committed an offence.
3. ' The use of the words reasonable grounds for believing repetitively in subsections (1) and (2) of section 497, Cr.P.0 is a further indication that the paramount criterion governing the grant or refusal of bail is the existence of reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed an offence. If such enquiry is undertaken by the Court in the first instance and an affirmative finding is given by the Court to the effect that reasonable grounds do exist for believing the accused to be guilty the second inquiry contemplated by the words "further inquiry" in subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C. Would be meaningless and almost an exercise in futility for if on the one hand the Court comes to the conclusion that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or ten years there is no question of holding any "further inquiry".
4. ' The next question that arises is as to the material on which the Court can arrive at a conclusion that reasonable groiinds exist for believing that the accused has committed such an offence. In that context the material is what would be available on the judicial record and in the police papers if also available, and what emerges from section 164, 'Cr.P.C. Statements recorded at pre-trial stage. It is duty of the Court to examine these documents and if on a perusal of these documents a conclusion could be reached that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with the serious sentences provided in law it is the bounded duty of the Court to refuse bail. On the other hand if all the material as is stated fails to convince the mind of the Judge that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty of an offence punishable with these sentences he would be justified in granting bail."
5. ' With this guideline provided by the D.B. In the unreported judgment passed in Criminal suo motu Reference No, 20 of 1983 I proceed to examine the case on its merits. Leaving aside all other considerations for the present the broad facts which emerge out of the F.I.R. Are contained in last but one para. Of the F.I.R.:- "About 22/23 months prior to this incident Muhammad Sadiq the father of accused Mukhtiar was murdered and in that case my brother Madad Ali was challaned and was on bail and the case is still pending in the Court of Sessions."
6. This paragraph speaks louder than the case law produced by the learned counsel. This gives an idea that prima facie the motive for this crime was provided on account of murder of Muhammad Sadik the father of the present applicant. Primarily it is he who seems to have planned this murder.
7. All others are his accomplice with no motives. In this context it is difficult to judge his case only on the limited fact of the nature of the injuries caused by him absolving him from everything else that happened causing the death of Madad Ali. It is not proper to analyse the evidence at this stage but in view of the allegation in the F.I.R., it is difficult to agree with the learned counsel that this applicant should be released on bail merely because the bullet which he fired struck the right upper arm and this injury did not prove to be fatal.It is not the marksmanship of the accused but the intention that he carries in his mind at the time of committing an offence for which he should be aocountable. I would, therefore, reject the bail application of this applicant.